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I. Executive Summary 
1. Sri Lanka is in many respects a development success story. With economic growth averaging 
more than 7 percent a year over the past five years on top of an average growth of 6 percent the preceding 
five years, Sri Lanka has made notable strides towards the goals of ending extreme poverty and promoting 
shared prosperity (the “twin goals”). The national poverty headcount rate declined from 22.7 to 6.7 percent 
between 2002 and 2012/13, while consumption per capita of the bottom 40 percent grew at 3.3 percent a 
year, compared to 2.8 percent for the total population. Other human development indicators are also 
impressive by regional and lower middle-income standards. Sri Lanka has also succeeded in ending decades 
of internal conflict in 2009 and steps have been taken towards reconciliation.  
 
2. Increases in labor incomes account for most of the reduction in poverty over the last 10 years. 
Between 2002 and 2012/13, most of the reduction in poverty was due to increased earnings, as opposed to 
higher employment or higher transfers. Although it is hard to be certain, increases in earnings are associated 
with: (i) a slow structural transformation away from agriculture and into industry and services that led to 
productivity increases; (ii) agglomeration around key urban areas that supported this structural 
transformation; (iii) domestic-driven growth, including public-sector investment that led to increases in 
labor demand, particularly in industry and services; and (iv) a commodity boom that led to higher labor 
earnings for agricultural workers in the context of lower agricultural employment.   
 
3. However, important challenges lie ahead that may hinder further progress on poverty 
reduction and shared prosperity. Despite the low levels of extreme poverty, roughly one quarter of Sri 
Lankans are nearly poor, as defined by living above the official poverty line (equivalent to about $1.50 per 
day in 2005 PPP terms) but below $2.50 per day in 2005 PPP terms. The living standards of the near poor 
are closer to those of the poor than those living above $2.50 per day. Moreover, Sri Lanka’s aspirations as 
a middle-income country (MIC) will differ from those of a successfully developing low-income country 
emerging out of conflict. Although Sri Lanka has excelled in overcoming human development challenges 
typical of a low-income country, its service delivery systems in education, health, and other areas must now 
adjust to face new and changing demands typical of a MIC.  Imperatives to improve social protection 
programs will increase owing to an aging population that has passed its demographic peak.  Finally, given 
increasing affluence and information, there will be higher expectations of the state to perform in order to 
facilitate growth, provide higher level of services, and demonstrate increasing responsiveness to a more 
demanding citizenry. 
  
4. The country is at an important economic and political crossroads as it faces these challenges.  
Sri Lanka’s real GDP grew by 43 percent from 2009 to 2014, with the top four sectors (accounting for half 
of total growth) being all non-tradable sectors: construction, transport, domestic trade and banking, 
insurance and real estate.  A substantial portion of this growth was driven by public investment to rebuild 
after the end of its 30-year internal conflict in 2009.  These sectors, as well as the economic boost at the 
end of the conflict, are not likely to be sustainable sources of growth in the long run.  In addition to the need 
to foster new sources of growth, Sri Lanka is in the process of major governance reforms following the 
election of a new government in early 2015.  The Constitution has been amended to overhaul the structure 
of government by reducing the power of the presidency and providing for more internal checks and 
accountability mechanisms.  There is also now a constitutional guarantee of citizens’ right to information. 
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At the same time, while reforms to promote transparency and accountability in government should lead to 
better performance, a political settlement around the new governance structure will need to emerge.       
 
5. Bearing in mind the challenges to Sri Lanka’s further development, this diagnostic consists 
of a systematic and detailed review of potential factors impacting progress on the twin goals.  In line 
with the World Bank Group’s new approach to working with country partners (Box 1.1), this report aims 
to identify the most critical constraints and opportunities to advancing achievement of the twin goals. In 
order to organize and discipline the analysis, the report uses a framework that combines the Hausman, 
Rodrik and Velasco (2005) growth diagnostic and the Bussolo and Lopez-Calva (2014) asset-based 
approach to identify a universe of 22 potential areas that may constrain or drive progress towards the twin 
goals.  Sri Lanka’s performance in each area was assessed for its relative impact on achieving the twin 
goals.  This systematic analysis was then presented in set of consultations with multiple stakeholders, 
including government, academia, think tanks, the private sector, civil society organizations, and 
international organizations to validate the findings, determine the relative importance of issues identified 
in each of the 22 areas and identify knowledge gaps.  These findings were weighted against criteria of: (i) 
the potential impact on ending poverty and on promoting shared prosperity; (ii) the degree to which 
addressing these constraints would have complementarities across different domains; (iii) the strength of 
the evidence base behind the impact; (iv) the time horizon of impacts; and (v) whether addressing the 
constraint is a precondition to unlocking wider potential. This process yielded consensus that the key 
priorities for sustaining progress in ending poverty and promoting shared prosperity are to address the 
country’s fiscal, competitiveness and inclusion challenges, as well as cross-cutting governance and 
sustainability challenges. 
 
The Fiscal Challenge 
6. Low and declining revenues critically impact Sri Lanka’s fiscal position. Sri Lanka now has 
one of the lowest tax revenue-to-GDP ratios in the world, reflecting a decline from 24.2 percent in 1978 to 
10.7 percent in 2014. The major causes of this decline are the low increase in the number of taxpayers, 
reductions in statutory rates without commensurate efforts to expand the tax base, inefficiencies in 
administration and numerous exemptions. In particular, since the introduction of a value added tax (VAT) 
in 2002, successive changes in the tax regime have led to over 500 types of exemptions for a wide variety 
of goods.  There are also over 40 broad types of exemptions on corporate and personal income tax 
depending on the source of income and the type of taxpayer. Administration is complicated by lack of 
Box 1.1 
The Systematic Country Diagnostic: 
A New World Bank Group Tool for Country Engagement 
 
Under its new approach to working with its country partners, the World Bank Group (WBG) requires 
the preparation of a Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD) to precede the development of Country 
Partnership Frameworks that guide programming. The objective of an SCD is to identify the most 
critical constraints and opportunities facing a country in accelerating progress toward the goals of 
ending extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in a sustainable manner.  The SCD is expected 
to produce an objective, evidence-based, candid assessment of the main challenges facing the country, 
without limitation to the areas where the WBG is currently engaged.   
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coordination among entities collecting revenue as well as the Board of Investment, which provides 
incentives. No tax expenditure analysis is conducted before or after the introduction of incentives. 
 
7. Low tax revenues combined with an expenditure profile that is largely non-discretionary has 
led to a lean, rigid budget with little room for critical development spending.  Sri Lanka’s overall 
revenues and expenditures are among the lowest in the region. Fiscal consolidation and relative 
prioritization of public investment in capital infrastructure following the conflict have squeezed spending 
on other public goods, including health, education and social protection, which are currently below levels 
in other regional and emerging market comparators. Fiscal consolidation combined with declining revenues 
has made the budget rigid, leaving little fiscal space for the government to maneuver.  Difficult-to-reduce 
items, such as public service remuneration, transfers, and interest payments, have accounted for 60 percent 
of expenditure in recent years. Moreover, wage pressures have been rising due to a 57 percent increase in 
the numbers of public servants in the past 10 years. This has yielded a situation where public servants 
account for 13 percent of the labor force, comparable to the OECD average of 15 percent in 2011. At the 
same time, increases in recurrent expenditures in early 2015, particularly a raise in allowances to public 
servants, is to be financed by one-time taxes, leaving very little room to maneuver. A strong commitment 
to fiscal consolidation in the face of these pressures has led to Sri Lanka having extremely low levels of 
public spending on education, health, and social protection as a percentage of GDP. Going forward, 
continued commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical to ensure macroeconomic stability, but this will 
require long-term improvements in revenues. 
 
The Challenge of Promoting More and Better Jobs for the Bottom 40 Percent 
8. Sri Lanka has a number of advantages that can contribute to inclusive growth. Given its 
relatively small domestic market, Sri Lanka will need to look outward to fulfill its ambitions to become a 
prosperous and competitive middle-income country. As such, the country has important strengths, such as 
overall strong human capital and a reliable infrastructure base, particularly when compared to other South 
Asian countries. Sri Lanka also enjoys an enviable location in a fast-growing region along a major trade 
route, opening opportunities to serve as a regional trading hub. Moreover, Sri Lanka’s boasts unique natural 
assets, with a temperate climate, diverse topography, and unique historical assets, giving it a strong basis 
for tourism. At the same time, the country has a track record of developing globally competitive companies, 
particularly in niches of the apparel and information technology (IT) sectors. 
 
9. To capitalize on its advantages Sri Lanka will need to find an effective balance along two 
axes: (i) inward vs. outward orientation of the economy; and (ii) the respective roles of the public and 
private sectors (Figure 1.1).  The country’s world market share has fallen to levels last seen in the 1980s, 
with a steady decline in commodity exports and an export basket that has remained largely unchanged in a 
context of rising production costs and weakening demand due to slow growth in some of its main markets 
(Europe and the Middle East). At the same time, the economy has shifted towards a public-sector led model, 
as public investment to rebuild following the end of conflict was responsible for much of the large growth 
in construction as well as transport over the last decade.   
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Figure 1.1 Sri Lanka. Rebalancing the Focus of the Economy, 1965-2013. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. All data refer to Sri Lanka 
 
Inward versus Outward Orientation of the Economy 
10. While Sri Lanka’s industrial policy has been broadly market-oriented since liberalization in 
the 1970s, the degree of outward orientation has wavered in the past decade. Two earlier rounds of 
economic liberalization introduced a series of reforms towards deregulating the economy, accompanied by 
a strong focus on export orientation and FDI promotion. The last decade has seen a noticeable shift towards 
protectionism. The introduction of para-tariffs has effectively doubled the protection rates, making the 
present import regime one of the most complex and protectionist in the world. Moreover the para-tariffs’ 
dispersion leads to prices that distort production and consumption patterns. Higher rates of protection on 
final products than on inputs used in their production lead to an anti-export bias, since producers have strong 
incentive to sell goods domestically even though their domestic costs are higher than their opportunity costs 
through trade. This is particularly worrying for the agricultural sector, where high protection of import-
competing crops along with fertilizer subsidies have created strong disincentives for crop and export 
diversification. Incentives are structured to expand production of import-competing crops (rice, maize) and 
discourage the production of exportables through the introduction of high export taxes (‘cesses’) on raw 
materials such as tea, rubber, cinnamon, coconut and spices, with the notion that this would increase value 
addition of exports. Revenues from cesses were supposed to be then invested in research and development 
for the corresponding sectors to encourage value addition, yet this has not been implemented.  
 
11. Foreign direct investment (FDI), a foundation for economic diversification, has been 
disappointing despite numerous fiscal incentives. FDI remains below 2 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) five years after the end of armed conflict, relative to much higher levels of FDI in other MICs such 
as Vietnam or Cambodia. While FDI can enhance access of producers to global production networks and 
facilitate the development of new activities within existing value chains, FDI inflows to Sri Lanka have 
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been largely focused on infrastructure (inclusive of real estate development), with a relatively small 
proportion reaching sectors of the economy that are associated with global networks of production. 
Although conclusive data is not available, the benefits from incentives in terms of attraction and retention 
of productivity-enhancing FDI may not outweigh the costs involved in fiscal losses and potential disruption 
of market dynamics (through, among other things, the creation of an unleveled playing field).  Global 
experience suggests that the most important ways to ensure both domestic and foreign investment include 
measures to improve the enabling environment, including through a skilled workforce and adequate 
innovation policies that form the basis of a competitive economy. 
 
12. Despite past achievements, the quality of general education lags behind higher middle-income 
countries and firms have difficulty accessing the skills they need. Although human development 
indicators are ahead of regional peers, the quality of education, as measured by periodic internationally 
comparable tests, lags behind that of higher middle-income countries, particularly in language and 
numeracy skills. Sri Lanka also lacks the kind of vocational and technical skills in its workforce that are 
increasingly in demand, reflecting constraints on the quality and relevance of higher education and research.  
For instance, over 75 percent of employers expect a high-skilled worker to know English and have computer 
skills, but only 20 percent of Sri Lankans are fluent in English and only 15 percent can use computers. More 
generally, there are poor linkages between what the private sector needs in order to innovate and research 
and development institutions that could meet these needs.  This is particularly acute in agriculture where 
there is limited distribution of new technologies critical for modern farming.   
The Relationship between the Public Sector and Private Sector  
13. The government’s performance as regulator and facilitator of economic activity has 
improved in recent years, though significant shortcomings remain. Given fiscal constraints, sustained 
growth will need to be driven by the private sector, which, in turn, calls for government regulation 
conducive to business.  Among areas of regulation, systems for registration of property rights and land-use 
regimes that introduce limitations and lead to fragmentation of land parcels are an important constraint to 
businesses. Land ownership issues are the most common reason cited by informal firms for not registering. 
Moreover, the predictability of state regulation with regard to property rights has proven to be an issue, 
with particular harm caused by the “Revival of Underperforming Enterprises and Underutilized Assets 
Act”, which expropriated 37 enterprises, in sectors like hotels, mixed-property development and the sugar 
industry.  Licenses and permits are also an obstacle, particularly in the Northern Province.  Finally, policy-
induced barriers consisting of regulatory and institutional bottlenecks account for nearly 70 percent of the 
total time spent on exporting or importing goods.  
14. Similarly, labor market regulations appear to be constraining the growth of employment. 
Although labor market regulations aim to provide job security to formal sector workers, since these 
represent only about 15 percent of the workforce, they have resulted in creating a deep divide between 
formal and informal workers.  Sri Lanka's Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) requires 
that firms with 15 or more employees justify layoffs and provide generous severance pay to displaced 
workers, with smaller firms being exempted. These severance payments are expensive relative to regional 
and middle-income peers. Finally, the legal framework prevents women from taking up night work or part-
time work in the growing service sector while the laws governing maternity benefits make employers bear 
the entire cost, potentially deterring employers from hiring women.  
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15. Regulatory compliance burdens prompt entrepreneurs to operate informally, which 
undermines competition. Most business establishments in Sri Lanka are small and hence do not benefit 
from economies of scale. Moreover, side-by-side operations of informal and formal firms in a market lead 
to unfair practices and market inefficiencies. Unfair competition from informal players is viewed as the 
single most important obstacle to the growth and competitiveness of established firms. At the same time, 
informal firms generally have no access to financial services, government contracts, and essential licenses 
and permits. 
  
16. Although successive policy regimes have introduced numerous programs aimed at supporting 
the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector, firms in this sector face multiple constraints, 
particularly access to finance and technology.  Financing issues are driven by weaknesses of the firms 
to put forward bankable projects as well as failures in SME banking which relies on asset-based financing 
with little flexibility to provide project-based finance. SMEs also find it difficult to access technology to 
upgrade their businesses. Reducing the cost of operating a business along with stronger enforcement can 
help to reduce informality, reduce uncompetitive practices, and, by extension, create an environment more 
conducive to investment in productivity-enhancing activities.  
 
17. The proliferation of small firms and informal employment has important consequences for 
the ability of the bottom 40 percent to share in the growth process. Most of the increase in non-
agricultural employment between 2002 and 2012 was among self-employed non-farm workers. Moreover, 
the decline in agricultural employment coincided with an increase in workers employed in establishments 
with no regular employees. By 2012, 74 percent of unskilled workers (those with less than a primary 
education) had only temporary or casual wage employment, up from 70 percent in 2006, suggesting that 
these workers are increasingly working under precarious conditions. Wages of temporary workers are on 
average 33 percent lower than wages of permanent workers; one-third of which cannot be explained by 
differences in the job or individual characteristics, suggesting that workers would choose more stable 
reliable jobs if they could. 
18. Beyond carrying out regulatory functions, the state itself is a major participant in the market 
through its large State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) sector and public service, which in turn has 
impacted competitiveness in a number of sectors and labor market dynamics.  SOEs have a significant 
market share in many sectors, including areas where there is not a strong apparent rationale for public 
intervention.  This is most striking in the finance sector, where major SOEs make up close to half of the 
market.  At the same time, there is a weak framework for public-private partnerships and relatively few 
cases of PPPs; infrastructure development over the past 10 years has been driven by direct public spending.  
Finally, the state plays an outsized role as an employer. There is strong demand for public-sector jobs as 
public-sector workers enjoy the advantages of formal employment and other benefits such as a pension.  
Moreover, the evidence suggests that there is a salary premium for public-sector workers and that this 
premium has grown between 2006 and 2012. Workers, particularly educated women, are queuing for 
public-sector employment.  
 
19. Finally, there has been a high degree of interconnectedness between the state and some 
segments of the private sector that motivates intervention by the government.   The variation in tax 
and customs incentives reflects government policy but also contains specific benefits for specific sectors, 
many of which have a limited number of major actors.  In addition, there are several high-profile cases of 
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movement of senior officials between public and private sectors as there is no developed framework for 
handling conflict of interest to separate public-sector work from private-sector interests. Given that there 
are frequent instances of state regulatory help to a given sector it follows that private-sector entities would 
seek to maintain or expand privileges, reinforcing the level of regulatory intervention into the economy.  
These circumstances also suggest that many private-sector entities would have to adjust considerably were 
Sri Lanka to open its markets to a greater extent. Changing the state’s role as an employer, market actor 
and regulator to provide for a more level playing field will encounter resistance from vested interests. 
Social Inclusion Challenges 
20. The highest numbers of people living in poverty and the bottom 40 percent are located within 
multi-city agglomeration areas. Urbanization in Sri Lanka has been a strong driver of growth and that 
trend will continue.  Streamlining urban management structures and improving their capacity to ensure they 
have the administrative powers to deliver functional urban services and conduct integrated, strategic 
planning (including land use planning and transport planning) will provide local authorities with the 
opportunity to respond to both present and future needs. Improved connectivity across the country will 
further assist in raising the economic potential located outside the Kandy-Colombo-Galle agglomeration, 
as well as improving growth drivers within those districts. Further analysis on the constraints to 
participation of the bottom 40 percent in further agglomeration and spreading economic activity will be 
important for assessing what is needed to have urbanization facilitate inclusion.  
 
21. The poor in more isolated regions of the country represent a different challenge.  There are 
high rates of poverty in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, the center where the estate sector (plantation-
based agriculture) is concentrated, and Moneragala in the southeast. Poverty rates are highest in portions of 
the Northern and Eastern provinces, which were most affected by the internal conflict. The high poverty 
headcount rates in these regions are associated with weak links to the labor market, particularly among the 
youth and educated women. People with physical disabilities and psychological problems due to conflict, 
in particular ex-combatants and widows, are particularly vulnerable to exclusion. 
 
22. Poverty measured by consumption has dropped significantly among estate workers, but non-
monetary measures of poverty and vulnerability remain high. Estate workers continue to be largely 
dependent on the estate’s management for many basic needs, particularly housing. While poverty in the 
estate sector fell markedly in the past decade, poverty rates continue to be higher compared to both urban 
and rural sectors, pointing to continued vulnerability.  This is particularly evident when looking at health 
and nutrition indicators.  Estates have the highest maternal mortality rates in the country, and both estate 
women as well as children suffer from high rates of malnutrition that are double national averages. Estate-
sector households are less likely to have drinking water, sanitary facilities or electricity within their 
households. Moreover, access to services and the quality of services in the estates is comparatively low. 
Poor outcomes in education impede the ability of the estate population to participate in Sri Lankan society. 
The youth are increasingly leaving the estate sector but they face difficulties in accessing salaried 
employment when competing with other youth. Women tend to be employed for the lowest-paying 
unskilled tasks that require intense labor, such as tea plucking or rubber tapping. Despite being income 
earners, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that the wages of estate women are often collected by their 
husbands or fathers who often spend it on alcohol. Alcoholism and associated abuse of women is much 
higher in the estate sector. 
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23. The estate sector faces structural challenges that will likely impact the population going 
forward.  Wages have risen by over 10 times since privatization in 1992 – due in part to the strong collective 
bargaining power of estate workers, linked to a powerful political party representing them. At the same 
time, Sri Lankan tea producers are facing increasing competition from Kenyan and Indian producers who 
have lower costs of production and higher productivity. As a result, the future welfare of estate communities 
is at risk due to narrowing surpluses enjoyed by Regional Plantation Companies (RPCs) and a socio-
economic structure that may not be tenable over the long term.  
 
24. Beyond the locational concentration of the population, inclusion across ethnic and religious 
groups is critical. Although partially correlated to spatial disparities, poverty outcomes across ethnicity 
and religion illustrate a second important challenge for social inclusion. Differences in poverty outcomes 
across ethnic groups are related to employment and other opportunities.  This is the case even when the 
North and East are excluded. As more youth migrate across the country in search of jobs, equal 
opportunities will be critical. Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Moors have relatively high levels of 
poverty, as detailed in Chapter V; however, empirical analysis finds that most of the difference in monetary 
poverty is related to inequality of opportunities. For a range of indicators, the most recent household survey 
shows that Sri Lankan Tamil households have lower access to basic services, including drinking water 
within their premises, the availability of a pipe-borne line nearby their house, a toilet within their unit and 
access to electricity. Similarly, educational attainment is lower for the ethnic minority workforce, and rates 
of ownership of land are also uneven among the country’s ethnic communities. In terms of labor market 
opportunities, labor force participation is low and unemployment is high for Sri Lankan Tamils and Moors. 
However, when focusing outside of the post-conflict regions, both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils have 
higher labor force participation and employment rates relative to their Sinhalese counterparts. This suggests 
that different rates of participation are mostly determined by differences in employment opportunities. The 
conflict-affected areas face the additional challenge of integrating displaced persons: while over 700,000 
have returned, they face multiple challenges in securing land rights, accessing shelter and infrastructure, 
and developing livelihoods.   
 
25. Finally, gender inclusion is critical, particularly as it relates to the labor market. Women made 
up 53 percent of the working age population in 2012, but only 34 percent of the employed population, a 
figure that has remained static for decades. Women are less likely to participate in the labor market, but 
when they decide to look for work, they are more likely to be unemployed. Social norms related to a 
woman’s role in the household and especially as related to childcare responsibilities restrict women’s 
opportunity to participate in the labor market. However, beyond social norms, gender wage gaps and 
occupational segregation dissuade and constrain women from participating in the labor force. At the same 
time, the formal legal framework for labor prevents women from taking up night work or part-time work 
in the growing service sector, and the laws governing maternity benefits make employers bear the entire 
cost, potentially deterring employers from hiring women. 
The Cross-Cutting Governance Challenge  
26. The governance challenge manifests itself in many ways which taken together constitute the 
fundamental constraint on progress on the twin goals.  Governance issues are cross cutting and underlie 
in many important ways the three challenges outlined above.  Governance is obviously central to the quality 
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and probity of public expenditure as well as the government’s capacity to provide for equality of opportunity 
for the poor and bottom 40 percent to improve their welfare.  Moreover, the quality of governance is integral 
to addressing corruption concerns and sustaining public trust. It is also integral to revenue performance, 
particularly the effectiveness of tax and customs administration.  The most prominent manner in which 
governance acts as a constraint is in how the state carries out regulatory functions for the economy.  Policies 
that orient the economy inward, such as the convoluted tax system, restrictive land and labor market 
regulation, and inefficient subsidies – and the related quality of administration thereof – reflect areas where 
governance is a critical constraint.  This burden of government regulation has led to a large informal sector, 
which negatively impacts improvements in productivity.  Governance weaknesses have further led to 
significant expansion of the public sector’s role in the labor market and certain economic sectors.  This 
expanded role in the economy contributes little to effective use of the country’s resources or productivity 
gains, whether it is interventions in agriculture, multiplying tax incentives, or absorbing a significant portion 
of the labor force.  Finally, ensuring the provision of key public goods such as infrastructure and public 
services is a core function of government; the extent to which there is inequality in access to such goods 
reflects areas where strengthened governance is warranted. 
Sustainability Challenges 
27. Sustainability of Sri Lanka’s development will involve keeping momentum towards 
reconciliation and successful completion of institutional reforms.  Achieving a lasting settlement of 
conflict that ensures peace and security for Sri Lankans is the sine qua non condition for progress.  While 
circumstances are unique to every country and conflict is not imminent, global experience suggests that Sri 
Lanka is “at risk” given its history of internal conflict.  Achieving lasting reconciliation and addressing 
issues, which led to grievances that in turn fueled conflict in the past, will be critical.  Sri Lanka has taken 
notable steps along this path, including following up on extensive recommendations by its Commission of 
Inquiry on Lessons Learned and Reconciliation (LLRC).  Important measures have occurred in recent 
months, including the appointment of a civilian as governor in the north and beginning to return some land 
occupied by the military after the conflict ended.   This momentum will need to be sustained.  Sri Lanka 
will also need to follow through on major institutional reforms now taking place to achieve a lasting political 
settlement around a government that is more transparent and accountable. 
 
28. Other risks to sustainability are associated with economic stability in the context of an 
uncertain external environment and environmental issues. External risks include a chronic current 
account deficit and relatively low reserve adequacy metrics; a gradual but steady decline in goods exports; 
an already high external debt burden and a rising cost for external financing as Sri Lanka must now borrow 
on commercial terms; and disappointing levels of foreign direct investment. While the current account 
deficit has decreased in recent years, in part thanks to slow increases in remittances and tourism, it remains 
financed largely by debt-creating inflows. At the same time, Central Bank foreign exchange reserves are at 
the lower end of what is considered adequate by standard metrics. Moreover, Sri Lanka is in the midst of 
its demographic transition, and is projected to age fast in the next few decades. As the elderly typically run 
down their savings and require additional public spending in the form of pensions, social protection and 
healthcare, their increasing share in the population means that national savings will fall even further. 
Finally, preserving Sri Lanka’s natural asset base and managing environmental impact as the country 
continues its structural transformation, including urbanization, will be critical to sustaining progress on the 
twin goals. Sri Lanka will continue to face environmental risks due to natural disasters as well as the long-
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term impacts of climate change, which by one accounting will result in reductions of 1.2 percent of GDP 
per year by 2050.  
Conclusions  
29. Sri Lanka’s has had impressive development gains but there are strong indications that 
drivers of past progress are not sustainable.  Solid economic growth, strong poverty reduction, 
overcoming internal conflict, effecting a remarkable democratic transition in recent months, and overall 
strong human development outcomes are a track record that would make any country proud.  However, the 
country’s inward looking growth model based on non-tradable sectors and domestic demand amplified by 
public investment cannot be expected to lead to sustained inclusive growth going forward. 
 
30. A systematic diagnostic points to fiscal, competitiveness, and inclusion challenges as well as 
cross-cutting governance and sustainability challenges as priority areas of focus for sustaining 
progress in ending poverty and promoting shared prosperity (Table 1.1).  The fiscal challenge is due 
above all to poor revenue collection, compounded by inefficiencies in public expenditures that result in 
rigidity and underinvestment in human capital.  The competitiveness challenge is a mix of several areas 
where Sri Lanka is behind comparator countries, most notably in fostering adequate skills in the labor force, 
but also in other areas such as FDI attraction, investment climate, and promotion of innovation.  The 
inclusion challenge is both spatial in the urban areas and remote “pockets of poverty” as well as cross 
cutting across ethnic, gender and age differences in Sri Lanka’s population.  Governance is a challenge in 
all areas, but is particularly manifested in regulatory constraints and an outsized public sector.  Finally, 
there are important sustainability risks, including the need to: maintain peace and security; carry through 
with governance reforms; address longer-term economic challenges of an aging population; and balance 
imperatives to grow with stewardship of Sri Lanka’s natural assets as a basis for lasting prosperity and 
quality of life. 
 
31. There are particularly important areas of synergy that provide for progress on inclusion, 
sustainability and growth. For instance, effective governance of cities will not only be critical for 
addressing spatial inclusion challenges, but could also improve the benefits of urban agglomeration and 
raise the level of overall growth and job-creation. Good governance in urbanizing areas is also important to 
balance social, environmental, and economic equity concerns to allow for Sri Lanka to benefit long term 
from its relatively unharmed natural asset base. Similarly, improving equality of opportunity (including 
addressing land claims) across ethnic groups is likely to be crucial for improving social stability and 
sustainability of peace. Moreover, closing gender gaps is not only important in terms of social inclusion, 
but is also critical in terms of the broader challenge of raising competitiveness and ensuring shared 
prosperity, particularly given that an aging population will increase the dependency rate.   
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Table 1.1 Sri Lanka. Priorities to end poverty and promote shared prosperity in a sustainable way 
 
Priorities Key Criteria Met 
FISCAL  
Fiscal sustainability a key precondition for progress in all 
areas, including macroeconomic stability. Greater fiscal 
space allows for addressing equality of opportunity 
through increased social spending, especially important 
for inclusion. Efficiency of social protection has direct 
impact on ending poverty. Evidence base is strong. 
Reform the tax regime and improve tax administration 
to improve revenue performance 
Improve the adequacy and effectiveness of spending 
Improve the amount of financing and efficiency of 
social protection 
COMPETITIVENESS  
Review and revise the country’s trade-related policies  Trade and adoption of new technologies promote 
diversification, external sustainability, and growth, which 
translates to good jobs. Overcoming skills mismatches 
contributes to growth and participation of the bottom 40 
percent, including minorities and women. Evidence base 
is strong for skills and trade policy issues. 
Provide more resources and quality-enhancing 
management in the education sector to expand skilled 
workforce and overcome skills mismatch 
Promote innovation by establishing linkages between 
R&D institutions and networks of entrepreneurs 
INCLUSION  
Proper urban management and effective governance 
of cities to address locational concentrations of 
poverty 
Urbanizing areas are associated with growth and absolute 
majority of poor are proximate to these areas. Ensuring 
continued benefits of agglomeration will help progress for 
the majority of the poor. For those living in more remote 
areas, more targeted interventions will be needed to ensure 
equality of opportunity through improved service delivery 
and greater participation in the labor force. Evidence base 
is very strong. 
Multi-sector interventions to reduce poverty and 
promote employment opportunities in areas with the 
highest poverty rates (North, East, Moneragala, and 
Estates) 
Improve equality of opportunity across ethnic groups, 
regardless of where they reside 
Increase labor force participation of women and 
ensure equal opportunity in access to jobs, political 
and private sector leadership 
GOVERNANCE  
Governance has cross-cutting impact on all other 
challenges. In particular, labor, land, and other regulation 
create major distortions in the economy. The size of the 
public sector leads to inefficient use of public resources 
and distorts labor markets. The ability of government to 
carry out core functions depends on effectiveness of the 
public sector. Evidence base is strong. 
Improve the regulatory environment to allow firms to 
grow and enhance overall productivity in the economy 
Review the regulatory role and participation of the 
public sector in the economy 
Improve the efficiency of the public sector 
SUSTAINABILITY  
Sustain peace and security through long-term 
reconciliation efforts 
Peace is sine qua non for continued investment, growth, 
and personal well-being of large segment of the 
population. Sustaining the state's institutional capability 
over the long term is integral competent facilitation of 
private-sector-led growth. Macro-economic and 
environmental sustainability are preconditions for 
continued progress as well as capitalizing on the country's 
asset base. Evidence of associated risks is strong. 
Develop a more accountable and effective state 
Place heavier emphasis on direct investment and 
equity portfolio flows than debt  
Preserve natural assets and address the impact of 
climate change 
Address the long-term fiscal sustainability concerns 
related to population aging 
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32. There is a particularly strong nexus of issues around providing for skills development that 
meets the needs of Sri Lanka’s economy.  On one hand, there are important elements of state performance 
needed to improve the population’s skills mix: its ability to create more fiscal space to provide quality 
education to the population, the efficiency of resources directed towards human capital development, its 
ability to listen to and partner with the private sector on ensuring that the right skills are being provided, 
and the impact that it has on the labor market given its outsized role as an employer.  At the same time, 
investment in skills, particularly with public financing, is integral to equipping the bottom 40 percent with 
capacity to get good jobs, a fundamental means of boosting shared prosperity. A more skilled labor force 
in turn helps Sri Lanka become more competitive, including within global value chains, as well as a more 
attractive destination for FDI.   
 
33. Addressing the constraints and sustainability risks diagnosed in this report will require 
effective leadership.  Consultations conducted while preparing this diagnostic showed that many of the 
identified constraints were known, at least on an intuitive level.  Indeed, with regard to several constraints, 
reforms or government intervention has been initiated to address problems such as equality of opportunity 
in underserved areas or improving Sri Lankans’ skill sets.  The present government has articulated further 
plans to address other constraints outlined in this diagnostic.  Yet there also remain interests that support 
the status quo, whether they are specific tax exemptions or limitations on the number of slots available in 
higher education institutions.  Sri Lanka is at a crossroads in its economic growth model and its governance 
framework that will provide for an effective state to facilitate growth and ensure social inclusion.  Effective 
leadership will be needed to steer it forward on a path that will continue its strong progress in ending poverty 
and promoting shared prosperity. 
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II. Country Context 
 
34. Sri Lanka is in many respects a development success story. With economic growth averaging 
over 7 percent a year over the past five years on top of an average growth of 6 percent the preceding five 
years, Sri Lanka has made notable strides in reducing poverty and promoting shared prosperity. The national 
poverty headcount ratio declined from 22.7 to 6.7 percent between 2002 and 2012/13, with most of the 
reduction occurring in the early part of the past decade. Growth has been pro-poor for most of the past 
decade, with consumption per capita of the bottom 40 percent growing at 3.3 percent a year, compared to 
2.8 percent for the total population. Other human development indicators are also impressive by regional 
and lower middle-income standards. Sri Lanka outperforms nearby country comparators on most 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), particularly with regard to poverty reduction, health, and 
environmental sustainability.  Coverage for primary school is near universal, while secondary and tertiary 
enrollment has substantially increased. Maternal and infant mortality rates are now at very low levels, and 
life expectancy, at 74 years, has been above its regional peers for over a decade. (See Appendix 1.1 for 
review of Sri Lanka’s performance on MDGs.) 
A. Political and Social Context  
35. The country’s achievements are impressive given the complex relationships among its 
communities that have led to conflict in the past. Sri Lanka is home to ethnic majority Sinhala; Sri 
Lankan Tamils, of whom many are concentrated in the north and east; Moors (Muslims) concentrated in 
the east, northwest, coastal areas of the south, and urban areas; Indian origin Tamils concentrated in the 
highlands and estate sector; and other less numerous ethnic groups including Malays and Burghers.  Urban 
populations, particularly the capital Colombo, have diverse ethnic composition.  Providing for social 
inclusion and peaceful co-existence and interaction among communities has been a persistent challenge, 
with inter-communal grievances leading to several outbursts of violence before and after independence in 
1948.  These tensions were a driving force contributing to the emergence in the late 1970s of armed Tamil 
militant formations, which in turn came to be dominated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  
A four-phased war between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state spanning 26 years ended with the military 
defeat of the LTTE and deaths of most its leaders in May 2009. Taken together with youth insurrections 
that led to conflict in the 1970s and 1980s1, direct and indirect costs of conflict through additional 
expenditures, losses in physical and human capital, and foregone investment have been estimated to be 
equivalent to over 5 percent of GDP per year during the period 1978-2005.2 This calculation of economic 
costs does not include the impact of loss of life and other physical and psychological trauma.    
 
36. The end of the conflict has led to much greater security for Sri Lankans and an opportunity 
to achieve lasting reconciliation. There is no longer the pervasive threat of violence that had long impacted 
development.  The state controls law and order across the island, resulting in improvements in overall 
security.  Security in turn provides for higher quality of life and stimulates economic activity at many levels. 
At the same time, the major political parties associated with the Tamil population work within Sri Lanka’s 
institutional framework at provincial and national levels while continuing to articulate their community’s 
                                                          
1 In addition to conflict involving Sri Lankan Tamils, there were two insurrections of leftist political groups composed 
of mostly Sinhalese against the Sri Lankan state in 1971 and 1987-89. There was also conflict in preceding decades 
among Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups, resulting with the LTTE virtually eliminating its rivals.   
2 Institute for Policy Studies. 2012.  
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issues.  The main Tamil political grouping played an important role in supporting the January 2015 election 
of Sri Lanka’s new president, Maithripala Sirisena.  Security and inclusive politics provide space for coming 
to a lasting settlement that would overcome grievances that fueled conflict in the past.   
 
37. There have been significant efforts to rebuild conflict-affected areas.  Sri Lanka has heavily 
invested in developing infrastructure throughout the country over the past five years, including in the 
conflict-affected areas of the north and east.  A total of 5.2 percent of all budget expenditures excluding 
interest payments were spent directly on reconstruction efforts in the Northern Province alone in the period 
2009-2013 (Ministry of Finance, 2014).  These efforts have included a painstaking demining effort covering 
targeted areas comprising over 2000 square kilometers that is 95 percent complete as of the beginning of 
2014, making farming possible in many fields which had been off limits. While levels of public service 
provision remain lower in the north and east, there has been visible progress in improving road and rail 
networks and installing housing, power transmission, water supply systems and other infrastructure.  The 
roughly 700,000 internally displaced people caused by the conflict have almost all returned to their homes 
or have otherwise voluntarily resettled elsewhere. The population in former conflict areas continues to face 
many hurdles in rebuilding their lives but resettlement after the conflict has been overall positive with 93 
percent resettled on their own lands.3  
 
38. Particularly after the election of President Sirisena in 2015, the government has taken actions 
to address grievances of the Sri Lankan Tamil community.  Following the end of the conflict, the 
preceding government established the LLRC and implemented several of the commission’s 
recommendations.  In particular, Northern Provincial Council elections were held in 2013 and were won 
by the main Tamil opposition party.  Steps to address grievances have been accelerated under President 
Sirisena, most notably: the appointment of a civilian as governor in the Northern Province; the commitment 
to a domestic mechanism to address issues of accountability for allegations of misconduct during and 
particularly at the end of the conflict; and the return of some of the lands that had been taken for military 
bases in the North and East.  The more pro-active stance of government responds to a key LLRC finding 
on the causes of conflict: “Successive governments since independence have been unable to fully resolve, 
and in some instances actually contributed to, communal tensions, particularly those involving the Tamil 
community.”  While much remains to be done on reconciliation, these steps work towards providing for 
long-term sense of security, justice and jobs for all communities, all of which are critical factors for avoiding 
renewal of conflict.4  
 
39. Sri Lanka is also at the threshold of major institutional and political reforms advocated by 
the new political leadership elected in 2015.  Since the passage of its 1978 Constitution, Sri Lanka has 
been dominated by an “Executive Presidency” that enjoyed wide-ranging powers, including the unlimited 
right to appoint and dismiss key officers of nearly all state institutions and no accountability to other state 
institutions.  The preponderance of the presidency created a centralized government and decision-making 
apparatus with weak checks and balances. Sirisena’s victory in elections over two-term President 
Rajapaksa, the country’s dominant political figure for the preceding nine years, was based on a platform of 
good governance that received diverse support.  His government has prioritized securing passage of 
                                                          
3 GoSL and United Nations.  Sri Lanka Joint Needs Assessment Final Report. 2014. 
4 World Bank 2011 World Development Report. 
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constitutional amendments to reduce the powers of the presidency while strengthening parliament, as well 
as legislation setting up a right to information regime, strengthened audit and procurement regimes, and 
more vigorous anti-corruption efforts.    
 
40. Institutional reforms and efforts at reconciliation are occurring against the backdrop of a 
fluid Sri Lankan polity.  There are two major national parties and a large number of smaller parties, 
including several with affiliation to ethnic groups.  Electoral competition has been robust at national and 
provincial levels, most notably in the recent presidential elections.  At the same time, public figures exercise 
substantial autonomy – with prominent instances of switching party allegiances, most notably in the recent 
presidential elections. The fluid polity has prompted formal and informal coalition building as well as the 
need for regular attention from the country’s leadership to sustain support from often-diverse bases.  The 
fluidity of the environment has been evident in securing the passage of constitutional and electoral reforms 
that required extensive political negotiations.  A new government involving a grand coalition has been 
formed after the August 2015 general elections and is in the process of formulating its economic and other 
policies.   
 
41. As Sri Lanka aspires to become a higher middle-income country, it will need to adjust its 
development model.  Growth in the last five years is in substantial part due to a “peace dividend”, which 
included significant reconstruction efforts.  Going forward, economic growth will likely require continued 
structural changes in the economy towards greater diversification and productivity increases and a reduction 
in the role of agricultural employment from its present share of a third of the population.  Although Sri 
Lanka has excelled in overcoming human development challenges typical to a low-income country, its 
service delivery systems in education, health and other areas must now adjust to face new and changing 
demands typical of a MIC.  Imperatives to improve social safety nets will increase owing to an aging 
population that has passed its demographic peak.  Finally, increasing affluence and information will lead 
to higher expectations for the state to perform in order to facilitate growth, provide a higher level of services, 
and demonstrate increasing responsiveness to a more demanding citizenry.   
B. Poverty and Shared Prosperity  
42. Economic growth in Sri Lanka has been among the fastest in South Asia in recent years. 
Growth has averaged 6.3 percent between 2002 and 2013, with per capita GDP rising from US$869 in 2000 
to US$3,280 in 2013. Moreover, the average growth rate accelerated to 7.5 percent between 2010 and 2013, 
reflecting a peace dividend and an aggressive policy thrust towards growth since the internal civil conflict 
ended. This growth is high as compared to regional and MIC peers, and has been accompanied by low 
inflation (Figure 2.1). Year 2014 also saw a continuation of the momentum with the economy growing by 
7.4 percent compared to a 7.3 percent growth reported in 2013 on robust growth in industry and services. 
 
43. Strong economic growth for over a decade has led to an important decline in poverty and 
promoted shared prosperity. Poverty, measured by per capita consumption, fell from 22.7 percent in 2002 
to 6.7 percent in 2012/13 using the national poverty line5, which is equivalent to about US$1.50 in PPP 
terms.  Extreme poverty fell from 13.2 to 3.2 percent using the US$1.25-a-day poverty line, while moderate 
                                                          
5 Given the ongoing conflict, a few regions were not included in the 2002 household survey. When looking at 
comparable regions, the decline in poverty was from 22.7 percent in 2002 to 6.1 percent in 2012/13.  
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poverty fell from 56.2 to 32.1 percent using the $2.50-a-day poverty line, commonly used across middle-
income countries (Appendix 1.2), over the same time period (Table 1). 6 
 
Figure 2.1 GDP growth and inflation over time and relative to other MICs 
A. Sri Lanka. GDP growth, 2000-2013 B. Average GDP growth and inflation,  
2009-2013 
  
Sources: World Economic Outlook, Department of Census and Statistics 
 
Table 2.1. Sri Lanka. Poverty and Inequality Trends 
 
                                                          
6 The national poverty line is expected to be updated soon in order to: (i) update household consumption patterns 
(the current line assumes the 2002 consumption pattern), (ii) incorporate methodological best practice particularly 
with respect to the minimum calorie requirement and the appropriate amount of non-food expenditure consistent 
with that minimum threshold, and (iii) set a more ambitious benchmark, appropriate for a country at Sri Lanka’s 
stage of development, to measure future progress against poverty. 
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Poverty gap
US $1.25 a day in PPP terms 13.2 6.8 3.8 3.2 6.9 3.5 2.8
US $2.50 a day in PPP terms 56.2 44.4 37.1 32.1 44.4 35.3 29.9
National poverty line 22.7 15.3 8.9 6.7 15.5 8.2 6.1
Poverty gap 5.1 3.1 1.7 1.2 3.1 1.6 1.0
Severity 1.6 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.3
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Gini 0.402 0.397 0.361 0.387 0.330 0.308 0.328
Theil 0.323 0.325 0.268 0.317 0.212 0.186 0.234
p90/P10 5.122 4.981 4.300 4.738 3.971 3.596 3.821
Shared Prosperity** 2002-06/07 2006/07-09/10 2009/10-12/13 2002-06/07 2006/07-09/10 2009/10-12/13
Average 1.95 3.33 4.23 1.95 3.60 4.25
Bottom 40 percent 2.59 4.91 2.84 2.59 5.40 2.83
Full Sample Excluding Northern and Eastern Provinces
* The second set of results (excluding Northern and Eastern Provinces) is generated using a version of the consumption aggregate 
which excludes durables
** The first set of results (Full sample) keeps all districts available in each pair of surveys. Both set of results use a version of the 
consumption aggregate which excludes durables
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44. Poverty reduction measured by per capita consumption is also reflected in increased per 
capita incomes, particularly for the poor. Between 2006/07 and 2012/2013, average per capita incomes 
grew only slightly, about 2 percent overall (Figure 2.2A). Growth in household income reported here is on 
per capita terms, and contrasts with the figures on total household income reported by DCS, which remained 
roughly constant in real terms. The discrepancy arises mainly because average household size fell during 
this period. Because larger households require more income than smaller households to maintain the same 
standard of living, per-capita income is preferred to total income as a measure of household welfare. 
However, for poorer households measured as those with lower per capita consumption, growth in real per 
capita income was over twice as fast, and was in line with similar growth rates in per capita consumption. 
 
Figure 2.2 Income and multidimensional poverty measures have improved 
A. Average growth in annualized real per 
capita incomes from 2006-2012, by decile 
of per capita consumption 
B. Education and health outcomes have 
improved 
  
Source: World Bank Poverty Assessment, 2015 based on 
2006/7 and 2012/13 HIES 
Source: FAOSTAT, WDI, and World Bank staff 
calculations based on HIES, DCS. School estimates exclude 
Northern and Eastern provinces for comparability. 
 
45. The reduction in poverty for the 2002 – 2012/13 period is also reflected in multidimensional 
measures. Households in the bottom 40 percent were increasingly able to afford to purchase non-food 
items, as the food budget share for this group fell from 67 percent in 2002 to 56 percent in 2012/13. 
Ownership of durable assets also rose, especially among the poorest. Primary education attendance is 
essentially universal. Secondary school attendance is also high and continued to nudge upward during this 
period. Completion, on the other hand, saw a major increase, as the share of 17 and 18 year olds who 
completed secondary school rose from 40 to 60 percent between 2002 and 2012/13. Health indicators also 
improved during this period. The rate of infant mortality fell from 13 to eight children per thousand births, 
and the rate of under-nutrition, while still high, decreased from 30 to 25 percent (Figure 2.2B).  
 
46. Despite the reduction in extreme poverty, living standards remain low for most Sri Lankans 
and a large share of the population remains vulnerable to poverty. Despite the low levels of extreme 
poverty, roughly one quarter of Sri Lankans are nearly poor, as defined by living above the official poverty 
line but below US$2.50 per day in 2005 PPP terms. The living standards of the near-poor are closer to those 
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of the poor than those living above US$2.50 per day. For example, the near-poor spend an average of 59 
percent of their budget on food, only six percentage points less than the poor, as opposed to 42 percent by 
households consuming more than US$2.50 per day (2005 PPP). 
 
47. Moreover, while the decline in poverty was strong, it was below what one could have expected 
given the sustained high growth rates over the last decade. Indeed, a 1 percent increase in per-capita 
GDP reduced the US1.25-a-day poverty rate by only 0.2 percentage points while a similar increase in 
growth led to stronger reductions in extreme poverty in other regional and developing countries (Figure 
2.3). It has, however, been in line with other post-conflict countries. 
Figure 2.3 Extreme poverty-growth semi-elasticity 1/ 
 
Source: World Bank 2015 Poverty Assessment (forthcoming) 
1/ Defined as the change in the US1.25-a-day poverty headcount rate (in percentage points) due to a 1 
percent increase of per capita GDP: (Change of poverty headcount in period/number of years in 
period)/(Annualized increase of per capita GDP) 
 
48. Growth was higher in the post-war period but the strongest reduction in poverty and 
improvement in shared prosperity occurred in the early part of the 10-year period covered by the 
past three Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES). Per capita consumption of the bottom 
40 percent grew at a rate of 3.5 percent for the 2002-2012/13 period, considerably faster than the average 
growth of 3 percent for the total population over the same time period.7 Simple decompositions show that 
most of the reduction in poverty was due to strong consumption growth, which shifted the entire distribution 
to the right, as opposed to large changes within the distribution. However, when the decade is broken into 
sub-periods, growth was disproportionately in favor of the poorer half of the population (“pro-poor”) up 
until 2009.  Although poverty continued to decline between 2009/10 and 2012/13, growth of the bottom 
half of the distribution was slower than growth for the top half, leading to an increase in inequality. This 
can easily be seen in the growth incidence curves (GICs) shown in Figure 2.4. The x-axis shows households 
ordered from poorest to richest, while the y-axis shows growth in household consumption. Between 2002 
and 2009/10, growth was faster at the bottom of the distribution, thus leading to a negatively sloped GIC – 
denoting pro-poor growth.  In contrast, between 2009/10 and 2012/13, growth at the top of the distribution 
was faster, leading to a positively sloped GIC.  
                                                          
7 The reported rates refer to the annualized growth rates, considering the period 2002-2012/13 as 10 ½ years long. 
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49. The most recent growth pattern has led to an increase in inequality. The corollary of stronger 
growth for the top of the distribution between 2009/10 and 2013/14 is that inequality increased. Standard 
measures of inequality, such as the Gini coefficient, increased from 0.36 in 2009/10 to 0.39 in 2012/13, 
leading to an inequality level almost as high as the one registered in 2006/07, before the end of the civil 
war (Table 1 on page 13). In effect, rising inequality tempered the poverty-reducing impact of growth.  
 
Figure 2.4: Growth Incidence Curves: Per capita consumption growth 
A. 2002-2009/10 B. 2009/10-2012/13 
  
Source: Comparable regions in HIES 2002, 2009/10, 2012/13. 
 
50. Inequality has not only increased, but disparities across the different ethnic and religious 
groups remain. Poverty declined fastest for Sri Lankan Moors (Muslims): if in 2002 one out of four Sri 
Lanka Moors was poor, 10 years later only about one every 18 Sri Lanka Moors was poor (or 6 percent), 
very close to the share of Sinhalese who are poor. In 2012/13, Sri Lankan Tamils had the highest rates of 
poverty among ethnic groups (Figure 2.5A). Among the different religious groups surveyed in 2012/13 
(which, in most cases, have a strong correlation with ethnicity), Hindus had the highest poverty rates: 12 
percent were poor, as opposed to 6 percent of Buddhists, Muslims and Christians (Figure 2.5B). 
 
Figure 2.5 Sri Lanka. Poverty headcount rates, by ethnicity and religion (national poverty line) 
A. Poverty headcount rate by Ethnicity B. Poverty Headcount Rate by Religion 
  
Source: Own estimates based on HIES. Department of Census & Statistics 
Note: Includes full samples available for each HIES. The results are similar when using comparable samples. 
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51. Other multidimensional measures also show inequality in outcomes. Sri Lanka successfully 
reached full enrollment in primary education (grades 1 to 9), but education attainment of higher levels of 
education remains strictly correlated to the well-being of households. For example, educational attainment 
among the poor is almost half of what it is for the non-poor. Although the level of education attainment has 
slowly increased both for poor and non-poor individuals, poor individuals have a very low likelihood of 
completing collegiate education. Similarly, the poor are characterized by having lower access to electricity, 
telephone, water, and sanitation and having to travel further to reach health services. These characteristics 
are especially true for those living on less than US$1.25-a-day (Appendix 1.3) 
 
52. Moreover, there is significant locational concentration of poverty in Sri Lanka. This is true 
both for monetary and multidimensional outcomes, including education, nutrition and access to services.  
The share of people living under the national poverty line, known as the headcount rate, is concentrated in 
three main areas (Figure 2.6). The first is the former conflict districts in the Northern Province, Mullaitivu, 
Mannar, and, to a lesser extent, Kilinochchi District. The second is Batticaloa in the Eastern Province, and 
the last one is Moneragala in the Uva Province. Areas with higher poverty rates also tend to have a larger 
portion of the bottom 40 percent. 
 
Figure 2.6. Poverty Headcount Rate in 
2012/13 
(percent of population in poverty) 
Figure 2.7 Distribution of the poor, 
2012/13 
(absolute number of poor) 
  
Source: World Bank & DCS Poverty Map. Poverty line is Sri Lankan national poverty line. 
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53. Notwithstanding high rates of poverty in specific remote districts, the majority of the poor 
and as well as the bottom 40 percent live in populous, effectively urban areas in the center of the 
island.  The location of the poor broadly corresponds to the location of Sri Lanka’s population as a whole.  
Figure 2.7 shows estimates of the number of people living in poverty. Kurunegala in the center of the 
country, for instance, is home to 7.6 percent of the country’s poor people even though only 7 percent of its 
population lives under the official poverty line. In contrast, Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi, and Mannar in the 
North, have very high estimated poverty rates (20.8-31.4 percent), but account for less than 5 percent of 
poor people nationwide due to the low population density in those regions. 
 
C. Understanding changes in poverty 
54. Between 2002 and 2012/13, most of the reduction in poverty was due to higher labor incomes,8 
and, in particular, to increased earnings, as opposed to higher employment or higher transfers. Most 
of the increase in labor income was, in turn, due to increased returns to work both in and outside of 
agriculture (Figure 2.8). Increased returns to agriculture accounted for about 31 percent of the decline, of 
which roughly two-thirds were higher returns to self-employed farmers. The other main factor was an 
increase in the returns to paid non-farm work, which accounted for 28 percent of the poverty decline. 
Combined, increases in the returns to work explain nearly 60 percent of the reported poverty reduction. 
These increases in returns are associated with an increase in average real wages, which could be due to 
either higher productivity or improved relative prices for the poor, given many are net producers. The 
finding of sustained increases in real wages over the decade is in line with results from alternate surveys 
conducted by the Central Bank, which show a sharp increase in services and government real wages from 
2002 to 2013 and in industry real wages in 2013.  
Figure 2.8. Net contributions to poverty reduction, 2002-2012/13 
 
Source:  World Bank 2015 Poverty Assessment. Estimates based on counterfactual consumption per capita 
distributions based on empirical models that simulate the observed change in each factor on overall household 
consumption per capita one at a time, thus allowing for changes in poverty. 
                                                          
8 Growth in real per capita labor income reported here is in line with overall growth in per capita income, partly due 
to smaller households as discussed in paragraph 41 and footnote 6 above.  
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55. Private transfers in the form of remittances, and the increase in the working age population 
also helped. Between 2002 and 2012/13 
remittances increased from 0.4 to 0.9 percent 
of total incomes and total consumption of the 
poorest 10 percent of households (Figure 2.9). 
Even though this was an increase relative to 
the incomes of the poor, most remittances in 
absolute amounts go to the richer part of the 
population. The age composition of the 
workforce also contributed to poverty 
reduction. The composition of the workforce 
in terms of gender, ethnicity and religious 
composition remained stable over the course 
of the decade. However, the share of 15-29 
year-olds declined from 26 to 20 percent 
between 2002 and 2012/13, making the 
overall workforce relatively more 
experienced, and thus likely to bring in higher labor incomes. It is also a strong signal that the population 
is aging, which raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability (see Chapter VI on economic 
sustainability and aging). 
 
56. In contrast to private transfers, public transfers did not make a net contribution to poverty 
reduction over the past decade. Public transfers (particularly the Samurdhi program) declined in real 
terms, and as such, its net contribution to reducing poverty was negative.9  In fact, results from analysis of 
the HIES show that the decline in poverty would have been 10 percent greater had the real value of 
Samurdhi remained constant. Finally, while both the improvements in education and the demographic 
dividend (the larger share of working-age adults) helped to reduce poverty, these were relatively small 
contributors to poverty reduction (Figure 2.8). 
 
57. It is very difficult to attribute the reasons for the increase in labor incomes. To the extent that 
there was both an increase in employment as well as increases in wages, this is consistent with an overall 
increase in demand for workers. Increases in labor demand, as indicated by increases in employment and/or 
wages, appear to be broadly spread across many sectors rather than concentrated in a few (Figure 2.10).  
Despite relatively high annual changes in wages in the agriculture sector it still experienced a decline in 
employment, reflecting that overall returns are lower compared to other sectors.  The increase in 
construction employment reflects the overall growth in the construction sector, especially after the end of 
the conflict. (Figure 2.18) 
                                                          
9 That is, if nothing else had changed, poverty would have increased simply because the value of these transfers was 
lower in real terms in 2012/13 relative to 2002. There are multiple social programs in Sri Lanka. The main direct 
cash transfer program is the Samurdhi Poverty Alleviating Program, which includes an income-support scheme that 
grants a monthly allowance according to the number of family members in each household, an insurance scheme 
that provides cash allowances during births, deaths and hospitalization of family members, nutrition programs for 
pregnant and lactating mothers and children of beneficiary families, and scholarship programs for children.   
Figure 2.9 Most remittances in absolute amounts go to 
the top of the distribution 
(percent of total household consumption) 
 
Source: Own estimates based on HIES. 
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Figure 2.10. Increased labor demand is reflected in wage and employment growth  
 
Source: World bank Poverty Assessment, 2015. Notes: Employment is change in percentage point change in share 
of workers employed in each sector. Real wage increase is the increase in real wages, including only wage workers. 
Wages are deflated using the Colombo Consumer Price Index. 
 
58. There are four potential drivers of the increase in labor incomes and its poverty impacts over 
the last 10 years. The following section focuses on these drivers: (i) a slow structural transformation away 
from relatively unproductive agriculture and into industry and services that led to aggregate productivity 
increases; (ii) agglomeration effects around key urban areas; (iii) domestic-driven growth, including public-
sector investment; and (iv) domestic and international food price increases that led to higher labor earnings 
for agricultural workers. 
 
Structural Transformation  
59. The economy saw a shift from agriculture to industry and services in the last 15 years (Figure 
2.11A). The share of value added from agriculture fell from 19.9 percent of GDP in 2000 to 10.8 percent 
in 2013 and is expected to have declined to 10 percent in 2014,10 while the share of value added from 
industries increased from 26.5 to 32.5 percent over the same period. Employment in agriculture declined 
from 36 to 31 percent between 2000 and 2012 and increased in industry and services over the same period 
(Figure 2.11B). It is noteworthy that a major part of the decline in agricultural employment (and rise in 
industry) occurred only in 2012, the last year measured.  
                                                          
10 Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2015 
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Figure 2.11. Sri Lanka. Sectoral Value Added and Employment Growth 
A. Sectoral Value Added (constant 2005 US$) 
(Index, 2000=100) 
B. Sectoral Employment 
(Index 2000=100) 
  
Source: World Development Indicators. Source: Own construction using Labor Force Surveys 
 
60. The shift toward employment in the industry sector and the expansion in services was 
associated with increases in productivity. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth accounted for about 
half of Sri Lanka’s growth over the last decade contributing on average 3¼ percentage points per year, 
rising to about 3½ percentage points recently.11 A range of empirical approaches suggest that potential 
growth has risen by almost 1 percentage point to about 6¾ percent in recent years compared to the period 
2003–08. This appears to reflect equally capital deepening (through increased investment on infrastructure 
and equipment) and improved factor productivity, with labor’s contribution broadly unchanged. Most of 
the increase in productivity took place within the industry and service sectors (Figure 2.12A), but an inter-
sector shift in employment away from agriculture and into industry and services also played a role and 
could partly explain increases in labor incomes (Figure 2.12B).  
Figure 2.12 Sectoral Productivity in Sri Lanka, 2002-2012 
A. Output per Worker by Sectors B. Decomposition of Growth in Output per Worker  
  
Source: Own estimates using WDI, DCS Labor Force Surveys. Decompositions done using JoGGS decomposition method (see 
World Bank, 2010) and growth accounting framework following Duma, 2007. 
                                                          
11 IMF 2014. 
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Agglomeration Effects 
61. Along with this structural transformation, Sri Lanka has been experiencing a dynamic spatial 
transformation process of urbanization and agglomeration in the past two decades. Urbanization12 
and agglomeration have been occurring in two forms: one is the prime multi-city agglomeration of Kandy-
Colombo-Galle in the Western Province, which is the largest in the country and has also experienced the 
bulk of the growth. The second form is a few localized single-city agglomerations in the eastern and 
northern parts of the country, mainly around Trincomalee, Batticaloa-Akkaraipattu, and Jaffna. This spatial 
transformation process has profound implications for both economic growth and alleviating poverty and 
vulnerability. The agglomeration spawning from the Colombo Metropolitan Region along the two corridors 
to Kandy and Galle/Matara is evolving to become a functional multi-city urban agglomeration. Recent 
growth, in particular, 
around Colombo, 
Kandy and Galle, 
including the 
corridors that 
connect those cities, 
is evident in the red 
lighting in Figure 
2.13, which 
represents night-time 
lights that were 
present in 2012 but 
not in 2002 or 1992.  
 
62. Agglomera-
tion may have been 
fueling growth and 
partly determining 
national 
performance. 
Economic growth in 
Sri Lanka has been 
partly driven by 
highly built-up areas. 
Using night-time 
lights data as a proxy 
for GDP for the 
2001-2011 period 
shows that a small 
                                                          
12 According to official estimates, only 15.7 percent of Sri Lanka’s population lives in urban areas, making it the 
least urbanized country in South Asia and MICs. This is due to the country’s conservative definition of urban as 
population living in ‘town’ and ‘municipal’ administrative units last demarcated in the 1980s.  This does not capture 
Sri Lanka’s level of population agglomeration described here. A 2010 agglomeration index which takes into 
consideration features associated with urbanization calculated that Sri Lanka a 47 percent rate of agglomeration.  
Figure 2.13 Night Lights Image of Sri Lanka, 1975- 2014 
 
Note: White areas show stable areas of lighting over the period 1992-2012, whilst red 
areas show lights which existed in 2012, but not in 2002 or 1992. 
Source: this map is produced by Chris Small, Columbia University by overlaying the 
tri-temporal Night Time Light images of VIIRS and DMSP-OLS imagery 
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number of regions are responsible for a larger share of national growth. In fact, 10 percent of Divisional 
Secretariat Divisions (DSDs) contributed nearly 30 percent of the country’s growth over the period (Figure 
2.14A). Furthermore, only 20 percent of DSDs contributed almost half of all growth in Sri Lanka. Satellite 
imagery on built-up areas by DSDs can be combined with night-light information to see the correlation 
between built-up areas and growth. Not surprisingly, a larger share of built-up areas is positively correlated 
to national growth measured using night-time lights (Figure 2.14B). That is, urbanization and growth have 
been moving hand in hand. 
 
Figure 2.14 Agglomeration and growth 
A. DSD Contribution to National Growth B. Built-Up Areas and Growth 
  
Note: GDP per capita is calculated on the basis of the intensity of night-time lights data.  
Source: Urban team of the World Bank. 
 
Increases in Aggregate Demand, including Government Infrastructure Projects 
63. Domestic demand was largely responsible for growth.  Private consumption accounted for 67 
percent of GDP in 2013, having expanded by 6 percent a year on average between 2002 and 2013 (Figure 
2.15A). Private investment, on the other hand, accounted for 23 percent of GDP in 2013, after an average 
growth of 9 percent a year during the same time period. In addition, public infrastructure spending grew at 
an average rate of 18 percent a year between 2002 and 2013, and made up 6 percent of GDP by 2013 (Figure 
2.15B). The impulse coming from exports, on the other hand, was very small, with an average growth rate 
of 4 percent a year, so that the contribution of exports to aggregate demand declined from 35 to 26 percent 
of GDP between 2002 and 2013. 
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Figure 2.15. Sri Lanka. Growth in Aggregate Demand 
A. Composition of Aggregate Demand 
(percent of GDP) 
B. Growth in Demand Components 
(Index, 2002=100) 
  
Source: World Development Indicators and Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
 
Increased Commodity Prices 
64. Higher real wages, especially in 
agriculture, played a key role in reducing 
poverty.  Although agriculture is no longer a 
major contributor to growth (accounting for 
under 11 percent of GDP), around one-third 
of the population still remains engaged in, and 
dependent on, agriculture.  Real wage growth 
in the agriculture sector averaged 5.7 percent 
annually from 2006 to 2012/13, causing 
poverty to fall more rapidly among self-
employed farmers and agricultural workers, 
ahead of workers in other sectors.  Wages in 
the industrial sector increased by 3.6 percent 
annually, while wages in the service sector 
grew by 3.1 percent on average, led by trade 
(4.6 percent) and transportation (6.0 percent) (Figure 2.16). During the same time, the share of workers in 
agriculture continued to decline by 1.3 percentage points, from 32 to 30.7 percent, with young workers 
shifting out of agriculture more quickly.  Minimum agriculture wages for employed farm workers rose 
considerably between 2009 and 2012, which may have also pushed up real agriculture wages. 
 
65. Productivity growth in agriculture has been slow and does not sufficiently explain 
agricultural wage growth.  Agricultural GDP per hectare of arable land grew by only 3.5 percent between 
2000 and 2011, compared to 26 percent in Indonesia, 35 percent in the Philippines, and 61 percent in 
Bangladesh.  Labor productivity has also fallen behind South-Asian comparators.  Agriculture TFP growth, 
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measuring technological progress, grew only by an average of 0.6 percent a year since 1980 and lags behind 
other South and East Asian countries, although it may have picked up recently.  TFP growth contributed 
only 53 percent to overall output growth while a large share of the agricultural output growth was achieved 
through the expansion of arable land that will not be sustainable in the longer term.   
 
66. In contrast, rising domestic and international food prices may have provided space for the 
increase in the agricultural minimum wage and corresponding increases in agricultural wages.  
Rising food prices, particularly from 2006 to 2009, provided additional profits to the owners of agricultural 
land.  In addition, international prices for tea rose more than 50 percent, from $2.1 to $3.3 per kg between 
2006 and 2009.  This occurred despite little change in yields.  The increase in the price for tea provided 
space for increasing the real minimum wage for agricultural workers (Figure 2.17A), although they continue 
to be lower than wages in industry and services. Agricultural wages, unlike those for industrial and service 
sector wages, tracked these minimum wage increases almost exactly (Figure 2.17B). 
 
Figure 2.17. Wages by Sector 
A. Minimum wages by sector 
(index, 1978=100) 
B. Real Wage Index 
(Index, 2002=100) 
  
Source: World Bank Poverty Assessment 2015.   
 
D. Macroeconomic Challenges to Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity  
67. Recent growth has been mainly led by the non-tradable sectors. Sri Lanka’s real GDP grew by 
43 percent from 2009 to 2014. The top four sectors contributing to 50 percent of the total growth during the 
period were all non-tradable sectors: construction, transport, domestic trade and banking, and insurance and 
real estate (Figure 2.18). Reflecting the intensity of a needed post-conflict infrastructure development 
thrust, the construction sector alone contributed to 16.8 percent of the total growth while growing by 109 
percent in real terms. The transport sector contributed to 14 percent of the total growth, reflecting improved 
transportation infrastructure and increased vehicle registrations.  Domestic trade (11.1 percent), import 
trade (7.8 percent) and financial services (8.2 percent) were the other main contributors to growth. Less 
prominent were the agriculture sectors. These sectors contributed to 5.3 percent of the growth while all 
other manufacturing/service sectors collectively accounted for 44.7 percent of the growth. Moreover, Sri 
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Lanka’s share of manufacturing output, which was 18.7 percent in 2000, rose to 19.5 percent in 2005 and 
declined to 17.2 percent by 2014 due to faster growth in the services sector. 
  
68.  Reliance on non-tradable sectors for growth could make it difficult to sustain the momentum 
in the long run. While data is lacking on the breakdown between private- and public-sector involvement 
across industries, there is strong indication that public investment to rebuild following the end of conflict 
is responsible for much of the proportionately large growth in construction as well as transport (which is 
inclusive of some transport infrastructure).  It would appear unlikely that these sectors would underpin 
sustained growth going into the future owing to fiscal space limitations as well as a decline in the need for 
post-conflict reconstruction. More generally, construction and transport infrastructure are not likely to be 
sources of sustained, consistent growth.  
 
69.  In contrast, there has been a steady decline in commodity exports. Before 1977, Sri Lanka’s 
development strategy, based on import substitution, aimed to create a comprehensive welfare state. Post-
1977, reforms aimed to liberalize the foreign trade regime and Sri Lanka was seen as the first country in 
South Asia to significantly open its borders to trade and foreign direct investment. In the decades that 
followed, trade of goods and services increased to 89 percent of GDP in 2000, with tea and high-end apparel 
exports leading the way (Figure 2.19). However, after the beginning of the new millennium, trade steadily 
declined reaching 54 percent of GDP in 2013. FDI remains below 2 percent of GDP five years after the end 
of armed conflict. The decline in openness and stagnating FDI took place when the rest of the world was 
integrating more strongly and global trade was accelerating. Sri Lanka’s world market share has 
consequently declined to levels last seen in the 1980s. 
 
Figure 2.18. Sri Lanka. Sectoral growth patterns 
 
Note: Bubble Size corresponds to size of segment 
Source: World Bank 2014a, based on Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
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70. Moreover, the 
configuration of production in 
Sri Lanka has remained largely 
constant in the last three 
decades. At the same time some 
MIC comparators, like Thailand, 
have been highly successful at 
diversifying their economies and 
leveraging existing industries to 
move up the value chain as well as 
fostering the development of new 
industries. Figure 2.20 shows a 
comparative development of the 
product space13 of Sri Lanka and 
Thailand over the same period. Sri 
Lanka experienced a rather limited 
growth of economic activities 
adjacent to existing industries; 
lower development of new 
industries; and exporting sectors remained at the periphery of the economy. In contrast, Thailand had a 
similar export structure to Sri Lanka in 1980 but a much different one by 2009. Thailand now has much 
lower activity in resource-based and labor-intensive exports and instead has dense clusters in electronics, 
microcircuits and machinery. 
 
71. While the trade deficit has recently improved, Sri Lankan exports face structural challenges. 
In particular, the tradable sectors are facing rising production costs, particularly for Sri Lanka’s main 
agricultural exports (tea and rubber).14 Similarly, although garment exports have increased in nominal terms 
and there has been movement to higher added-value production, the share of garment exports relative to 
GDP has continuously declined.  Weaker external demand from the European Union (EU) and the United 
States and rising relative labor costs has also affected garment exporters. Productivity growth in tea has 
been stagnant, and the sector has been challenged by drought and lower demand from the Middle East.   
 
 
  
                                                          
13 Product Space Analysis helps to illuminate the relationship between diversification and economic growth. It 
measures the distance between a pair of products based on the probability that they are exported by the same countries.  
14 This has always been an issue as plantation workers (tea and rubber) have historically been very well organized 
under political leadership of the Ceylon Workers Congress. Their strong bargaining power has driven a wedge 
between wage and productivity trends. Many workers are paid even if they do not have work. 
Figure 2.19: Steady decline in trade 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, January 2015; Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 
Staff estimates 
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Figure 2.20: Product space comparison: Sri Lanka vs Thailand in 1980 & 2009 
        Product Space in Sri Lanka, 1980              Product Space in Thailand, 1980 
 
 
        Product Space in Sri Lanka, 2009               Product Space in Thailand, 2009 
  
Source: MIT Media Lab–Macro Connections and Harvard University–Center for International Development n.d. 
 
72. Pressure on Sri Lanka’s balance of 
payments caused by persistent trade deficits 
has been offset partially by strong remittance 
inflows and a growing role for tourism. 
Collectively, remittances and tourism increased 
from 8.5 percent in 2000 to 12.4 percent of GDP 
in 2014 (Figure 2.21). Remittances alone grew 
from 7 percent to 9.5 percent of GDP during the 
same period. On average, these two sources 
covered 92 percent of the trade deficit from 2000 
to 2013, and were able to cover the entire trade 
deficit in 2014. The current account deficit 
declined from 7.8 percent of GDP in 2011 to 2.7 
percent of GDP in 2014. 
 
73. The current account deficit has been 
financed mostly by external borrowing, rather than through FDI. Much of this external borrowing by 
the public and private sectors went to finance the country’s rebuilding following the end of the conflict. 
Despite this borrowing to cover current account deficits, Sri Lanka has been able to reduce its debt to GDP 
ratio in the past five years thanks to fast growth, relatively low real interest rates and a stable exchange rate. 
Figure 2.21 Current Account and Trade Deficit 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, January 2015; Central 
Bank of Sri Lanka, Staff estimates  
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This also shows where the risks are: a slowdown in growth, increasingly commercial terms on new 
borrowing, and exchange rate volatility may reverse the decline in the level of external debt-to-GDP. 
 
74. On the fiscal front, low and declining fiscal revenues have become a key macro-economic 
concern for Sri Lanka. The tax revenue-to-GDP ratio, which amounted to 24.2 percent in 1978, declined 
to 14.5 percent in 2000 and reached 10.7 percent in 2014 despite an annual increase in GDP per capita of 
11 percent a year (Figure 2.22). This partly led to large fiscal deficits, particularly before end of conflict, 
when Sri Lanka averaged deficits of around 7-8 percent of GDP a year. Over the past five years, the 
government has made an effort towards fiscal consolidation, reducing the budget deficit from 9.9 percent 
in 2009 to 6 percent in 2014.  
 
75. Despite fiscal consolidation efforts, Sri 
Lanka continues to face public debt risks. 
Although much improved from earlier years 
where the debt stock was over 100 percent of 
GDP, public debt stood at 75.5 percent of GDP at 
end-2014, posing macroeconomic risks if growth 
slows in coming years. Increases in current 
spending in 2015 have been offset with one-time 
revenue measures, implying long-term revenue 
streams will be required (see Chapter III for 
detailed discussion). The composition of debt is 
also changing, moving from concessional lending 
to shorter-term commercial borrowings. 
However, during 2014 there has been a systematic 
conversion of short term T-bill issuance into 
longer term T-bonds, while foreign holdings of T-
bills and bonds have been contained at 12.5 percent of the outstanding value (Central Bank, 2015). About 
44 percent of the public debt stock is external, so that exchange rate fluctuations and any rupee depreciation 
could risk deteriorating the debt indicators. 
 
76. More generally, twin deficits in the fiscal and current accounts are mirrored by low national 
savings, with a persistent savings-investment gap being financed mostly through debt-creating flows 
over the last decade. National savings has averaged about 25 percent of GDP since 2010, while national 
investment was as high as 31 percent of GDP.15 Most of this gap has been covered by debt-creating flows, 
as opposed to FDI over the last decade. Despite strong GDP growth, the external debt amounted to about 
57 percent of GDP at end-2014.   
  
                                                          
15 IMF Country Report No. 14/285. 
Figure 2.22 Fiscal Performance of Sri Lanka 
A. Revenue/expenditure trends 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, Central Bank of Sri Lanka  
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E. Identifying Drivers and Constraints to Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity  
77. The context outlined in this section sets the stage for a systematic diagnostic of drivers and 
constraints to poverty reduction and shared prosperity going forward.  Sri Lanka’s political, social, 
and economic features are the result of a wide variety of factors.  These same factors, particularly the more 
proximate factors that are in effect at present, are expected to drive or constrain continued progress on the 
twin goals of poverty reduction and shared prosperity.  At the same time, there are new trends and emerging 
opportunities that will also play a role in shaping Sri Lanka’s development trajectory in the coming years.  
The goal of this SCD is to take stock of these factors, identify their relative importance, and set out what 
would therefore be priorities to be addressed in order to end extreme poverty and promote shared prosperity. 
The SCD focuses on drivers and constraints of progress in the next five years, corresponding to the term of 
the new government to be formed after elections in the summer of 2015.  
 
78. This diagnostic is based on a systematic and detailed review of key potential factors impacting 
progress on the twin goals.  In order to identify these constraints we used a hybrid framework that 
combines the Hausman, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) growth diagnostics methodology with the Bussolo and 
Lopez-Calva (2014) assets-based framework as detailed in Appendix 1.4.  The framework was used as a 
way to organize and discipline the analysis by identifying a broad range of 22 areas where there were 
possible constraints to, or drivers of, progress on the twin goals.  Sri Lanka’s performance in each area was 
assessed and weighed for their relative impact on achieving the twin goals.  This preliminary systematic 
analysis was then presented in a set of detailed consultations with multiple stakeholders, including 
government, academia, think tanks, the private sector, civil society organizations, and international 
organizations to validate the findings, determine the relative importance of issues identified in each of the 
22 areas, and identify knowledge gaps.   
 
79. Discussion around the preliminary analysis and ensuing consultations led to a consensus 
around four major themes, which form the basis for organizing this report and the major challenges 
to progress along the twin goals.  The themes are: (i) Fiscal sustainability and the need to ensure fiscal 
space for development; (ii) Fostering growth and jobs for the bottom 40 percent; and (iii) ensuring spatial 
and social inclusion.  The fourth major theme – the importance of more effective and efficient governance 
– is a cross-cutting issue in all three chapters, reflecting the critical roles of public-sector management, 
government’s interface with the private sector, and governance’s impact on inclusion. These four major 
themes were recurrent in discussions with multiple stakeholders in terms of the severity of constraints they 
pose for achieving the twin goals of ending poverty and promoting shared prosperity. The next three 
chapters describe each of these themes and discuss the priority areas. Those are followed by a chapter on 
economic, social and environmental sustainability concerns, which are also critical in achieving the twin 
goals. The final chapter summarizes the main findings and provides conclusions.   
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III. Addressing the Fiscal Challenge 
 
 
80. Sri Lanka’s government has demonstrated a strong commitment to fiscal consolidation in the 
recent past. In the decade before end of conflict, the country averaged fiscal deficits of around 7-8 percent. 
However, over the past five years, the government has trimmed budget deficits each year, going from 9.9 
percent in 2009 to an estimated 5.7 percent in 2014. The public debt, which was hovering around 106 
percent of GDP in 2002, was reduced to 75.5 percent of GDP by 2014. Moreover, the government has 
committed to reduce the fiscal deficit to 3.8 percent of GDP by 2017 and public debt to 60 percent of GDP 
by 2020.  With the exception of a spike in 2009 linked to massive recovery and rehabilitation needs 
immediately after the war’s end, this has been achieved by reducing government expenditures.  
 
81. This overall strong performance masks four structural weaknesses in the government’s fiscal 
position: low, declining fiscal revenues; increasing rigidity of expenditures; insufficient spending on 
key public goods and services, particularly for human development; and inefficiencies in the public 
sector.  Preserving fiscal balance will become increasingly challenging owing to an extremely low revenue 
base combined with long-term-expenditure commitments including a relatively large public service.  If 
current trends continue, the government will have limited fiscal space to facilitate development.  At the 
same time, experience of regional and MIC comparators suggests that Sri Lanka is not investing enough in 
human development.  The country’s past success in these areas cannot be expected to continue without 
significant increases in spending, which in turn requires greater fiscal space. 
 
82. Honoring commitments initiated in 2015 while maintaining continued commitment to fiscal 
sustainability will require measures to secure long-term revenue increases. Fiscal debt sustainability 
analysis has shown that slower-than-projected growth, higher primary deficits, or higher borrowing costs 
could quickly lead to sustainability concerns. With public debt amounting to 76 percent of GDP at end-
2014, continued commitment to fiscal consolidation is critical. Reflecting the government’s commitment 
to sustainability, the budgeted fiscal deficit is expected to narrow in 2015. However, increases in recurrent 
expenditures are to be financed by one-time taxes, ambitious revenue targets for existing taxes, and cuts in 
public investment, leaving very little room to maneuver. Moreover, recurrent spending increases on wages 
and transfers initiated in 2015 will need to be sustained once the one-time revenue measures expire. Given 
government plans to increase expenditures on education and health from their present low levels, long-term 
increases in revenue will be needed in order to reduce the fiscal deficit and public debt.  
KEY PRIORITIES IN ADDRESSING THE FISCAL CHALLENGE 
*  Maintaining continued commitment to fiscal sustainability will require long-term revenue 
measures. 
*  Simplifying the tax regime and improving tax administration to increase the tax base could 
reverse the declining revenue trend. 
*  Low revenues and rigidity in expenditures undercut investment in human development while 
higher levels of financing and effectiveness thereof are needed to meet Sri Lanka’s needs as it 
transitions to a MIC. 
*  Inefficiencies in social protection and management of the public service particularly undermine 
efficient use of resources. 
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A. Low and Declining Fiscal Revenues 
83. Sri Lanka now has one of the lowest tax 
revenue-to-GDP ratios in the world, and it has 
been declining for decades. The country’s tax 
revenue-to-GDP ratio amounted to 24.2 percent in 
1978, after which it declined to 14.5 percent in 2000 
and to 11.6 percent in 2013 (Figure 3.1).  The decline 
is in large part a reflection of Sri Lanka’s strong GDP 
growth16 with revenues increasing in absolute terms.  
Nonetheless, the fact that revenues have not kept 
pace with economic growth and barely kept pace with 
inflation in absolute terms is a continuing constraint 
on the budget. The government has signaled the need 
to reverse this trend in recent budgets, each year 
planning for a significant improvement in the tax 
revenue-to-GDP ratio over the medium term.  However, projections of revenue increases have consistently 
failed to materialize (Figure 3.2A). In comparison, most of the other South Asian countries as well as 
middle-income countries have seen modest improvements in tax collection in the recent past. (Figure 3.2B).  
 
Figure 3.2 Revenue Performance of Sri Lanka 
A. Actual Revenue Performance Has 
Disappointed 
B. Tax Collection Peer Comparison 
  
Source: World Economic Outlook, Central Bank of Sri Lanka  
 
84. Indirect taxes account for 80 percent of Sri Lanka’s tax revenue.   The country has lower-than-
expected revenues from taxes on income, profits, or capital (direct taxes) and higher collections from 
international trade and from goods and services (indirect taxes) than its peers, both as a share of total 
                                                          
16 During the period 2000 to 2013, the per capita GDP grew from USD 869 to 3280 at 11 percent annually. 
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Figure 3.1. Revenue and Expenditure Trends 
 
Source: World Economic Outlook, Central Bank of Sri 
Lanka 
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revenues and as a share of GDP17 (Figures 3.3).  The dependency on indirect taxes, -- mostly VAT, excise 
and customs revenue – limits the country’s capabilities to expand the tax base and raises issues regarding 
the equity of the system and how the tax burden is distributed among social groups. 
 
Figure 3.3 Tax Composition in South Asia 
A. Tax Composition in South Asia 
(percent of total) 
B. Tax Composition in Sri Lanka 
(percent of total) 
 
 
C. Taxes on Income, Profits, Capital, 2012 
(percent of Revenue) 
D. Taxes on Trade, 2012 
(percent of Revenue) 
  
*2011 data except Bhutan which is 2009. 
Sources: IMF FAD Database, MoF Annual Report, 2012; World Bank (2014) 
 
85. The decline in tax revenue can be traced to trade liberalization, shortcomings in recent tax 
reforms, numerous exemptions, and difficult tax administration.18  First, trade liberalization and a 
gradual reduction of external trade taxation have lowered tax revenues from international trade. This effect 
was exacerbated by measures introduced in 2012 to curb imports (see Chapter IV for a detailed discussion 
of trade policies). Second, tax reforms initiated in 2011 streamlined import taxes, unified VAT rates, and 
abolished some “nuisance” taxes to improve the transparency and efficiency of the tax system. However, 
the unification of the VAT was at a lower rate, and corporate and income tax rates were lowered without a 
                                                          
17 Collectively, these taxes accounted for 77 percent of the total tax revenue in 2013 whilst income taxes and 
telecommunication levy contributed to 20 and three percent of tax revenues respectively. 
18 IMF (2014a and (2014b). 
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commensurate broadening of the tax base. Third, the authorities have introduced numerous tax exemptions 
and holidays to boost foreign investment or support specific activities, resulting in an erosion of the tax 
base (see below). Finally, tax exemptions have made tax administration more difficult, discouraged tax 
compliance, and created demand for new exemptions. 
 
86. A decline in VAT collection is the main driver of tax-revenue-to GDP reduction in recent 
years.  The VAT’s share in total revenue has declined from 43 percent in 2004 to 25 percent in 2013, while 
the decline in the tax-to-GDP ratio broadly tracks that of the decline in the VAT-to-GDP ratio (Figure 3.4). 
VAT collection is weak at 2.9 percent of GDP in 2013 with a c-efficiency19 of 25 percent, which is roughly 
half of the c-efficiency for lower middle-income countries. Domestic-based consumption taxes have 
remained at the same share over time, while there has been a marginal increase in import-based taxes, excise 
taxes, trade taxes, and the Nation Building Tax (NBT), a cascading indirect tax using a similar base to the 
VAT, as a share of total revenue.  On the other hand, the share of the corporate income tax collection 
increased, as did the “special taxes,” such as the Social Responsibility Levy (SRL) and devolved duties to 
Provincial Councils.  
 
Figure 3.4. Trend in tax-to-GDP and drivers of change 
 
Source: Ministry of Finance, staff calculations 
 
87. Sri Lanka’s low tax revenues are caused primarily by problems with tax administration 
allowing for weak compliance.  The country ranks 158th out of 189 countries in paying taxes due to the 
high number of payments (47), time taken (167 hours per year) and tax rate (55.6 percent of profits), 
according to Doing Business 2015 Report. A 2013 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability report 
similarly identifies weaknesses in Sri Lanka’s tax administration, particularly indicators for collection of 
gross tax in arrears, clarity and comprehensives of tax liabilities and effectiveness of penalties on non-
compliance  (Figure 3.5).   
 
                                                          
19 “C-efficiency” is the tax collection as a share of the tax base divided by the tax rate. See Ebrill, 2001 and Keen, 
2013. 
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88. There are multiple institutions involved with tax administration. Under the MoF, there are 
three agencies involved in tax collection, including the Department of Customs, Department of Excise and 
the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), with the latter collecting less than 50 percent of total government 
revenues.20   There is high rotation of staff, which results in the downgrading of specialized skills in tax 
administration.  With regard to tax policy, there is significant influence and overlap from agencies other 
than the tax authorities (e.g. Board of Investment - BOI), which frequently grant tax exemptions that further 
undermine revenue administration capabilities. There is limited data sharing between the Customs and IRD, 
but not among other entities, although reforms are planned to overcome this issue.  
 
Figure 3.5. PEFA performance on tax-related indicators 
 
Source: World Bank (2013) 
Note: Rating from A (highest score) to D (lowest score) 
 
89. Tax administration is complex and inefficient, though increased use of IT expected in the near 
future may lead to improvement over the medium term.  At present, the system relies heavily on self-
reporting for direct taxes and there is a lack of regulations covering penalties for non–compliance with 
registration requirements for the corporate income tax.  Monitoring compliance is split by type of tax and 
customer segment within the IRD.  In November 2015 the IRD plans to launch the first phase of a Revenue 
Administration Management Information System, which is designed to enable information sharing, 
integrate taxpayer information from 22 government institutions, and provide for online tax filing for the 
first time. Other countries, notably Sri Lanka’s neighbor India, have been able to improve administration 
in recent years largely thanks to IT improvements.  Yet, global experience also indicates that rolling out 
such systems and implementing them well is complex.  Strong management and technical capacity within 
IRD will be required. 
 
                                                          
20 In 2012, the IRD collected Rs. 443,455 which was 44.9 percent of total government revenue according to the 
IRD’s 2012 Performance Report. 
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90. Tax administration relies on self-reporting of taxes, which is onerous although there has been 
recent progress. Sri Lanka ranks 158th on ‘paying taxes’ according to the 2015 Ease of Doing  
Business rankings.  These rankings are 
comparable to South Asian comparators 
(India is 156th and Pakistan is 172nd), but 
below MIC comparators Thailand and 
Malaysia (62nd and 32nd, respectively).  A 
2015 study of the administrative burdens 
showed a reduction of 43 hours in the number 
of hours required for corporate tax 
compliance due to improvements in 
electronic systems for filing and paying 
taxes. The number of hours endured by firms 
in Sri Lanka is now lower than many peers, 
but the number of payments remains 
somewhat higher (Table 3.1). 
 
91. Sri Lanka also provides a large number of tax privileges, though a tax expenditure analysis 
to assess their fiscal impact has not been carried out.  Since the introduction of a VAT in 2002, 
successive changes in the tax regime have led to an increase from around 200 to over 500 types of 
exemptions for a wide variety of goods.  There are also over 40 broad types of exemptions on corporate 
and personal income tax depending on the source of income and the type of taxpayer. In addition to these 
statutory exemptions, the BOI provides a package of additional tax incentives to investors. While this was 
partially streamlined with regard to income tax exemptions in 2012, the BOI can continue to approve 
incentives on customs duties, VAT and other border taxes.  Finally, additional ad hoc tax regimes are 
applied to entities implementing 13 large projects thus far approved under the 2010 Strategic Development 
Act.  Annual budgets in recent years regularly include a package of new tax incentives targeting specific 
sectors or types of payers.  Tax expenditure analysis is not conducted before or after the introduction of 
incentives, and statements of tax expenditures are not compiled or published.   
 
92. Multiple incentives regimes have also led to coordination problems, further undermining 
effective administration. Firms have been granted tax incentives by BOI generally are not monitored by 
the IRD (with the exception of corporate income tax since 2013) since the latter does not consider other tax 
matters related to BOI investors under its ambit.  There has been no formal system of sharing information 
between the two agencies, which further complicates monitoring by IRD.  Follow up to ensure that firms 
began to pay taxes after tax holidays ended did not occur.  
 
93. In contrast, Sri Lanka’s statutory tax rates are comparable to many middle-income countries, 
though features of policy concerning VAT undercut revenue mobilization because of the 
administrative burdens that arise.  The VAT statutory tax rate is in line with other middle-income 
countries, while its individual income tax rates are somewhat lower and corporate income tax rates are 
relatively high by international standards (Tables 3.2 and 3.3).  Tax policy with regard to VAT includes 
unusual features that create additional administrative burdens.  In particular, Sri Lanka employs a 
“simplified VAT” regime whereby significant registered exporters are entitled to purchase goods and 
Table 3.1: Paying Taxes – Compliance of Corporate 
Income Tax 
Country No. of hours  No of payments 
Sri Lanka 16 5 
India 45 2 
Thailand 160 2 
Pakistan 40 5 
Malaysia 26 2 
Singapore 32 1 
Bangladesh 140 5 
Source: PWC World Bank Paying Taxes 2015 
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services from similarly registered suppliers free of VAT, obviating the need for a refund.  Enforcing 
compliance is complicated because there is no chain of transactions and hence  IRD will not detect what is 
occurring unless businesses declare the goods and services.  The over 500 exemptions to VAT pose similar 
disruptions and monitoring challenges for IRD.  Finally, although thresholds for payment of VAT have 
been raised since last year, the threshold likely remains too high, given the still small number of VAT-
payers (roughly 15,000 registered payers).  
 
 
 
   
B. Expenditure Pressures 
94. Low tax revenues combined with an expenditure profile that is effectively non-discretionary 
has led to a lean, rigid budget.  Sri Lanka’s overall revenues and expenditures are among the lowest in 
the region.  There is little flexibility in the short term on the expenditure side of the budget.  Sixty percent 
of expenditure in 2013 was on items that the government cannot readily reduce: interest payments, salaries, 
and transfer payments (Figure 3.6).  Nearly two-thirds of transfer payments are pensions for civil servants, 
which are a commitment that must be met, with the remainder fertilizer subsidies, social protection 
payments and other transfers. Furthermore, Sri Lanka has had a large expansion in the number of public 
servants in the past 10 years, growing from 646,000 in 2004 to 1.06 million in 2013, an increase of nearly 
two-thirds (MoF 2014).  This growth reflects explicit policies to provide public service jobs, especially for 
university graduates (see below).  These trends will only grow the wage/allowance and pension burdens. 
  
Table 3.3 VAT compared with other countries 
Country / Category Average VAT 
Rate 
C-Efficiency 
Sri Lanka 12 25 
Bangladesh 15 
(standard rate) 
23.4 
Low-Income 16 38 
Lower  Middle-
Income 
13 46.6 
Upper Middle-income 15 51.6 
High Income 20 55.6 
Source:  IMF (2011) 
Table 3.2. Tax rates (2013) 
 Individual Corporate Indirect 
Bangladesh 25 27.5 15 
Cambodia  20 10 
India 33.9 33.9 13 
Indonesia 30 25 10 
Malaysia 26 25 10 
Sri Lanka 24 28 12 
Thailand 35 23 7 
Vietnam 35 25 10 
Note: Top rates.  Sri Lanka’s individual tax rates 
range from 4 to 24 percent and corporate tax rates 
are from 12 to 28 percent, with numerous 
exemptions and special regimes for various payers. 
Source: KPMG 
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Figure 3.6. Fiscal Indicators 
A. Revenue, Expenditure, Deficit/Surplus B. Budget Rigidity  
  
Note: Bubble size corresponds to the size of the 
deficit/surplus, 2013 data.  
Source: World Economic Outlook 
Source: World Development Indicators, Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Finance and Planning   
 
95. There is moderate risk in Sri Lanka’s 
public debt profile.  There has been significant 
accumulation of public debt in recent years, 
mostly from abroad. Although much improved 
from earlier years where the debt stock was over 
100 percent of GDP, public debt stood at 75.5 
percent of GDP at end-2014 and could pose 
macro-economic risks if growth moderates in 
coming years. The composition of debt is also 
changing, moving from concessional lending to 
shorter-term commercial borrowings. However, 
during 2014 there has been a systematic 
conversion of short-term T-bill issuance into 
longer-term T-bonds, while foreign holdings of T-
bills and bonds have been contained at 12.5 
percent of the outstanding value (Central Bank, 2015). With about 44 percent of the public debt stock is 
external, exchange rate fluctuations and any rupee depreciation could risk deteriorating the debt indicators. 
 
96. Although the fiscal deficit has been brought down, the government’s contingent liabilities 
have grown fast in the recent years. The outstanding amount of Treasury guarantees given to various 
state and non-state entities to expedite the development work increased from 1.6 percent to 5.7 percent of 
GDP from 2006 to 201421, implying an annualized growth rate of 37 percent during this period. Moreover, 
                                                          
21 In order to facilitate guarantees for requiring entities, the ceiling imposed by Financial Management Responsibility 
Act No: 3 of 2003 for such contingent liabilities (at 4.5 percent of GDP) was increased to 7.0 percent by way of an 
amendment in 2013. 
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within the mix that has been changing over time, the significance of guarantees given to institutions with 
stable revenue streams22 declined from 90 percent in 2006 to 40 percent in 2014 while guarantees given to 
state establishments that are primarily dependent on state budget are on the rise23. Monitoring these 
guarantees is important to strengthen public finances as they could elevate fiscal risks24,25  (Figure 3.7).  
 
C. Insufficient Spending in Key Areas 
 
97. Fiscal consolidation and relative prioritization of public investment in capital infrastructure 
following the conflict have squeezed expenditure on other public goods, especially with regard to 
human capital.  General government spending on education fell from 2.7 to 1.8 percent of GDP between 
2006 and 2013, while spending on health fell from 2 to 1.4 percent of GDP over the same period, though 
estimates for 2014 show a significant rebound (Figure 3.8A). These levels are low relative to other middle-
income countries (Figure 3.8B), particularly given the rising costs of healthcare associated with an aging 
population.  Moreover, Sri Lanka faces increasing demands for a more skilled workforce to be able to 
compete globally while meeting the aspirations of the youth, as described in the next two chapters.  
 
Figure 3.8. Health and Education Expenditures 
(share of GDP) 
A. Sri Lanka. General Government 
Expenditures (share of GDP) 
B. Sri Lanka and Regional Comparator 
Countries 
  
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Includes central and 
provincial government spending. 
Source: World Development Indicators. Includes central 
and provincial government spending. 
 
 
98. Sri Lanka’s expenditure on social protection programs has also declined steadily in recent 
years.  The total amount of transfers has increased in absolute terms over the past decade, but has not kept 
pace with GDP growth (Figure 3.9A).  In 2013 two-thirds of social welfare programs went to social 
transfers, while the remaining third was spent on health and education programs, various subsidies, and 
                                                          
22 Primarily Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC) and Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB) 
23 These include Road Development Authority, Kotalawala Defense University, Urban Development Authority 
24 Fiscal Adjustment in an Uncertain World, Fiscal Monitor, IMF, April 2013.  
25 Often comparable estimates are not available due to existence of various forms of contingent liabilities (IMF 2005). 
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absorbed losses of SOEs (primarily the Railways, Postal Service and Transport Board) (Figure 3.9B).  
Moreover, growth in absolute terms has been driven by a significant increase in pensions and to a lesser 
extent, fertilizer subsidies.  Because Sri Lanka’s state pension system only encompasses public servants 
and the military, which mostly represent better-off households, the poverty reduction impact of these 
transfers is limited.  Most notably, there was no increase until 2013 in absolute expenditures on the major 
anti-poverty Samurdhi (“Prosperity”) program, an integrated welfare program providing cash transfers, 
housing assistance, subsidized kerosene and assistance to pregnant and lactating mothers set up in 1994.  
Despite a small increase, only 0.22 percent of GDP was spent on anti-poverty and disaster relief programs.  
New cash transfer programs for the elderly and the disabled have been introduced but these amounted to 
only 0.03 percent of GDP in 2013.   
 
Figure 3.9. Social Protection Expenditures are insufficient and inefficient 
(share of GDP) 
A. Social Protection Expenditure 
2000-2013 
B. Decomposition of Expenditure on Social 
Welfare Programs, 2013 
  
Source: Ministry of Finance and Treasury Source: Ministry of Finance and Treasury 
 
99. Low levels of public spending may undercut Sri Lanka’s past strong gains in human 
development and leave it less well equipped to face changing human development needs as a MIC.  
For decades Sri Lanka outperformed other lower-income countries in making steady improvement on 
human development outcomes, such as life expectancy, maternal health and educational enrollment (see 
Appendix 1.1 on achievement of the MDGs).  It is much closer to average in outcomes when compared to 
other lower middle-income countries LMICs.  Sustaining progress will involve addressing different types 
of challenges more typical of a MIC.  For instance, whereas Sri Lanka excelled in addressing communicable 
diseases in the past, it now faces a bigger problem with non-communicable diseases reflecting an aging, 
more urban, and affluent population.  Similarly, the changing economy is placing greater demands for a 
more skilled workforce, whereas Sri Lanka’s tertiary education has enrollment rates below the LMIC and 
South and West Asian averages (a discussion of tertiary educational needs is in Section IV). 
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100. Sri Lanka will also need to finance 
infrastructure needs to keep pace with 
increasing demand.  Sri Lanka’s infrastructure 
compares favorably to its South Asian neighbors 
in terms of accessibility, and the past five years 
have seen a major expansion of public 
investment in infrastructure (see Appendix 2.1 
for a more detailed review on access and 
management issues for various infrastructure 
sectors).  In particular, over the past five years, 
the government has invested about 4.4 percent of 
its total expenditures (outside of interest 
payments) in infrastructure in the Northern 
Province alone in order to redress imbalances.26 
However, Sri Lanka’s needed investment 
remains high in order to keep pace with the 
changes underway in the country.  In particular, increasing urbanization will require more sophisticated 
infrastructure to maximize benefits from agglomeration, provide for livability, and avoid congestion.  With 
greater affluence will come increased use of individual vehicles, currently growing at 10 percent a year and 
set to displace the modal share of public transport if demand management measures and public transport 
development are not addressed (Figure 3.10). Structural transformation that has underpinned productivity 
growth will place further demands for more, cost-effective infrastructure, particularly power.   
 
101. In the past, the pressures on financing capital investment were eased by waves of 
concessionary donor funding that will not continue because Sri Lanka has reached middle-income 
status. Consequent to a deteriorating security situation and political instability, the international donor 
community substantially limited official development assistant (ODA) to Sri Lanka throughout the 1990s. 
Donor aid surged following the signing of a ceasefire between the government and LTTE in 2002 and again 
following the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004. The combined effect of these was that ODA to Sri 
Lanka rose from US$330 million (2 percent of GDP) in 1999 to $1.33 billion (5 percent of GDP) in 2005 
– comprising the highest level of aid to the country. Despite complications in disbursing post-tsunami aid 
in conflict areas due to the lack of full government control there, social and connective- infrastructure needs 
(roads particularly) in the East and also in the deep South of the country were met by generous donor funds, 
easing the pressure on public funds.  Given that Sri Lanka has achieved middle-income status, this level of 
funding is not likely to materialize going forward, highlighting the imperative for domestic revenue 
mobilization. 
 
102. Public investment will need to be applied effectively to crowd in other sources of financing.  
Public financing will remain important, but it will need to be supplemented by more private sources to 
address infrastructure needs.  In- recent years the government increased expenditure on energy, water 
supply, transport and communications from under 11 percent of total spending in 2005 to around 20 percent 
annually from 2009-13 (or roughly 4 percent of GDP, except 2009, which had a large fiscal deficit).  
                                                          
26 Ministry of Finance, 2014 
Figure: 3.10. Usage patterns of vehicles, 1960-2030 
 
Source: Kumarage, 2012. 
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Although there are some exceptions, infrastructure was built thanks to direct public financing. As is 
discussed at greater length in the next chapter, effort should be undertaken to leverage public funds with 
private-sector investment given the quantum of investment needs going forward.   
 
D. Inefficiency in Social Transfers 
103. In addition to low levels of spending, Sri Lanka’s social protection system has limited 
effectiveness.  Some of the programs 
classified as social transfers should not be 
classified as such.27   Pensions account for 
most transfers, but not surprisingly given the 
public service background of pensioners, less 
than half of them are in the bottom 40 percent 
(HIES 2012/13).  Less than 30 percent of the 
population over 65 drew a pension in 2013.  
Expanded subsidies for fertilizer are 
available to all farmers (with differentiation 
in the amount of subsidy depending on the 
crop); it can be argued in only the most 
general terms that these farmers are 
relatively likely to be poor. 
 
104. Anti-poverty programs suffer 
from poor targeting. In fact, analysis of the HIES shows that if it were possible to perfectly target 
individuals below the poverty line, the amount needed to bring all poor individuals to the poverty line would 
have been only 0.12 percent of GDP in 2013. Programs rely on manual registration and identification, and 
lack a capability to actively search for excluded individuals. Although some programs have categorical 
eligibility criteria, more than half of Sri Lankans living below the poverty line receive no benefits from 
existing social assistance or social welfare programs (though they may benefit from free health and 
education). At the same time, a third of spending on social transfers goes to the richest 60 percent of the 
population. Samurdhi and School Lunch programs transfer nearly the same amount to the bottom quintile, 
and in both cases roughly 55 percent of benefits go to the bottom 40 percent. The other three programs, 
when considered as a group, distribute 53 percent of their transfers to the bottom 40 percent (Figure 3.11). 
By tightening eligibility criteria and making an effort to register the poor for benefits, existing spending 
could be more effective in combating poverty. 
 
105. Fertilizer subsidies have limited impact on the poor while creating negative distortions in the 
agriculture sector that undermine productivity. Fertilizer subsidies are the least well-targeted transfer, 
with only 45 percent of the benefit being devoted to the bottom 40 percent (Figure 3.11). Furthermore, these 
subsidies have distorted market decisions by encouraging cultivation of certain crops, especially paddy, 
hindering the movement to other types of agriculture that have more potential for value addition.  Even for 
                                                          
27 Although the Ministry of Finance categorizes civil service pensions as part of welfare programs, they are part of 
total civil service compensation rather than a welfare program and cannot be considered a social protection program 
per se. Moreover, note that the Ministry of Finance refers to SOE losses as part of welfare spending (World Bank, 
2014a). 
Figure 3.11. Incidence of Social Benefits 
(percentage of benefits accruing to each quintile) 
 
Source: World Bank Poverty Assessment 2015 based on HIES 
2012/13. 
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targeted crops, these subsidies have not prompted productivity increases.28  At the same time, intensive 
usage of cheap fertilizers lead to environmental and potential human health hazards. Thus, subsidies 
negatively affect those in the bottom 40 percent engage in agriculture across multiple dimensions, 
suggesting a need for rationalization. 
 
106. Moreover, poverty programs are fragmented. There are the 11 major anti-poverty programs, 
including Samurdhi, in addition to multiple-agency programs that split the already small amount available 
for welfare programs.  Programs rely on manual registration and identification, and lack a capability to 
actively search for excluded individuals.  They also employ varying eligibility requirements and 
administrative structures, and lack modern information management systems that would allow for 
harmonization among programs. 
 
107. Pressures on the healthcare system and the social protection system are expected to grow with 
an aging population. The proportion of the country’s working age population (defined as ages 15 to 59 in 
Sri Lanka) reached its peak in 2006 and the overall population is expected to peak in 2016 (Figure 3.12).  
The child population (up to age 14) declined from 35 percent in 1981 to 23 percent in 2011, while the 
number of people aged 60 and above is expected to double in 2041 relative to 2011. Sri Lanka is in the 
midst of its demographic dividend at present and hence there is urgency to “get rich before getting old.”  
While this fiscal burden may continue to be mitigated by the limited coverage of pension schemes to public-
sector workers, Sri Lanka can expect to need to develop programs for social protection of the elderly.  
Furthermore, the 40 percent increase in the number of civil servants over the past 10 years, discussed below, 
will substantially increase the number of pensioners under the current system (see Chapter VI for a detailed 
discussion of fiscal issues associated with an aging population).   
 
 
Figure 3.12. Sri Lanka Age-Gender Pyramid 
A. 2001/2 B. 2012.13 
  
Source: HIES Source: HIES 
 
                                                          
28 Annual crop productivity figures are from Agriculture and Environmental Statistics Division; Department of 
Census and Statistics, Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
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E. A Large Public Sector 
108. Despite its small fiscal footprint and relative state effectiveness,29 Sri Lanka’s public sector is 
large.  With over one million employees, public-service employment exclusive of semi-public entities, 
accounts for about 13 percent of the labor force.  Although cross-country comparisons are difficult owing 
to different definitions of the public service, the size of the public sector in Sri Lanka is higher than 
comparable public services in Thailand (roughly 9 percent) and close to OECD levels (average of 15 percent 
in 2011).  There have been also small but steady increases in semi-governmental organizations such as 
SOEs employment over the past 10 years, comprising a further 239,000 employees in 2013.   
 
109. Human resource management of the public service is complex with limited controls on the 
expansion of the civil service. Public servants are either recruited to one of 28 island, combined and other 
services (categories of employees) or are hired in terms of respective service minutes and individual 
schemes of recruitment of specific departments or other agencies.  The complement of staff recruited 
through either route is proposed by the department/agency and approved by the Department of Management 
Services (DMS) in the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Analysis regarding overall staffing needs is therefore 
effectively carried out only by the agency in question.  While the MoF through its DMS plays an oversight 
role, decisions are made on a case-by-case basis without a holistic view of managing the size of the overall 
civil service.  Politically important ministries have demonstrated ability to increase their staffing 
complement in recent years.  Hiring per the approved cadre schedules is then carried out via the Public 
Service Commission (PSC) on the basis of examinations.      
 
110. There is also fragmented control of remuneration. Wage reforms in 2006 led to the 
consolidation of over 100 various positions to 37 grades and corresponding salaries, which have been 
occasionally increased by the Ministry of Public Administration (MPA) upon recommendation of the 
National Pay Commission appointed by the president. There is also an extensive system of allowances that, 
in terms of aggregate spending, have been roughly equivalent to the formal wage bill over the past five 
years. All public servants (and pensioners who receive 50 percent of the benefit) receive a cost-of- living 
allowance that has increased from 1,000 rupees in 2006 to a commitment of 10,000 rupees in 2015. Outside 
of cost-of-living allowances, there is a wide range of additional allowances and incentive payments that 
vary for different services and individual schemes of recruitment.  The type, criteria for receipt,and the 
quantum of allowances are approved by the MPA’s director general of establishment.. For instance, 
preliminary medical officers may receive a base monthly wage of 26,000 rupees per their grade, but seven 
additional allowances account for an additional 105,000 rupees, as well as the right to earn more through 
private practice in the evening.  Thus, the complement of staff is approved by the DMS, wages are set by 
the National Pay Commission and a varied system of allowances is set by the MPA’s Establishment 
Department. 
 
111. Political governments have substantially influenced the size and operation of the public 
service.  The government from 2005 to 2014 explicitly sought to increase public-sector employment, 
particularly with recent graduates through the Yovun Diriya and other programs.30  Particularly large 
recruitments were carried out in 2005 and 2012. While recruitment is carried out by an objective process 
                                                          
29 Sri Lanka’s ranking for Government Effectiveness and Controlling Corruption according to World Governance 
Indicators has been consistently higher than South Asian and LMIC averages over the past 10 years.  
30 See Mahinda Chintana, also 2013 budget speech. 
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of examination, the higher echelons of public service have been subject to influence by political 
governments. Since the 1972 Constitution, all ministry secretaries have been directly appointed and 
removed by the president. This has led to a small number of high-profile appointments of people without 
prior civil service experience.  It has also meant that with every change of government, secretaries cease to 
hold their positions (and are often reassigned to another agency).  Other transfers and promotions fall under 
the PSC, which, in turn, has served at the pleasure of the president for almost all of the past 30 years. This 
framework is conducive to senior officers developing strong political affiliations.31 New constitutional 
amendments are expected to provide for more autonomy of the civil service through a more independent 
PSC..   
 
F. Improving Public Expenditure Management 
112. There are additional ways to address the fiscal challenge through further improvements in a 
generally sound system of public expenditure management.  A 2013 Public Expenditure and Fiscal 
Accountability (PEFA) assessment noted relative strengths in terms of budget process, quality of annual 
financial statements, legislative scrutiny, and timeliness and quality of follow up on audit findings.  At the 
same time, Sri Lanka scores below LMIC averages on several PEFA indicators including: (i) monitoring 
and reducing payment arrears; (ii) oversight on aggregate fiscal risk; (iii) public access to key fiscal 
information; (iv) tax payer registration and tax collections; (v) internal audit and payroll controls; (vi) 
procurement procedures and transparency; and (vii) predictability in the availability of funds.   
 
113. Budget planning and execution practices can have an adverse effect on sector planning and 
performance.  There is limited linkage between long-term financing frameworks and sector plans, with the 
latter effectively lacking cost estimates. During annual budget preparation, ceilings provided by the MoF 
are often late and do not relate to medium-term financial plans. In most cases, sector plans and strategies 
follow an activity-based expenditure classification that is not compatible with the administrative and 
functional classification used for budgeting and financial reporting.  These budget practices lead to an input-
oriented culture that focuses on “spending the budget” with little reward for achieving outputs or outcomes. 
At the same time, due to chronic shortfalls in actual revenues, budget adjustments are effectively carried 
out through cash rationing by the Treasury vis-à-vis ministries and other agencies.  This leads to ad hoc 
prioritization of non-discretionary expenditures, such as salaries, to the detriment of other priority items. 
While Sri Lanka’s government has nonetheless functioned relatively well under these circumstances, sector 
performance suffers as a consequence.      
 
114. Public investment planning is further impacted by capacity and procedural issues.  Capacity 
could be strengthened to raise the effectiveness and efficiency of public investments.  A key issue is the 
limited capacity to assess the planned effectiveness of investments in order to prioritize among various 
needs. Efficiency depends on the quality of planning and life-cycle costing prepared by respective sector 
ministries or departments. The Department of National Planning must approve the investments, but it lacks 
engineers, quantity surveyors or other technical specialists to check assumptions and estimates.  Recurrent 
cost requirements linked to investments are rarely factored into the assessment.   
 
                                                          
31 Transparency International, National Integrity Assessment, 2010. 
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115. A weak procurement environment remains a concern, though reforms are imminent.  Public 
procurement expenditure in Sri Lanka is approximately equivalent to 21 percent of total government 
spending in 2013, making up over half of total discretionary expenditures.  Despite its importance, there 
are a number of institutional issues that undermine efficient procurement. In particular, there is no dedicated 
oversight and support agency after the abolition of the independent National Procurement Agency in 
January 2008 and the transfer of its functions to the MoF’s Public Finance Department. Although the 
government has procurement guidelines, manuals and standard documents, there is inconsistency internally 
and in execution.  There is no independent complaints review mechanism for public procurement. Finally, 
Sri Lanka is yet to take steps to introduce electronic government procurement, which in other countries in 
the region and beyond has made public procurement more economic, efficient and transparent. Within this 
fluid institutional context, the government has on several occasions made high-profile procurements on the 
basis of unsolicited bids, leading to allegations of cost inflation.32  These issues are expected to be addressed 
through a new national Procurement Commission mandated by the 19th Constitutional Amendment, as well 
as through the passage of revised and consolidated financial regulations on procurement.   
 
116. Governance within public expenditure management could be strengthened through greater 
transparency and accountability.   There are several areas where more openness about the use of public 
money would be welcome, including: budget execution reports with greater frequency than the present bi-
annual reports; information about contract awards and associated terms; information about resources 
availability to individual primary service units (e.g. schools); and presentation of audit findings.  Providing 
for greater public awareness and understanding of the public sector’s use of resources would enhance 
accountability.  Efforts towards this objective could include making budgeting and financial information 
more easily understood by non-financial specialists as well as providing public access to proceedings of 
parliamentary committees on public accounts and public enterprises. 
G. Medium-Term Fiscal Sustainability 
117. Fiscal sustainability analysis suggests high risks to slower than projected growth, higher 
primary deficits, or higher borrowing costs. Public debt, hovering around 106 percent of GDP in 2002, 
was reduced to 75.5 percent of GDP by 2014 -- reflecting relatively low borrowing costs and strong growth, 
supported by gradually improving primary balance. However, fiscal sustainability analysis carried out in 
2014 highlighted some important risks. First, slower-than-projected growth (alone or combined with a 
higher primary deficit and higher borrowing costs) could stop or reverse the decline in debt ratio.33 
Moreover, the relatively high share of foreign currency-denominated debt (at 42 percent of the total as of 
2014) also creates a vulnerability to currency depreciation. Sri Lanka’s public debt was 614 percent of total 
government revenue and grants at end 2014, highlighting the fact that a moderate increase in borrowing 
costs could eat up a large share of revenues. 
 
118. A slowdown in growth or adverse shock may reverse the downward trend in public debt to 
GDP. The reduction in the public debt-to-GDP ratio has been largely due to fast GDP growth and low 
average real interest rates on debt in the backdrop of a relatively stable currency. If growth slows, a sudden 
                                                          
32 In some cases forgoing competition was due to conditions of external financing for projects.  There have been allegations of 
inflated cost to the government.  See, for instance, Kumarage, Amal, “Road Building or Rip-Off?”  Sunday Times, December 21, 
2014.    
33 IMF Article IV for July 2014. 
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fiscal adjustment might be needed to contain the debt level. The low level of fiscal revenue, the still high 
level of public debt and persistent fiscal deficits leave little room for counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
Government guarantees given to state-owned and private establishments have risen fast from 1.6 percent to 
5.7 percent of GDP between 2006 and 2014, and could pose a risk to the fiscal position.  
 
119. The fiscal deficit could expand in 2015, requiring long-term revenue measures to ensure 
sustainability going forward.  The new government presented its budget for 2015 to the Parliament in 
January 2015. An extension to the budget presented by the previous government for 2015 in October 2014,34 
it includes the fiscal costs pertaining to the promises made by the losing candidate who was then in power 
as well as those of the winning candidate. The result has been a change in the composition of expenditures 
toward recurrent spending due to: increases in public-servant salaries; new and expanded subsidies, 
including a reduction of prices of fuel and essential goods through lower taxes and benefits to selected 
niches of the society; and reduction of fuel excise taxes for 2015 and beyond. The related costs were 
expected to be financed by one-time taxes35 and lower public investment.  However it is yet unclear whether 
the narrowed deficit target of around 5 percent of GDP set for 2015 can be achieved. Over the medium 
term, the government plans to massively increase expenditures on education and health from their present 
low levels.36 Since revenue will drop in 2016 once the one-time measures expire, reducing public debt to 
maintain fiscal sustainability and honor medium-term commitments will require increasing tax revenue 
collection through permanent measures sooner rather than later.  
 
H. Priorities in Addressing the Fiscal Challenge 
120. Continued strong commitment to fiscal sustainability will require long-term domestic 
revenue mobilization efforts.  Honoring medium-term commitments while reducing the fiscal deficit and 
public debt will require increasing tax revenue collection through permanent measures beyond 2015. 
 
121. Simplify the tax regime and improving tax administration.  Sri Lanka has extremely low and 
declining revenues driven by a complex tax regime and poor tax administration. Low revenues and rigidity 
in expenditures is causing the country to undercut investment in human development just when its transition 
to a MIC poses new challenges.  
 
122. Improve the adequacy and effectiveness of spending.  Low levels of public spending on health, 
education and social protection undercut Sri Lanka’s past strong gains in human development and leave it 
less well equipped to face changing human development needs as a MIC.  Sri Lanka will also need to 
finance infrastructure needs to keep pace with urbanization, the need for cost-effective power, and other 
infrastructure.  Beyond increasing fiscal space for these priority projects, there is need to improve efficiency 
of spending, towards improved targeting of benefits, including those recently approved in 2015. 
                                                          
34 A month before announcing the snap presidential election 
35 The most significant being a super gains tax (a 25 percent retroactive tax imposed on individuals or corporates who 
generated profits over LKR 2.0 Billion in 2013/14). In addition the measures include collection of tax arrears (by 
offering credit to those who have left tax payments in arrears at concessional interest rates from the banking sector) 
and levies/taxes on selected entities such as the Sri Lanka Tea Board and Telecom Regulatory Commission. 
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123. Improve the efficiency of spending on social protection and public-sector personnel 
management that undermine the effectiveness of the state. Reducing fragmentation and improving 
targeting of the existing social protection system can ensure that every dollar spent on social protection has 
a maximum impact in reducing poverty. Similarly, improving controls on public-sector remuneration and 
reducing political influence in civil service management could substantially improve the efficiency of 
public service delivery.  
 
  
KEY KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
 Fiscal sustainability analysis to incorporate recent policy changes and to reflect medium-
term plans of the incoming government. 
 Tax expenditure analysis of fiscal incentives. 
 Functional review of tax administration to identify collection vulnerabilities. 
 Distributional analysis of alternative tax reforms options.  
 Effectiveness of spending on infrastructure in terms of rate of return and impact on access and 
reduction of poverty. 
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IV. Fostering Growth and Jobs for the Bottom 40 Percent 
 
KEY PRIORITIES  
*  Review and revise the country’s trade-related policies.  
*  Invest in education and training and enhance the dialogue between private sector and education 
system to ensure that the population has the skills demanded by high-productivity enterprises. 
*  Promote innovation by establishing linkages between R&D institutions and networks of entrepreneurs 
that can benefit. 
*  Improve the regulatory environment to allow firms to grow, reducing informality and allowing for 
economy-wide increases in productivity as firms can reach economies of scale. 
*  Review the role and participation of the public sector in the economy. 
 
A. Ample Opportunities for Success  
124. Sri Lanka has a number of advantages that provide ample opportunities for further 
development.  Notwithstanding ongoing challenges, the country boasts overall strong human capital and a 
reliable infrastructure base, particularly when compared to other South Asian countries.  It has ended its 
internal armed conflict with signs of an emerging long-lasting settlement to address grievances that fed the 
conflict.  Although it is still too early to judge their impact, governance reforms initiated should bring about 
more accountability and hence more responsive and effective government. Coupled with a demonstrably 
democratic system, this should strengthen further public confidence in government and hence stability.     
 
125. Sri Lanka enjoys an enviable location in a fast-growing region.  Proximity to growing regional 
economies – at its closest point Sri Lanka is only 26 kilometers across the Palk Strait from India – provides 
major opportunities. Sri Lanka currently has bilateral trade agreements with both India (ISFTA) and 
Pakistan (PSFTA), the two largest economies in South Asia.  It also has two regional trade agreements – 
one with the South Asian region (SAFTA) and the other with wider Asia (APTA), and a trade in goods 
agreement in negotiation with China. Proximity to India, with its estimated 250 million middle-class 
consumer population by 2016 – over 20 times Sri Lanka’s own domestic market – offer a large export 
market for Sri Lankan producers. Already in the first 14 years of the ISFTA, exports to India have grown 
by 1,000 percent, and the number of product lines exported to India has grown fivefold (increasingly in 
higher value products).  India has become Sri Lanka’s third largest export market, behind the United 
Kingdom and the United States.  There are also extensive opportunities for developing trade in electricity 
with India. 
 
126. It is also located along a major trade route, opening opportunities to serve as a regional 
trading hub.   Less than 20 kilometers off its shores is the main East-West Indian Ocean shipping line, 
connecting East Asia to West Asia, Africa, and Europe. New investments in the country’s port infrastructure 
– the new Colombo (South) Port extension and the Hambantota Port – have enhanced capacity for handling 
ship-based trade. The former has increased Sri Lanka’s container handling capacity by 50 percent, making 
Colombo the 27th busiest port in the world, handling about one-third as many containers as Dubai and one-
sixth as many containers as Singapore in 2013 (Containerization International Yearbook 2013). The latter 
has made Sri Lanka an important transshipment hub for the Indian car market, with around 15,000 vehicles 
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being handled each month. The Hambantota Port is being geared as an industrial port (unlike the 
transshipment-only port at Colombo). Meanwhile, Sri Lanka’s Katunayake airport continues to be a key 
passenger and cargo-handling destination in South Asia and the national airline is a leading carrier of 
passengers into the Indian sub-continent. The success of the new airport at Mattala remains in doubt, but 
the facility affords an opportunity for investments in cargo/air-freight handling and aircraft Maintenance 
Repair and Overhaul services. The close proximity of the airport to the seaport, together with the nearby 
industrial park, could make Hambantota a successful trading hub for South Asia (similar to Penang Export 
Hub in Malaysia), with the right investment promotion strategies.  
 
127. Sri Lanka’s boasts unique natural assets, with a temperate climate, diverse topography, and 
rich biodiversity. Sri Lanka has a fertile land providing for agriculture, plentiful water resources and 
extensive stocks of fish in its maritime waters.  Its topographical variation and location as an island near 
the Asian mainland has led to rich biodiversity, making it one of the world’s 35 biodiversity ‘hotspots’ 
(Conservation International).  It boasts UNESCO’s natural World Heritage Sites and offers the unique 
opportunity to see in one day the ‘Big Four’ mammals – leopard, bear, elephant, and whale.  There is 
considerable potential for the development of nature-based tourism.  It has a high rate of endemism of flora 
and fauna and great genetic diversity of agricultural crops, with 3,000 varieties of rice having been recorded 
as well as a large variety of coarse grains, legumes, vegetables, spice crops, roots and tubers.  It is renowned 
for its tea, coconut, and cinnamon.  The country has significant potential for the export of high-value 
agricultural products. 
128. Natural assets together with 
cultural and historical assets provide a 
strong basis for tourism, which is only 
beginning to grow since the end of the war.  
There has been a marked rise in arrivals since 
2010, but there is potential for a much bigger 
increase (Figure 4.1).  Sri Lanka has recently 
been recognized as one of the Top 10 global 
tourist destinations by National Geographic 
(2011), Lonely Planet (2012) and the New 
York Times (2013). The country’s tourism 
assets are relatively well known and the 
island has a broad appeal since it offers 
different experiences found in other 
destinations in the South and Southeast Asia 
region (e.g. the Maldives, India, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam). Sri 
Lanka has the advantage that all these experiences are available on an island roughly the size of Ireland or 
Costa Rica. However, tourism investments in Sri Lanka have been targeting a small part of the island, with 
98 percent of tourist beds concentrated in the South and West of the island along the beach and in Colombo. 
Although some new attractions have been developed in the North -- such as the Ridiyagama Safari Park, 
the Pinnawela Open Zoo, the Wet Zone Botanical Garden, and a number of new national parks -- there is 
scope to develop tourism in the East, North and Northwest of the island (Box 4.1). 
Figure 4.1 Annual Tourist arrivals, 1967-2013 
 
Source:  Sri Lanka Tourism Development Authority. * 
Provisional. 
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129. Globally competitive companies have emerged in Sri Lanka, particularly in the apparel and 
IT sectors.  Although initially facilitated by government liberalization policies in the late 1970s and the 
1990s, respectively, these companies have proven resilient to changing conditions. The apparel industry 
has moved from a commodity exports model to successfully targeting niche markets for higher-value added 
production. The IT sector has also grown, with Sri Lanka most recently ranked 16th as a destination for 
locating Business and Knowledge Process Outsourcing services in the Global Services Location Index in 
2014,37 moving up from 29th in 2007.  Several Sri Lankan IT companies have attained global recognition 
in providing software solutions for stock exchanges, mobile and internet payments/banking, human 
resources management, supply chain and retail management, simulation games for the defense industry, 
and technology product design (software and hardware integrated engineering).   
 
130. For Sri Lanka to capitalize on its location, human and physical assets, and demonstrated 
capacity to develop globally competitive firms, it will need to find an effective balance along two axes: 
(i) inward vs. outward orientation of the economy; and (ii) the respective roles of the public and 
                                                          
37 GSLI is released by A.T. Kearney, a technology consultancy. 
Box 4.1 Tourism on the Rise but Constrained by Capacity 
 
The sector that picked up the fastest following the end of the war was tourism, with the country 
receiving global acclaim as a leading tourist nation. The unique product offering owing to the diverse 
attractions in a compact area gives Sri Lanka an edge over many other Asian destinations. New tourist 
hotels have been one of the most robust sectors for increased private investment after the conflict ended. 
Global chains like Shangri-La Group (Hong Kong SAR, China/Singapore), India's upscale ITC Group, 
Thailand's Minor Group and Banyan Tree, Spain's RIU Hotels & Resorts, Singapore's Aman Resorts 
and Mustafa Group have begun investing in the country. In addition, international brands such as 
Sheraton, Marriott, Hyatt, Movenpick and Onyx have signed management agreements with local hotel 
companies. Locally, several of the domestic conglomerates, including Jetwing, John Keells, Aitken 
Spence, Hemas, Citrus and Dilmah have expanded their tourism investments. These new additions and 
upgrades are increasing both the supply and quality of medium- and high-end accommodation that is 
needed for continued growth. However, the growth of the sector could be severely hampered by 
inadequate capacity. It is projected that an additional 30,000 new rooms are required across Sri Lanka 
to cope with growing demand. The tourism industry would need to invest in different segments of new 
accommodation to meet different tourist needs – from city hotels, large resorts, high-end boutique hotels 
and villas, as well as tented camps and rural bungalows. Alongside this, 50,000-60,000 new hospitality 
staff needs to be trained to support just the growth in room inventory. Sri Lanka currently has the 
capacity to train only around 1,800 new graduates each year. At the same time, the tourism sector 
requires professionals in other disciplines, such as marketing, IT and sports/recreational training. 
Additionally, Sri Lanka would need to develop new destinations across the country (particularly in 
under-developed locations with natural assets in the North and East), and diversify the product offering 
in order to cater to a wider variety of tourist needs, while remaining conscious of the environmental and 
social pressures brought on by rising tourist numbers.  
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private sectors.   The story of Sri Lanka’s economic development over the past 30 years has been 
dominated by the country’s movement along these two dimensions (Figure 4.2).  In the past decade, policies 
have moved the country towards a more inward-looking, public sector-dominated model.  This model of 
growth led by domestic consumption, and to a lesser extent public spending, has made it an outlier 
compared to other fast-growing countries in Asia, which are more export oriented.  Given the fiscal 
pressures discussed in Chapter III, it will be difficult to sustain high levels of growth by relying on the 
public sector alone.  While there is no “right” location on either axis, Sri Lanka’s progress going forward 
will likely involve recalibrating its economic orientation and the role of the public sector.  
Figure 4.2 Sri Lanka. Balancing the Focus of the Economy, 1965-2013. 
 
Source: World Development Indicators. All data refer to Sri Lanka. 
 
131. The Global Competitive Index (GCI) suggests that Sri Lanka is less competitive on measures 
that reflect openness and the quality of government intervention.  The GCI points to particular 
weaknesses in terms of property rights, favoritism in government policy, and labor legislation.  The Index’s 
scores for most indicators (and all indicators in the Figure 4.3) are based on assessments of business 
executives familiar with Sri Lanka and, as such, provide an independent qualitative assessment of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the business environment.38   
 
  
                                                          
38 In the case of Sri Lanka there were 100 respondents to the survey.  
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Figure 4.3 Obstacles to Global Competitiveness, Rankings 
 
Source: World Economic Forum, 2014-15 
 
B. Inward versus Outward Orientation of Economic Activity 
132. Sri Lanka is smaller and less open today than it was for most of the last 30 years (Figure 4.4). 
Before 1977, Sri Lanka’s development 
strategy, based on import substitution, aimed to 
create a comprehensive welfare state. Post-
1977, reforms aimed to liberalize the foreign 
trade regime and Sri Lanka was seen as the first 
country in South Asia to significantly open its 
borders to trade and foreign direct investment. 
In the decades that followed, trade of goods 
and services increased to 89 percent of GDP in 
2000, with tea and high-end apparel exports 
leading the way. After the beginning of the new 
millennium, however, trade steadily declined 
to 54 percent of GDP in 2013. FDI remains at 
below 2 percent of GDP five years after the end 
of armed conflict. The decline in openness and 
stagnating FDI took place when the rest of the 
world was integrating more strongly and global trade was accelerating. Sri Lanka’s world market share has 
consequently declined to levels last seen in the 1980s.  
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133. Overall export performance is mainly in unsophisticated product lines, notwithstanding the 
success of some niche companies. Sri Lanka’s exports of manufactured goods per capita are only one-
third and less than half of China’s or Vietnam’s levels, respectively (Figure 4.5A). Not much more than 
one-tenth of the exports are for skill- and capital-intensive production with the rest being low-added value 
skills and resource intensive products (Figure 4.5B). IT exports tripled between 2007 and 2014, but still 
make up less than 4 percent of total exports. Sri Lanka’s export performance highlights the huge untapped 
potential in the tradable sector. It also implies that there are significant barriers holding back private 
creativity to realize the economic potential of Sri Lanka’s relatively educated labor force. Additionally, the 
export product categories have remained largely the same over two decades (Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.5  Exports per capita are low and Labor-intensive 
A. Exports per capita (US$) in 2012 B. Skill & Capital intensive exports  
(percent exports) 
  
Source: World Bank calculations based on WDI 
 
Figure 4.6: Sri Lanka’s exports by product category in 1990 vs 2013 
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Source: World Integrated Trade Solution. 
 
134. What explains the inward orientation and lack of diversification? This section aims to unpack 
the reasons for the relatively slow growth in exports and lack of dynamism in the emergence of new 
economic sectors. In addition to trade and industrial policies and regulatory hurdles, the focus will be on 
the barriers to attracting FDI, the availability of skills for a competitive economy, and innovation policies 
that promote diversification.   
Trade and Industrial Policies 
135. Sri Lanka’s export production basket is still a reflection of the outward-oriented economic 
policies adopted in the years following the two waves of liberalization – first in 1977-79 and then in 
1990-92. The government created Export Processing Zones (EPZs) – industrial parks with preferential tax 
treatment and specific regulatory conditions aimed at attracting manufacturing FDI. Originally adopted as 
a policy objective in 1978, EPZs took on greater prominence during the second phase of reform in the 
1990s, with the establishment of the BOI, and continued to be used as a strategy to encourage FDI and 
boost manufacturing exports. The government extended incentives to industry to set up in EPZs, provided 
special customs facilitation, duty-free imports of intermediate inputs and equipment, tax exemptions and 
preferential tax rates, streamlined administration, and subsidized utilities. A parallel policy objective during 
this time was the industrialization of rural communities (targeting employment for rural youth) and the 
expansion of the apparel industry through the implementation of the 200 Garment Factories Program. This 
was aimed at both domestic and foreign investors, inside and outside the EPZs. Much of the early 
investment into the EPZs was by foreign firms and concentrated in the garments sector, taking advantage 
of the Multi Fiber Agreement quota for garment exports to EU markets. This then explains part of the 
structural transformation described in Chapter II: whereas foreign export-oriented manufacturing firms 
accounted for only 24 percent of the total in 1977, they accounted for around 80 percent of all manufacturing 
exports in the 1990s. Firms with an agreement with the BOI accounted for half of manufacturing exports 
by the 1990s. The establishment of manufacturing export firms attracted international buying groups with 
links to these foreign firms, establishing local offices in Sri Lanka. 
 
136. While Sri Lanka’s industrial policy has been broadly market-oriented since liberalization in 
the 1970s, the degree of outward orientation has wavered. The two rounds of economic liberalization 
introduced a series of reforms towards deregulating the economy, accompanied by a strong focus on export 
orientation and FDI promotion. These reform rounds were accompanied by incentives to promote exports, 
including a favorable special tax regime and favorable operating environments with easier customs 
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facilitation and import duty cuts. But in the last decade (since the mid-2000s), there has been a noticeable 
slide towards protectionism and industrial policy has focused more on promoting domestic enterprises.39  
 
137. There has been an increase in para-tariffs in the past decade. This has not only significantly 
increased nominal protection and prices of imports, but has also added to trade policy complexity. The 
combined system of the Most Favored 
Nation applied tariff rate and the para-
tariffs has made the present import 
regime one of the most complex and 
protectionist in the world.40 
Implementing para-tariffs has 
effectively doubled the protection rates 
to 24 percent (Figure 4.7). Worse still is 
the para-tariffs’ dispersion, which leads 
to prices that distort production and 
consumption patterns. Last, higher rates 
of protection on final products than on 
inputs used in their production lead to 
high effective protection rates and anti-
export bias, because producers have 
strong incentive to sell goods 
domestically even though their domestic 
costs are higher than their opportunity costs through trade. This is particularly worrying in the case of the 
agricultural sector, given that a large share of the bottom 40 percent of the population continues to be 
agricultural producers. Trade barriers also make it more difficult for local producers to access inputs, 
reducing their competitiveness and ability to integrate in global value chains. Firms are also less likely to 
invest in capital equipment that would raise productivity and promote technology transfers. 
 
138. Stagnating product diversification and weak export performance has come on the back of an 
industrial policy orientation in the past decade that does not promote competition and aims to protect 
domestic industry. Although successive governments after 1977 carried out ad hoc import substitution 
policies, these did not have a significant aggregate impact on trade policy. The decade since 2005 has seen 
the most extensive measures were adopted, where the focus noticeably tilted towards promotion of domestic 
agriculture (with generous subsidies and guaranteed prices), domestic industries (with specific tax breaks 
and tariff protection), and wide-scale public infrastructure programs (particularly connective infrastructure 
like highways and ports).   
 
139. The government has been interventionist, “tilting the playing field” in many areas through a 
web of tax and trade policy incentives for a large number of domestic sectors and actors.  As noted in 
Chapter II, there are now over 500 VAT exemptions for various industries and actors and 48 various types 
                                                          
39 Kaminski B and Ng F (2013) ‘Increase in Protectionism and its Impact on Sri Lanka’s Performance in Global 
Markets’, World Bank, p3. 
40 Pursell 2011a,b 
Figure 4.7. Sri Lanka. Nominal Trade Protection, 1982–
January 2011 (percent) 
 
Source: Kaminski and Ng 2012. 
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of income-tax holidays, many of which are quite expansive (such as “new undertakings in less developed 
areas”).  Many of the incentives appear to benefit a specific, small set of firms.  For instance, in 2012, the 
government announced fiscal measures to support import substitution industries in cement, 
pharmaceuticals, steel, fabric and milk powder. Without any wide scale existing local entrepreneurship in 
these sectors to take advantage of these concessions, it was apparent that such measures were targeted to 
benefit a handful of firms.   
 
140. FDI has also been promoted through incentives for specific investors provided through BOI 
and under the Strategic Development Projects (SDP) Act, giving government a large, direct role. The 
SDP Act in particular provides fast-track approvals, exemptions from a range of income and border taxes, 
and special treatment on land ownership. The act allows for negotiation of individual deals and the 
eligibility of projects are discretionary; whether a project is strategic in nature can be left to interpretation 
by the subject minister, so long as it is in a sector that is specified in the act. Many of the 13 SDPs that have 
been approved have been unsolicited proposals. There is little reporting on their terms, particularly tax 
benefits and the terms for use of land, nor is it possible to determine fiscal impacts by available budget data.  
The upshot of these regimes is that prospective investors have a strong incentive to negotiate with 
government to secure privileges.  This is particularly the case with SDPs where terms are decided on a case-
by-case basis; BOI incentives are uniform for all investors.  
 
141. The government has also made attempts to encourage greater domestic value-addition of 
manufactured exports as well as commodity exports. This was done by introducing high taxes (called 
‘cesses’) on exports in “raw form” as determined by the government. The taxes are primarily imposed on 
exports of tea, rubber, cinnamon, coconut and spices.  Revenues from cesses are supposed to be then 
invested in R&D for the corresponding sectors again to encourage value addition.  It is yet to be seen 
whether this has had any significant impact on boosting value-added exports of primary commodities. These 
policy measures would need to be accompanied by steps to increase competitiveness and innovation of 
firms in these sectors to truly be able to move up the value chain. The falling prices of key commodities – 
like natural rubber (due to the global expansion of synthetic rubber) – have also hurt the ability of traditional 
firms to finance industrial upgrading in line with government policy directions. 
 
142. Inward orientation and lack of diversification are reflected in the structural characteristics 
of Sri Lanka’s agriculture sector.  Although, agriculture has contributed about one-third to Sri Lanka’s 
poverty reduction over the past decade (Chapter II), the sector has remained in a low productivity 
equilibrium including the plantation (tea, coconut, rubber) and field crops sectors.  Achieving self-
sufficiency in rice has been a success but has also meant that Sri Lanka’s agriculture production structure 
has remained concentrated in the basic and relatively low-value food crop.  In 2013, about 66 percent of 
the cultivated area was under rice cultivation but the share of rice in the overall value of crop production 
was only about 20 percent.  Despite growing domestic demand and potential for export growth, higher-
valued crops, in particular fruits and vegetables have not expanded, while growing demand has been met 
by increased imports of, for example, dairy products, potatoes, onions and maize.  
 
143. A recent EU ban on Sri Lankan fish exports further limits export potential in a sector that is 
important for the bottom 40 percent. In February 2015, the EU imposed a ban on fish imports from Sri 
Lanka over concerns on Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated fishing. The EU is the main destination of fish 
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exports of Sri Lanka, with about 42 percent of fish exports being shipped to the EU in 2013. The fisheries 
sector employs an estimated one million citizens, contributing over 1.8 percent of GDP in 2014. Much of 
the population involved in this sector is located in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Recent analysis 
using a Computable General Equilibrium model found that the overall effect of the ban on Sri Lankan fish 
could cause a decline in Sri Lanka’s GDP growth rate by 0.01 percentage points and a 3 percent increase 
in poverty from 6.74 to 6.94 percent.41 Although the ban is on the fishing sector, unskilled workers in 
agriculture and other sectors are likely to be the most adversely affected due to inter-sectoral linkages and 
because of increased competition with workers who lose their fishing jobs. 
 
144. Sri Lanka’s new policy makers will need to review and revise the country’s trade-related 
policies in order to promote economic diversification and shared growth. The links between growth 
performance and specific trade policies are ambiguous and depend on many endogenous and exogenous 
factors such as factor endowments, geographical location, demography, etc. Each policy comes with its 
own set of challenges. For example, import substitution laid the foundation for industrialization in Brazil 
but at some point led the economy to collapse under the weight of accumulated inefficiencies. Some East 
Asian countries (e.g. Japan, South Korea) caught up with developed economies while keeping multinational 
corporations and FDI largely out of the country whereas others (e.g. Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) 
actively sought to attract foreign investors and benefited from positive spillovers. In the case of Sri Lanka, 
moving from growth fueled by reconstruction and infrastructure towards growth based on a diversified and 
competitive economy will likely require a rethinking of the policies in place and their suitability as 
foundations for the economy of the future. 
Attracting and Retaining Efficiency-Enhancing Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)  
145. FDI is needed as a foundation for economic diversification, but Sri Lanka’s performance has 
been disappointing. In addition to boosting investment necessary for growth and providing long-term 
balance of payments financing, FDI can help enhance the sophistication of Sri Lankan products and exports 
through introduction of new technologies and production processes. It can also give rise to positive 
spillovers through improvement of skills and introduction of new management practices. Finally, FDI can 
enhance access of Sri Lankan producers to global production networks and facilitate the development of 
new activities within existing value chains (increasing value added in production). However, FDI in Sri 
Lanka has been lower than in peer countries in spite of Sri Lanka’s comparative advantages, such as its 
location and access to major markets (Figure 4.8).  
 
146. Not all FDI has the same potential for positive spillovers to the economy. FDI inflows to Sri 
Lanka have been largely focused on infrastructure (inclusive of real estate development), with a relatively 
small proportion reaching sectors of the economy that are associated with global networks of production 
(Figure 4.8B). There are broadly three types of FDI: (i) natural-resource-seeking; (ii) market-seeking; and 
(iii) efficiency-seeking. When considering investment policy, it is critical to acknowledge that the factors 
that motivate, dissuade and impact investors are vastly different depending on the business they are in, and 
the markets they target. The basic motivations of an investor provide an insight into the socio-economic 
impacts that the firm may have in Sri Lanka. Countries often make the mistake of designing investment 
policies around the type of foreign investments that they already have, rather than tailoring policies to suit 
the type of investment that they want to grow. In that regard, it is important for authorities to identify those 
                                                          
41 Sahin et al, 2015. 
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types of investors that are more likely to make a positive contribution to the domestic economy. In turn, 
this identification should be consistent with the investment policy that is developed for the country. 
Figure 4.8 Net Inflows and composition of FDI 
A. FDI net inflows in 2013 ( percent GDP) B. Composition of FDI 
 
 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators Source: Board of Investment, World Bank 
 
147. Using incentives may not be an effective tool to attract efficiency-enhancing FDI to Sri Lanka. 
Investment incentives can be used to compete for potential investors; to encourage certain business 
practices; and to attract investment into priority regions and priority sectors. However, evidence from both 
survey and econometric studies indicate that the key determinants affecting an investor’s decision on where 
to locate are often based on broad economic and investment climate factors such as market size, regulatory 
policies, natural resource endowments, infrastructure, and human capital availability (Box 4.2).42 
Investment incentives, therefore, tend to be most relevant at the margins of investor decision-making; they 
are likely to be most influential when investors are wavering between similar options, and when a country 
already has a favorable investment climate.  As Sri Lanka seeks to enhance the attraction and retention of 
FDI with positive transformative potential, it should analyze the effectiveness and adequacy of incentives 
together with the costs involved in fiscal losses and potential disruption of market dynamics (through, inter 
alia, the creation of an unleveled playing field).  
                                                          
42 While many countries have sought to attract FDI through offering incentives to investors, research has 
demonstrated that a) incentives alone can be insufficient to attract efficiency-enhancing FDI, b) retention of FDI is 
low as incentives pose a significant fiscal strain and investors often switch investment destinations when incentives 
dry up, and c) fixing enabling environment deficiencies can be more effective than offering incentives to cover for 
such deficiencies. 
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 Box 4.2. Global Experience in Attracting and Retaining FDI:  
Infrastructure and Incentives are Not Major Factors 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency conducted a Global Investment and Political Risk survey 
of investors in 2013 to identify the main factors that inform the selection of investment destinations. Global 
investors seek macroeconomic and political stability in the host country as a foundation. Beyond that, the 
availability of qualified staff is the most important decision element, and one that has grown rapidly in 
relevance over the past few years. Other factors, such as the availability of infrastructure, have substantially 
decreased in importance when investors select locations. Notably, while the size of the domestic market 
used to be a major decision factor, it has become less important owing to shifting interest towards 
efficiency and linkages to global markets..The views of global investors offer insights that can be used to 
determine the priorities for policies and investments aimed at attracting and retaining FDI. They also 
highlight the fact that bringing FDI to Sri Lanka will require much more than investment in infrastructure 
and incentives to investors. Research on other countries has demonstrated that: (i) incentives alone can be 
insufficient to attract efficiency-enhancing FDI; (ii) retention of FDI is low as incentives pose a significant 
fiscal strain and investors often switch investment destinations when incentives dry up; and (iii) fixing 
enabling-environment deficiencies can be more effective than offering incentives to cover for such 
deficiencies. 
Sri Lanka may consider other factors to attract investment, including: 
 Minimizing uncertainty and fostering investor confidence through certainty on policies and 
regulations. 
 Eliminating unnecessary regulatory and policy obstacles to FDI. 
 Investing in education to ensure that the population (and especially the youth) has the skills demanded 
by efficiency-enhancing enterprises (see below).  
 Establishing a level playing field that fosters competition and eliminates preferential treatment for 
specific public or private players. 
 Developing a well-functioning financial sector that can actively contribute to the development of local 
firms that can be part of the ecosystem around foreign enterprises. 
Factors that inform the selection of investment destinations 
        A. Main obstacles to FDI       B. Top Political Risks from 2012-2015 
  
Source: MIGA (2013) World Investment and Political Risk Report, IBRD/World Bank. 
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Ensuring Human Capital and Skills for Competitiveness 
148. The challenges of competing in the global economy require not only high human capital and 
advanced skills but also a workforce that can adjust to shifts in domestic and global demand. 
Education and training are fundamental for a competitive economy, especially for the production of high-
value-added goods and services.43 International evidence shows that skills are key to improving the welfare 
of individuals and ensuring that the private sector can innovate and adjust to greater global competition, 
master processes that will increase productivity, and attract and retain FDI. 
  
                                                          
43 Ashton and Green (1996) 
Minimizing uncertainty and fostering investor confidence. Governments have a major role in 
building investor confidence through ensuring predictability and consistency in regulations that govern 
the activities of foreign investors, as well as protecting investor rights and ownership. Arguably, this 
confidence is particularly important in attracting efficiency-seeking investors, whose business model 
depend on productivity and reliability of production (which can be easily disrupted by regulatory 
changes), rather than on cheap access to natural resources. Recent actions including the appropriation of 
37 “underutilized” assets, as well as the proposed/upcoming changes to land laws, significantly 
undermine the confidence of foreign investors on Sri Lanka, and reduce its competitiveness as a long-
term investment destination in favor of jurisdictions that can provide a higher degree of certainty to 
foreign investors. 
 
Investment entry barriers include both (de jure) rule-based, legal barriers and (de facto) factual 
barriers that arise on the ground. Although most countries in the world seek to attract foreign 
investment, very few countries maintain an entirely open investment regime. Some limitations may 
intentionally discriminate against foreign firms, such as when a country closes a sector for security or 
cultural reasons, or protects a domestic industry. Other limitations may arise as a substitute for 
regulation, or because of institutional dynamics and inefficiencies. In addition to policy obstacles, there 
are procedural barriers, including documentation requirements, as well as de facto barriers such as lack 
of enforcement or excessive discretion on the part of public officials.  Research conducted on OECD 
countries, estimated FDI increases after the removal of specific restrictions (Table B1). While these 
figures may not necessarily reflect the situation in Sri Lanka, they highlight the potential of reforms in 
enhancing the attractiveness of a country as an investment destination. In the case of Sri Lanka, the 
World Bank has not undertaken a formal assessment of specific barriers. Such analysis would help in 
order to identify the current obstacles that may be further reducing the attractiveness of the country as 
an investment destination.  
 
Table B1. FDI Flows: the hypothetical effect of removing FDI restrictions 
Type of FDI restriction removed Percent change in inward FDI 
(average across OECD countries) 
Removal of foreign equity ceilings 77.9 
Removal of approval and national interest tests  21.2 
Easing of nationality requirements on management 10.1 
Source: OECD Research (2003)   
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149. Educational attainment of the 
Sri Lankan working age population has 
improved. The proportion of those who 
have completed O-levels has increased 
from 30 to 35 percent, with a higher 
increase for females than for males, and 
higher for youth than for adults (Figure 
4.9). For example from 2002 to 2012, the 
number of 20 to 24 year olds with O-levels 
increased by 12 percentage points (42 to 54 
percent) while for 25 to 29 year olds it 
increased by only 7 percentage points 
(from 36 to 43 percent).  Younger cohorts 
are not only more educated in general, but 
their educational attainment has increased 
over time. For example, the proportion of 
individuals with O-levels and A-levels is 
11 percentage points higher for 20 to 24 year olds than for 25 to 29 year olds, while the proportion of those 
with degrees or more for 25 to 29 year olds are higher (5 percent) compared to older age groups (4 percent 
for 30 to 39 year olds and 3 percent for 40 to 49 year-olds). 
 
150. Despite the past positive achievements, the quality of general education lags that of many 
higher middle-income countries. Sri Lanka’s Quality of education, as measured by annual national 
assessments of learning outcomes and periodic internationally comparable tests, lags that of several higher 
middle-income countries, particularly in language and numeracy skills (Figure 4.10A).44 In particular, if Sri 
Lanka aims to improve its educational outcomes it will likely need to increase the resources devoted to 
education. This is especially the case in rural and estate sectors, and among students from the types of 
schools attended by low-income households where educational outcomes are weaker.45 Furthermore, there 
is significant variation in learning outcomes among provinces (Figure 4.10B). 
  
                                                          
44 Dundar et al. (2014), Aturupane et al. (2014). Country selection based on data availability. 
45 UNDP, 2014 
Figure 4.9. Completed O-levels by age group 
 
Source: World Bank using Labor Force Survey  
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Figure 4.10 Learning Outcomes 
A. Learning Outcomes in Sri Lanka and 
Comparator Countries, 2010 
B. Cognitive Test Scores for Students in English 
in Sri Lanka’s Provinces, 2012 
  
Source: National Education Research and Evaluation 
Center, University of Colombo, 2010. 
Note: TIMSS is Trends in International Mathematics 
and Science Study, an international assessment 
Source: National Education Research and Evaluation 
Center, University of Colombo, 2013 
 
151. Moreover, Sri Lanka has a shortage of adequate vocational and technical skills in its 
workforce, skills that are increasingly in demand. Although there is an increasing demand for mid-level 
technicians, in particular in the services sector, and low-skilled workers in manufacturing, only 16 percent 
of workers have completed technical and vocational education and training (TVET), and only 73 percent 
of those have acquired few, if any, job-relevant skills (Figure 4.11). Just 16 percent of workers know how 
to use a computer and 24 percent have proficiency in English. Aptitude for these skills is lowest in the rural 
and low-skilled parts of the population. Many existing training programs in the TVET sector suffer from 
low quality and a lack of relevance to the skills demanded by employers. Importantly, the links between 
vocational training centers and industry are missing. In fact, 46 percent of employers indicate that job-
specific skills are the most important factor in deciding whether to retain a high-skilled worker and 38 
percent said the same about retaining low-skilled workers. 
 
152. When it comes to advanced skills and human capital, Sri Lanka has very few highly skilled 
workers, and there are constraints on the quality and relevance of higher education and research.46 
Sri Lanka lags in higher education enrollment compared to other middle-income countries (Figure 4.12A). 
Moreover, enrollment in tertiary education as a proportion of labor force averaged just 1 percent since 1995, 
far below enrollment rates in other fast-growing economies in East Asia (Figure 4.12B). Overall enrollment 
in higher education for 20- to 24-years-olds in Sri Lanka is about 17 percent, whereas the average higher 
education enrollment rate for middle-income countries is about 30 percent. 
  
                                                          
46 Dundar H et al (2014), IPS, 2014 and World Bank, 2014b 
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Figure 4.11 Increasing demand for workers with better skills 
A. Expected additional hiring by occupation and 
sector (percent), 2013-14 
B. Employers ranking of skills when making 
decisions about retaining white-collar workers 
  
Source: Dundar H et al (2014).  
 
Figure 4.12 Sri Lanka has a small stock of highly skilled workers, with trends that are not encouraging 
A. Gross Enrollment Rate, 
Tertiary (2012) 
B. Trends in higher education enrollment rates as a 
percentage of labor force, 1986–2010 
  
Source: UIS http://data.uis.unesco.org/# Source: Chellaraj 2012 
 
153. The structure and composition of Sri Lanka’s higher education enrollment has multiple 
defects.47 First, the largest share of enrollment, nearly 60 percent, is in external degree programs (EDPs), 
where students are enrolled in universities and sit examinations, but do not follow lectures or classes, and 
                                                          
47 See World Bank, 2009b. 
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receive no academic support from the university. This is a low-cost option for the government to expand 
higher education access and coverage: but it is at the expense of quality. The greatest proportion of 
unemployed graduates is drawn from these EDPs. Second, the balance between enrollment in the public 
sector and in the private sector is heavily skewed against the private sector, which has only 12 percent of 
enrollment. This is due to Sri Lanka’s strong state-centered higher education system. A major constraint to 
expanding private-sector participation is the absence of a clear and transparent process for private higher 
education institutions to register and obtain quality and accreditation assurances. A third major constraint 
is the relatively low public investment that has limited the expansion of the public universities, especially 
in the sciences, technology and engineering. In fact, the proportion of students enrolled in science and 
engineering has actually begun to decline since 2002.48 Indeed, the composition of students in the 
conventional degree programs of the universities is still dominated by disciplines such as the liberal arts, 
management, commerce and law, with underrepresentation of scientific and technical fields. A middle-
income country, if it is to grow fast, needs a higher proportion of skilled and competent science and 
technical graduates. Moreover, enrollment in employment-oriented alternative higher education institutions 
in the public sector is small, at only 3 percent of total higher education enrollment. Finally, leadership and 
communications skills are some of the non-cognitive abilities of white-collar workers that are most highly 
prized by Sri Lankan firms. Unfortunately, many soft skills are not learned sufficiently by Sri Lankans 
through the formal education system. To compete effectively in international markets Sri Lanka’s 
workforce will need to attain a higher level of computer literacy, the ability to operate the latest equipment, 
and fluency in foreign languages.49  
 
154. The result is that Sri Lanka’s firms have difficulty accessing the skills they need. In 2010, 
manufacturing companies ranked the inadequate education of the labor force as the third most important 
constraint on their operations, with only Bangladesh and Afghanistan having higher such ratings in South 
Asia (Figure 4.13). Only electricity supply and tax rates were greater concerns. This is a problem that affects 
firms across all sectors. If these firms cannot find the skills that they need, they will not be able to upgrade 
their processes and products to compete in a more liberalized trade regime. 
 
155. There is a mismatch between the level and type of skills taught by the education and training 
system and what potential employers value.50 While 56 percent of employers think that high-skilled 
workers should pass GCE A-levels, only 18 percent of the population has done so.51 Similarly, 70 percent 
of employers think that an average low-skilled worker should have passed GCE O-levels, but only 35 
percent of low-skilled employees and 40 percent of the self-employed have done so. About 60 percent of 
employers responding to a survey expected that an average worker in a high-skilled occupation should have 
completed technical or vocational education and training, and 24 percent think the same about low-skilled 
workers. Yet only 16 percent of the population has that qualification (Figure 4.14). Similarly, 80 percent of 
                                                          
48 Chellaraj, 2012 
49 Dundar et al. 2014 
50 Dundar et al (2014). Overall skills stock of the labor force is measured from the STEP household survey of the 
population 15-64 years old. The employers’ view of available skills is measured from the STEP employer survey and 
serves as a proxy for the skills demand. 
51 Based on the employer survey high-skilled workers are those who work as managers, professionals, technicians, 
and associate professionals; low-skilled workers work in clerical support, services, sales, skilled agriculture, forestry 
and fishery, crafts and related trades, plant and machine operation and assembly, and low skilled occupations.  
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employers expect a high-skilled worker to know English and 40 percent expect that of less-skilled workers 
while 75 percent of employers think an average higher-skilled worker should have computer skills and 38 
percent expect the same of lower-skilled workers. However, only 20 percent of Sri Lankans are fluent in 
English and only 15 percent can use computers. The supply and demand differences are less stark in workers 
who are formally employed; the informal sector lags seriously behind. 
Figure 4.13. Factors that inform the selection of investment destinations 
A. Skills constraints as major or severe 
obstacle for firms, latest available year 
B. Labor factors that affect firm operations and growth 
in 2012 ( percent) 
 
 
Source: Dundar H et al (2014). 
 
Figure 4.14: Education and training mismatches 
 
Source: Sri Lanka STEP Household Skills Measurement and Employer Surveys. 
 
156. When it comes to vocational training, many employers question the quality and relevance of 
education and training curricula. Employers believe that the TVET system could be critical for providing 
the workers they need but feel that it does not convey up-to-date knowledge (50 percent) or produce the 
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kinds (54 percent) or levels (52 percent) of skills needed (Figure 4.15A). To compensate for skills shortages 
in the labor force many employers train their own workers.   
 
157. The returns to education have been declining. Despite average educational attainment going up, 
the premium to additional years of education has declined over time (Figure 4.15B). This may be expected 
when overall average educational attainment increases without a commensurate increase in demand, leading 
to a decline in the premium from higher education.  To demonstrate a mismatch between the demand for 
skills and the supply of education requires estimating returns to each type of skill under consideration, 
controlling for the increase in quantity of each such skill. However, to the extent that companies report 
shortages of well-trained workers, this decline in the returns to education is consistent with the view that 
Sri Lanka’s educational system is not providing the skills desired by the market. This problem is particularly 
worrisome for the youth, who often wait for years to be admitted into university and then end up with 
degrees that provide relatively low returns. 
Figure 4.15. Inadequate skills lead to low returns to education 
A. Employers’ perception of general 
education, TVET, and university, percent 
B. The returns to education have been 
declining52 
  
Source: World Bank calculations using Sri Lanka STEP 
Employers Survey. 
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force 
Surveys excluding Northern and Eastern provinces 
Innovation Policies 
158. Promoting innovation and entrepreneurship is essential to increase the competitiveness of Sri 
Lanka’s private sector. While many countries have sought to enhance innovation through direct 
government support in the form of subsidies and grants, the results and effectiveness of such programs have 
been mixed at best. Enhancing innovation in Sri Lanka will likely require a long-term innovation policy 
that fosters linkages between domestic and foreign firms as well as between universities and R&D 
institutions and the private sector in Sri Lanka. An effective innovation policy will also eliminate costly 
barriers to imports of capital goods and be in line with policies aimed at attracting efficiency-seeking FDI. 
                                                          
52 Private returns to education to the ith level of education is calculated by taking the difference between the 
coefficients of the two neighboring schooling levels in the Mincer equations, and dividing by the difference in 
education attainment. 
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159. Different countries have adopted different innovation policies and there is no one-size-fits-all 
approach Sophisticated economies such as South Korea and Singapore have promoted R&D-driven 
innovation, which leads to the introduction of products and processes that are “new to the world” (Figure 
4.17). However, investment in R&D may not be efficient in absence of linkages between R&D institutions 
and networks of enterprises that can benefit from it. Economies that have yet to catch up with more 
productive peers often implement policies that seek to accelerate the absorption of existing technologies 
that are “new to the country” as a way to enhance the productivity of existing industries (Table 4.1). Sri 
Lanka’s expenditure on R&D and formal transfer of technology has been modest compared to other 
emerging markets.  
 
160. Strengthening research and development and promoting collaboration between academia 
and the private sector is critical. In the past the focus of government has largely been on income tax and 
VAT incentives to boost R&D, particularly through government institutions. However, two constraints 
quickly emerged: (i) the small number of suitable government research institutions capable of catering to 
industry needs; and (ii) the limited capacity in, and low-industry orientation of, government research 
facilities. Raising overall public and private R&D is important but should be done in the context of 
knowledge institutions that effectively collaborate with the private sector.  
161. Investment in, and quality of, R&D has been insufficient to facilitate effective modernization 
of agriculture.  Sri Lanka has fallen behind in the generation of new knowledge and technology as well as 
in the distribution of new technologies that are critical for modern farming.  The percentage of the 
agriculture budget allocated for R&D and extension is small compared to other Asian nations.  The majority 
of the country’s 23 research institutes focus on traditional sub-sectors and crops, including fisheries, rice, 
and the plantation crops (tea, rubber, coconut, sugar cane).  Very little funding is allocated to higher-value 
crops (vegetables, fruit, dairy) that are critical to driving sector modernization and exports. In fact, only a 
small portion of the value of export cesses – which are supposed to be the industry's contributions to 
agricultural R&D (tea, rubber, coconut mainly) -- are given to the research institutes. These institutions 
focus on physical output of commodities and less explicitly on profitability of for its customers.  At the 
same time, publicly run extension services are under-resourced and do not allow for effective diffusion of 
new technologies.  R&D must shift towards a more market-driven approach as farmers diversify their 
farming systems by producing more high-value crops, livestock, and related products. Sri Lanka would 
benefit from an overall reorganization of its R&D and extension system, including promoting more private-
sector participation.   
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 Figure 4.16: R&D expenditure  
(percent of GDP) 
Figure 4.17: Proportion of firms using technology 
licensed from foreign companies ( percent) 
 
 
Source: World Bank WDI (Sri Lanka as of 2010). 
Table 4.1: Technology and development53 
 Availability 
of latest 
technologies 
Firm-level 
technology 
absorption 
FDI and 
technology 
transfer 
Bangladesh 99 108 112 
China 97 68 81 
India 110 102 95 
Indonesia 53 42 40 
Japan 14 2 55 
Malaysia 33 24 8 
Mauritius 48 44 57 
Pakistan 85 83 90 
Philippines 58 41 31 
Rep. of Korea 30 28 73 
Singapore 15 16 2 
Sri Lanka 70 53 53 
Thailand 74 55 15 
Vietnam 123 121 93 
 
Source: World Economic Forum (2015). Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys (Sri Lanka as of 2011). 
 
162. Sri Lanka’s potential for innovation and scientific discovery is highlighted by its output of 
intellectual property where it lags behind some particularly dynamic countries (Figure 4.18). 
Countries that have moved from middle-income to high-income status tend to show higher levels of patent 
generation than nations that do not make the jump, and Sri Lanka is likely to need to follow the same path.54 
Sri Lanka has an intellectual property framework in place but it has scope for improvement.55 Beyond the 
legal and regulatory framework covering intellectual property rights, there is also scope to strengthen 
                                                          
53 See http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2014-2015/economies/#economy=LKA 
54 Bulman D, Eden M and Nguyen H (2014)  
55 See http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/profile.jsp?code=LK and http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2014-2015/economies/#economy=LKA 
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financial services and support mechanisms to foster the commercialization of local inventions and 
improvements of technology and production techniques.  
Figure 4.18. Applications for Trademarks and Patents per US$100 billion, 2013 
(total count, by applicants origin) 
A. Applications for trademarks  B. Applications for patents  
  
Source: http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/?lang=en  
 
C. The Relationship between the Public Sector and Private Sector 
163. The relationship between the public sector and private sector has been a critical determinant 
of Sri Lanka’s development over the past few decades and will shape its progress going forward.  
Global experience points to the importance of private-sector-led growth and government regulation to 
facilitate such growth.  Industrial, trade, and tax policies carried out by successive governments – many of 
them extremely granular in nature -- have shaped the contours of Sri Lanka’s economy.   The government 
has also had a major impact on the economy and jobs for the population through regulation of the private 
sector in terms of market entry and transactions, land use, and labor practices. While all states regulate these 
issues, particular features of Sri Lanka’s approach have led to specific types of constraints.  Finally, the 
state itself is a major participant in the market through its large SOE sector and large public service, which 
in turn has impacted competitiveness in a number of sectors and labor market dynamics.  These government 
policies have contributed to the emergence of a large informal sector, which further distorts the market and 
undermines productivity.  Addressing constraints evident in the present pattern of the state’s interaction 
with the private sector – improving economic governance -- is a priority for sustaining growth and 
expanding employment opportunities for the population as a whole and the bottom 40 percent in particular. 
Public Sector Performance as a Regulator 
164. The investment climate in Sri Lanka lags behind that of regional peers and is a significant 
drag on competitiveness going forward. Sri Lanka has made some important reforms over the past years 
that have translated into improvements in some areas of investment climate. However, most areas of the 
investment climate remain more challenging than in other regional and LMIC comparators by several 
measures, including the Ease of Doing Business indicators (Figure 4.19). Going forward, sustainable 
private-sector-led growth will require the ability of the country to identify and eliminate unnecessary 
business environment obstacles to entrepreneurship particular to Sri Lanka. This will require more intensive 
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public-private dialogue to involve the private sector in identification of the most significant obstacles to 
their operations as a way to prioritize reforms. At the same time, after reforms take place on paper, their 
full and consistent implementation across the country is essential to ensure equal opportunities for 
entrepreneurs in all regions. Finally, it will be important to assess the impact of reforms to ensure that they 
have achieved the objective expected.  
 
 
Regulatory Environment: Land 
165. Issues related to regulation of land are viewed as a barrier to business development. Access 
to land was among the chief constraints to business cited in the 2011 Enterprise Surveys, and land ownership 
issues are the most common reason cited by informal firms that do not register.56 While larger firms – 
through the SDP, BOI, and other special regimes – can circumvent some of the difficulties in accessing 
land, SMEs encounter significant difficulties. In a survey of SMEs (2014)57, 62 percent of firms affirmed 
the complexity of land-acquisition procedures, 65 percent reported that these procedures involve high costs, 
and 65 percent also reported corruption in the procedures.  Doing Business also notes the difficulty in 
registering a property. 
 
166. The state owns most land, while privately owned land is often subject to disputes over claims.  
Around 80 percent of land is state-owned, with the state owning all plantation land and common lands 
                                                          
56 de Mel et al (2013). 
57 Wijesinha, A. and Ekanayake R. (2014), ‘Tax Policy and Enterprise Development in South Asia – Sri Lanka 
Country Report’, Governance Institutes Network International: Islamabad.  
Figure 4.19. Comparison of Rankings, Doing Business 2015 
 
Source: World Bank Doing Business, 2015.  
Note: Higher ranking implies lower comparative performance 
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(forests, beaches, etc.) and 55 percent of non-plantation cropland, mainly in large irrigation areas.  The state 
has consistently avoided outright sales of land. Private ownership of agricultural land is restricted to 50 
acres per person. There is much anecdotal evidence of a large number of disputes over ownership claims 
of land in both rural and urban areas.  This is caused by both incompleteness and inconsistencies in past 
registration systems as well as inheritance law, which mandates the partition of land among successors.  
The system for demarcating and registering tenure rights to land parcels is fragmented among institutions 
and there is a lack of provisions to resolve disputes over claims to land quickly and conclusively.  For these 
reasons, the vast majority of civil cases in courts taking more than five years to resolve (and in some cases 
stretching over decades) relate to partition and land disputes.58 Contestation over ownership dampens 
investment, reduces the efficiency of land markets and ultimately undermines productive use of land assets. 
 
167. Tenure and use regimes of most state-owned land by private parties are regulated by the 
Land Development Ordinance (LDO). According to this ordinance originating from the 1930s, the state 
provides the right to occupy and use land in perpetuity subject to restrictions on sale, lease and mortgaging 
and conditions on failing to use land productively.  The provision of rights is in two stages – first 
“permitted” for a short period of time and then “granted” as a right.  Although there are few cases of the 
government taking back land or denying alienation of tenure rights to others, the latent possibility provides 
local administrators with discretion and deflates the value of the land ownership rights.  Under the LDO 
and through other incentives associated with fertilizer subsidies, the state regulates the types of crops that 
should be grown, with particular attention given to ensuring rice production.  Plantation land is handled 
through long-term concessions to large private companies or directly managed by state-owned agricultural 
enterprises. 
 
168. Finally, the predictability of state regulation with regard to property rights has been 
impacted by a few recent cases of controversial government legislation. Most notable among these was 
an act introduced in late 2011 under which private-sector projects on state land deemed by the government 
to be abandoned, underused or being operated outside of the scope of the original agreements were returned 
to the state. The “Revival of Underperforming Enterprises and Underutilized Assets Act” expropriated 37 
enterprises in sectors like hotels, mixed-property development and sugar industries. While the government
 at the time stated this would be a one-off measure, the law’s targeting of specific enterprises and language 
that provided for further takings spooked business confidence.  Similarly, in 2013 the government abruptly 
introduced legislation to restrict foreign ownership of land, including legal entities with foreign equity. 
Consultative mechanisms for private-sector inputs on specific legislation that may affect the business 
climate are ad hoc at best.  
Regulatory Environment: Licenses and Permits 
169. Licenses and permits are an obstacle to a greater degree than in comparator countries, with 
significant differences within the country.  Almost one in five companies responding to an enterprise 
survey in 2011 identified licensing and permitting as a major obstacle to their operations – as compared to 
close to one in 10 firms with similar views in other countries. These investment climate difficulties affect 
firms unevenly across industries and regions (Figure 4.20). While one in 10 service-sector firms are 
negatively affected, almost one in three manufacturing firms are impacted. One in 100 firms in the Southern 
                                                          
58 World Bank 2013 
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Province suffer from these difficulties, while they hamper almost six out of 10 firms in the Northern 
Province. The uneven impact of investment climate deficiencies highlights a potential gap between the 
written law and its application, which could stem from discretionary behavior of some regulatory agencies. 
The uneven application of laws and regulations across regions could reinforce existing regional growth 
imbalances and hurt employment creation in areas where more of the bottom 40 percent is located, like in 
the Northern Province. 
Figure 4.20: Percent of firms identifying business licensing and permits as a major constraint 
A. Cross country comparison B. Sector and regional breakdown 
  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2012 
 
Regulatory Environment: Trade Facilitation 
170. Sri Lanka has seen steady 
improvement in its ranking on international 
trade facilitation indexes although its 
performance is still lower than the middle 
income and East Asian peers with which it 
currently competes.  Sri Lanka’s performance 
on key international trade-facilitation indices 
are indicative of the strides the country has 
made in improving its trade facilitation in the 
last five years (Figure 4.21). However current 
challenges involve the stiff competition being 
posed by other middle-income and South East 
Asian countries that are vying for a greater 
share of global investments. The perceptions 
identified in international indices point to 
significant improvements that could be made to 
the regulatory and institutional infrastructure 
that currently exist in Sri Lanka. 
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Figure 4.21: Changes in Logistics Performance Index 
(2010-2014) 
 
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on World 
Development Indicators data. 
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171. Bureaucratic bottlenecks have given rise to high trade transaction costs. Policy-induced 
barriers consisting of regulatory and institutional bottlenecks account for nearly 70 percent of the total time 
spent on exporting or importing goods (Figure 4.22). The preparation of documents is the most significant 
component, absorbing more than 50 percent of the time spent on import or export procedures. The existence 
of two processes for BOI companies and non-BOI companies, onerous documentation requirements and 
the failure to update the outdated customs ordinance are key issues that increase the complexity of the 
regulatory framework governing trade in Sri Lanka. Reform efforts (such as upgrading to the ASYCUDA 
World system) are also undermined by insufficient information and communication technology capacity 
among the agencies and failure to integrate the 30 government agencies involved in trade facilitation 
through a single window facility.  
 
172.  Trade facilitation efforts will benefit from increased coordination among all government 
agencies involved in the trade transaction process and, in particular, alignment with the World Trade 
Organization-Trade Facilitation Agreement, which will ensure a reduced documentation burden for 
businesses, more streamlined procedures, application of risk-based controls, increased transparency 
of information, regular stakeholder 
consultation and increased automation. 
Increasing coordination among agencies -
- with a focus on streamlining, 
harmonizing and simplifying border 
clearance, legislation, policy and 
procedures from a “whole of government” 
perspective through standard operating 
procedures, memoranda of understanding, 
and coordinated decision-making -- will 
improve the business environment. The 
establishment of the National Trade 
Facilitation Committee is a positive step 
in that regard. Moreover, clearance times 
are affected by a heavy inspection burden. There is no legal provision for risk management as there is a 
government decision that mandates 100 percent examination, a legacy from the conflict period. Removing 
the regulation and applying risk-based controls along with implementation of a streamlined and automated 
trade transaction system (single window) will facilitate trade. Finally, given the complexity involved in 
regulating imports and exports, increasing transparency in the information provided both electronically 
through a trade portal and through regular consultations with trading firms would enhance accountability 
and improve information flow among stakeholders, leading to better trade-facilitation performance. 
Regulatory Environment: Labor market 
173. Labor market regulations appear to be constraining the growth of employment. Labor market 
regulations aim to provide job security to formal-sector workers but, since these workers represent only 
about 15 percent of the labor force, the regulations instead result in a deep divide between formal and 
informal workers.  While it is relatively easy to hire workers in Sri Lanka, it remains difficult for formal 
firms to downsize during downturns. Sri Lanka's Termination of Employment of Workmen Act (TEWA) 
requires that firms with 15 or more employees justify layoffs and provide generous severance pay to 
displaced workers, with smaller firms being exempted. Moreover, severance payments are expensive 
Figure 4.22: Duration of procedures for imports/exports 
  
Source: WBG calculations based on data from www.doingbusiness.org 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Document
Preparation
Customs
clearance and
technical
control
Ports and
Terminal
Handling
Inland
Transportation
and Handling
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
ti
m
e 
 s
p
en
t
Policy induced barriers             Logistics related barriers 
78 
 
relative to regional and middle-income peers. Although formally subject to TEWA, firms in EPZs may 
have been partially exempt from TEWA due to lax enforcement in that sector. Empirical work59 has shown 
that TEWA restrictions retard the growth of non-EPZ firms below the threshold of 15 workers, only 
atypically productive firms pass the threshold, and once they do, they grow faster than EPZ firms, 
suggesting that the TEWA failed to lower unemployment. Instead, it slowed employment growth of non-
EPZ firms and induced firms to seek the EPZ sector in order to evade the law. 
 
174. In addition, the legal framework governing work in the private sector reduces female 
employment. Legislation prevents women from taking up night work or part-time work in the growing 
service sector.60 This not only promotes exclusion of women from some economic sectors, such as the 
growing tourism industry, but it also reduces overall potential employment. Similarly, the laws governing 
maternity benefits61 make employers bear the entire cost, potentially deterring employers from hiring 
women.62  
Regulatory Environment: Enforcement of Contracts 
175. Sri Lanka’s commercial justice system is prone to delays, though there have been 
improvements in recent years.  The country’s justice system suffers from a relatively small number of 
judges and corresponding high caseloads, and lax enforcement of civil procedure, which leads to frequent 
continuations and gaps in law that make resolution of land and land inheritance disputes very difficult.  
Recent controversies over leadership in the judiciary and executive influence have further undermined the 
sector.  There is a backlog of over 25,000 civil cases lasting more than five years (and, in some instances, 
more than 30 years), the vast majority of which are land and partition (land inheritance) cases.  Alternative 
dispute resolution has not taken root, with the exception of community level mediation boards.  However, 
the introduction of a specialized commercial high court in Colombo to hear higher value commercial cases 
has improved adjudication in terms of timeliness and quality of judgments.63      
Regulatory Environment and Informality 
176.  Regulatory compliance burdens prompt entrepreneurs to operate informally, which in turn 
undermines competition. Moreover, the level of informality is much higher in some sectors (such as non-
garment manufacturing, where one in three firms reportedly start operations informally and stay informal 
                                                          
59 Abidoye, Orazem and Vodopivec (2009). 
60 The Shop and Office Employees Act No. 19 of 1954 states under paragraph 10(2) that „a person who has attained 
the age of fourteen years and who [...] is a female, shall not be employed in or about the business of a shop or office 
before 6 am or after 6pm on any day“. Exception included in the act include: (i) women from the age of eighteen 
years may be employed in or about the business of a hotel or restaurant for the period between 6pm and 10pm; (ii) 
women from the age of eighteen may be employed in a residential hotel before 6am or after 6pm; and (iii) women 
from the age of eighteen may be employed in or about the business of a shop or office for the period between 6pm 
and 8pm. See Shop and Office Employees Act accessed at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/1350/Shop 
percent20and percent20Office percent20Employees percent20Act.pdf (April 1, 2015).  
61 Maternity benefits in Sri Lanka’s private sector are governed by the Maternity Benefits Ordinance No. 32 of 1939 
(for women employed in any trade) and the Shop and Office Employees Act No. 19 of 1954 (for women employed 
in shops and offices) (Abeykoon et al. 2014). In 1993, Sri Lanka ratified the ILO Maternity Protection Convention 
(Revised) 1952 (No. 103). However, there remain shortcomings between the national legislation and the ILO 
convention. One of the shortcomings is that maternity benefit payments are financed through employer liability.  
62 Gunatilaka 2013 
63 Doing Business methodology uses a case which would fall under regular district court jurisdiction rather than the 
Colombo High Court.  
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for three years on average) and in some regions of the country (notably Eastern region where more than 60 
percent of firms surveyed start operations informally and remained informal for almost seven years on 
average (Figure 4.23A). Informality affects the ability of firms to grow and enhance productivity due, inter 
alia, to limited investment, limited access to finance and inadequate business processes. 
 
Figure 4.23: Regulatory compliance prompt entrepreneurs to operate informally 
A. The proportion of firms operating informally is high, 
particularly in non-garment manufacturing and in the North, 
East and Uva Province 
B. Informal practices are a major 
obstacle to the growth and 
competitiveness of established firms 
  
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2011 
 
177. Side-by-side operations of informal and formal firms in a market lead to unfair practices and 
market inefficiencies. Unfair competition from informal players is viewed as the single most important 
obstacle to the growth and competitiveness of established firms (Figure 4.23B). Formal firms may find 
themselves at a disadvantage as they face higher marginal costs, such as for labor and taxes, than informal 
firms. At the same time, informal firms generally have no access to financial services, government 
contracts, and essential licenses and permits, and there is local evidence that greater formalization can 
stimulate collaboration between smaller informal firms and formal firms, investment in operational 
efficiency and business growth.64 
 
  
                                                          
64 de Mel et al (2012). 
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Small and Medium Enterprises and Access to Finance 
178. Most business establishments in Sri Lanka are small, with profound implications for 
productivity. An important obstacle to improving firm-level productivity is the extent to which firms can 
take advantage of economies of scale. The 2014 Economic Census found that 93 percent of private 
economic establishments had fewer than 5 
employees (Figure 4.24). Nearly 22 percent 
of those establishments are in manufacturing, 
while 70 percent are in the service industry, 
including 40 percent in wholesale and retail 
trade, and 8 percent in hotel and food 
services. While the link between firm size 
and productivity is not documented in Sri 
Lanka, developing-country experience 
would suggest that small firms tend to be less 
productive. Moreover, these micro firms are 
younger than large enterprises, with an 
average of 10 years since beginning 
commercial operations against an average of 
20 years for medium and large firms. SMEs 
are particularly prevalent in regions outside 
the Western Province. 
 
179. The proliferation of informal employment and small firms has important consequences for 
the ability of the bottom 40 percent to share in the growth process. Most of the increase in non-
agricultural employment between 2002 and 2012 was among self-employed non-farm workers (accounting 
for 48 percent of the increase). Self-employed workers increased from 21 to 25 percent of non-agricultural 
workers between 2002 and 2012, while the share of informal-wage workers65 hovered above 30 percent of 
the non-farm workers (Figure 4.25A). Moreover, the decline in agricultural employment coincided with a 
sharp increase in workers employed in establishments with no regular employees. By 2012, 37 percent of 
non-farm workers were employed in establishments with no regular employees, up from 33 percent in 2006 
(Figure 4.25B).66  Similarly, by 2012, 74 percent of unskilled workers (those with less than a primary 
education) had only temporary or casual wage employment, up from 70 percent in 2006, suggesting that 
these workers are increasingly working under precarious conditions. Wages of temporary workers are on 
average 33 percent lower than wages of permanent workers; one-third of that gap cannot be explained by 
differences in the job or individual characteristics, suggesting that to some extent workers would choose 
more stable jobs if they could.67 
  
                                                          
65 Informal workers were defined as by DCS as workers in companies not registered, those without accounts, or 
those with less than 10 regular employees. This data is only available beginning in 2006. 
66 Although calculations presented here exclude the Northern and Eastern province for comparability purposes, the 
share of workers in establishments with no regular employees was also 47 percent in 2012 when the North and East 
are included. 
67 Arunatilake et al (2015). 
Figure 4.24. Sri Lanka. Distribution of Industries by 
Number of establishments and Persons Engaged 
 
Source: DCS, 2015 Economic Census listing sheets. 
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Figure 4.25. Non Agricultural Employment 
A. Non-farm employment by type of work 
(share of total employment) 
B. Private Sector Employment by Firm Size 
(share of private sector employment) 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) based on Labor Force Survey data. Excludes Northern and Eastern provinces. 
 
180. Under these circumstances, a key question is why firms stay informal in the first place and 
what can be done to encourage formalization. A standard hypothesis has been that reducing the cost of 
operating a business could reduce informality, reduce uncompetitive practices, and, by extension, create an 
environment more conducive to investment in productivity-enhancing activities. However, existing 
evidence indicates that lowering the costs of formalizing on businesses would have only limited impact.68 
In fact, it appears that most informal firms will not formalize unless forced to do so via increased 
enforcement, suggesting formality offers little private benefit to informal firms. Similarly, rigorous 
evaluations of business training programs show limited to no effects on actual firm outcomes and 
performance.69 Even providing business training and grants have not yet been shown  to encourage firms 
to formalize.70  Given this evidence, what policies should Sri Lanka focus on?  
 
181. There are several compelling reasons to try and bring larger and more profitable informal 
firms into the formal system. First, collecting taxes from relatively well-off owners of informal firms 
would widen the tax base, while the revenue collected is likely to justify the costs of greater inspections to 
ensure that they do become formal. Secondly, these larger and more successful informal firms are more 
likely to be the ones competing with formal firms for customers. Ensuring that such firms also become 
formal may cut back on unfair competition that prevents more efficient formal firms from growing faster. 
The challenge is how to encourage formalization of such firms. Based on the evidence described above, 
lowering the cost and complexity of registration seems a necessary, but not sufficient, step. Policymakers 
could also experiment with innovative approaches to encourage suppliers or customers to demand 
                                                          
68 See Bruhn and McKenzie (2013), Bruhn (2013), Mullainathan and Schnabl (2010) and de Mel et al (2013) for 
evidence from Brazil, Mexico, Peru, and Sri Lanka. 
69 For a recent review of the literature, see McKenzie and Woodruff (2012). 
70 See McKenzie and Woodruff (2012) for a review of the literature and de Mel et al (2012) for evidence on Sri 
Lanka. 
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formality. One such example being tried in several countries is to link each tax receipt number to a lottery, 
so that customers have an incentive to demand a tax receipt on each transaction. Such a system has been 
used in Taiwan, China; Korea; China; and Puerto Rico. Wan (2010) compares changes in tax revenues in 
districts in China that introduced this reform to those that did not, and finds the introduction of this tax 
receipt lottery increased sales tax revenue by 17 percent. 
182. For subsistence enterprises, the existing evidence seems to suggest that such firms see no 
benefits from formalizing, and would typically contribute very little to taxes if they did formalize. 
They may still compete with larger firms, but in the absence of other job opportunities for these individuals, 
the government may prefer to leave them alone rather than have them close down. The only remaining 
public rationale for trying to bring them into the formal sector is that the presence of so many informal 
firms may send a message to the public that obeying the law is optional, and also dissuade more prosperous 
informal firms from formalizing. An alternative approach used in some countries is to write the law in a 
way that does not require informal firms with income below a certain threshold to register, putting them in 
compliance with the law. But unless such a threshold is set very high, there are still likely to be many firms 
above the threshold who choose not to register. 
Access to Finance 
183. Despite ample liquidity in the banking sector and declining interest rates, access to finance 
continues to be a constraint reported 
by SMEs. Stalled growth in credit to the 
private sector can be tied to crowding out 
by the needs of the public sector – which 
utilizes almost 50 percent of the domestic 
resources in the country. To improve the 
efficient allocation of resources in Sri 
Lanka, the banking sector will need to 
become more competitive and efficient, 
and the non-banking financial sector will 
need to be developed to provide much-
needed alternative options to the SME 
sector. In particular, accessing finance 
appears to be particularly difficult for 
smaller firms, those operating in specific 
sectors (including garments and retail), 
and firms managed by women. For those 
firms, accessing credit is often dependent 
on their ability to post collateral with a 
value of more than 200 percent of the loan amount, a substantial obstacle for many firms (Figure 4.26).  On 
the other hand, larger firms appear to have relatively easy access to loans and much lower collateralization 
requirements. Although a movable collateral registry is available, it is limited in its operations, severely 
curtailing the ability of firms and entrepreneurs to use moveable collateral (e.g. machinery, inventory, 
accounts receivable) as security to their loans. As a result, despite the high penetration of regulated financial 
institutions in Sri Lanka, an estimated 64 percent of micro, small and medium enterprises remain without 
checking or savings accounts (World Bank, 2014e). 
Figure 4.26.  Access to Finance Difficulties Driven by High 
Collateral Requirements 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Surveys 2011 
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184. Access to finance is most impacted by weaknesses in the financial system and the bankability 
of projects, while availability of funds per se is not a problem.  Past strategies to address this challenge 
have relied on directed lending and concessional credit rather than improving financial intermediation for, 
and bankability of, SMEs. Sri Lanka has had numerous programs to enhance access to finance targeting 
specific sectors (including nine for agriculture, 11 for SMEs, and seven for microfinance)71, yet SMEs 
continue to highlight access to finance as a major constraint. Weaknesses in intermediation include: 
deficiencies in Sri Lanka’s credit infrastructure (the lack of a movable collateral registry and an incomplete 
credit information system); limited financial innovation (e.g. the lack of factoring, operational leasing of 
equipment); limited ability of, or incentive for, commercial banks to serve new markets segments (lack of 
cash-flow-based lending practices); and deficiencies in the legal framework governing lending activities 
(costly and long judiciary procedures for foreclosure, and an outdated Secured Transactions Law)72.  The 
disconnect between extensive penetration of banking institutions across the island and ample liquidity with 
the difficulties that SMEs have in accessing finance points to a lack of competitiveness in the banking sector 
overall.  Financial institutions appear to be complacent with their current client base and do not face market 
pressure to go after the SME segment.  However, further analysis is merited to identify specific bottlenecks 
reducing the ability of creditworthy firms and economically viable projects from getting financing, 
especially among SMEs (see Appendix 2.2. for more analysis of potential constraints). 
 
185. Access to technology and business-development services are additional constraints on SMEs.  
SMEs find it difficult to access technology to upgrade their businesses. A 2015 study showed that while 
access to finance was the foremost constraint (49 percent), the second most-cited constraint by SMEs (23 
percent) was access to technology73. Much of the public and private technology transfer institutions operate 
primarily or exclusively in Colombo and there are rigidities in accessing project-based funding from banks 
to finance investments in technological upgrading. There are also market failures in providing business 
development services (BDS), to support improvements of SMEs’ management and business practices 
(accounting, auditing, business planning, marketing, energy efficiency, etc.). While multiple public, private 
and donor-funded initiatives have begun providing BDS across the country, the majority of SMEs still 
indicate a lack of awareness of such services, while certain critical needs of SMEs (taxation advisory, 
market intelligence, digital technology, etc.) are not being met by existing BDS providers74. Rigorous 
evaluations focused on intensive technical assistance and subsidized consulting services find positive and 
significant impacts on productivity and return on assets in the short run, and employment in the long run.75 
The State as Market Participant 
186. Beyond its role as a regulator, the state has increasingly become a direct participant in Sri 
Lanka’s economy. As described in the following two sections, the state is an important participant through 
                                                          
71 Central Bank of Sri Lanka 
72 For example, long judiciary processes to foreclose collateral in case of borrowers’ default usually leads banks to request higher 
collateralization levels to cover for the additional costs associated. 
73 Wijesinha, A. and N. Perera (2015), ‘Banking on SME Growth: Concepts, Challenges, and Policy Options to Improve Access 
to Finance in Sri Lanka’, March 2015, Working Paper Series No. 20, IPS: Colombo. 
74 Attygalle, K., D. Hirimuthugodage, S. Madurawala, A. Senaratne, A. Wijesinha, and C. Edirisinghe (2014), ‘Female 
Entrepreneurship and the Role of Business Development Services in Promoting Small and Medium Women Entrepreneurs in Sri 
Lanka’, May 2014, IPS and OXFAM International: Colombo. 
75 See Valdivia (2012), Bruhn et al (2013), Bloom et al (2011) for evidence on Peru, Mexico and India respectively. See 
McKenzie and Woodruff (2012) for a review of the literature. 
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its SOE sector, as well as through its role as an employer. Both of these roles have an impact on the ability 
of the private sector to participate in the economy and have affected competitiveness in a number of sectors 
as well as labor market dynamics. 
 
187. In playing its role in ensuring the provision of public services and infrastructure, Sri Lanka’s 
government has primarily used traditional procurement rather than seeking partnerships with the 
private sector in the past decade.  Investment in infrastructure over the past decade has been driven by 
public spending.  While in some cases this was tied to the terms of external financing for infrastructure, 
there was a policy of directly spending to build assets to be owned by the state. Of course, private investment 
was not discouraged and there is cooperation in many sectors.  Yet there are very few public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), especially for the building or operation of infrastructure, under which the government 
would seek to share risks and take advantage of private-sector financing know-how, and innovation. Even 
in instances where the government has recognized the need for private sector involvement and ownership, 
it is rare for the private sector to receive more than 50 percent ownership, which is often needed to attract 
quality operators wary of undue state interference.  Notably, private-sector power-generation projects 
require partnership with the state. 
 
188. To date Sri Lanka lacks robust PPP legislation, an institutional mechanism and capacity to 
plan, structure and implement PPP projects, and regulatory structures to ensure public interests and 
investor concerns are balanced. Sri Lanka continues to lack the necessary technical expertise to enter into 
large-scale PPP projects in a transparent and mutually beneficial manner, and many infrastructure needs 
continue to be met by borrowed capital. Previous attempts at creating institutional mechanisms for PPPs 
have been shut down. For instance, the National Procurement Agency set up in 2004 with the aim of 
eliminating corrupt practices and the wasting of time and resources, and improving transparency and 
efficiency in infrastructure activities did not provide a framework for PPPs and in any case was eventually 
shut down in 2008. Similarly, although a dedicated PPP unit in the BOI was set up in 2006, it did not 
become a robust entity. As a result, Sri Lanka lacks robust PPP legislation and an institutional mechanism 
to manage and regulate PPP projects. In fact, since 2009 publicly led investment was financed through 
commercial borrowing in the form of Sri Lanka Development Bonds, sovereign bond issues, and other 
syndicated loans, along with bilateral loans at near-commercial rates, particularly from China. Much of the 
infrastructure completed post-war – two new ports, a new airport, roads and bridges island wide, two new 
expressways, and two new power plants – have been financed through these channels. 
 
189. At the same time, the state is a major participant in economic activities through a substantial 
SOE sector. There are 55 major SOEs enterprises covering a wide range of sectors (Box 4.3).  The 10 most 
important SOEs, which account for about 90 percent of the asset base of all major SOEs, are financial 
institutions (Bank of Ceylon, People’s Bank, National Savings Bank, and Sri Lanka Insurance Corporation), 
major public utilities (Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, and the National Water 
Supply and Drainage Board) and logistics/transport service providers (Sri Lanka Ports Authority, Airport 
and Aviation Services, and Sri Lankan Airlines).  There are other smaller SOEs in banking, public utilities 
and logistics as well.  Finally, the government has major SOEs in other sectors, including construction, 
livestock, lotteries, media, marketing and distribution, plantations, pharmaceuticals, industrial estates, 
mineral extraction, general trading and timber sales.  Major SOEs accounted for nearly 17 percent of GDP 
in 2013 (Table 4.2).   
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190. SOEs play a significant role in Sri Lanka’s fiscal balance.  Transfers from the budget to public 
enterprises have averaged about 3 percent of total expenditures (around 50 billion LKR), mainly driven by 
direct transfers and on lending to the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB). The total debt of the 55 major SOEs 
accounted for approximately 4.8 percent of total public debt in 2013.  This number reflects reductions in 
debt thanks to conversions of debt to government equity and capital infusions to strategic State-Owned 
Business Enterprises (SOBEs), which have regularly occurred and were particularly large in 2013 (Ministry 
of Finance and Treasury).  
 
Box 4.3. Defining State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
 
State-owned enterprises are a subset of what are legally defined as public enterprises.  The 
Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises identifies six categories of institutions that fall under 
its oversight: regulatory bodies, promotional agencies, state-owned enterprises, educational agencies, 
development agencies and research institutions.  There are about 240 entities that fall under the 
committee’s ambit, many of which are financed by the budget.  Regular monitoring and reporting is 
carried out by the MoF for 55 larger SOBEs, which have commercial income. For the purposes of the 
SCD, the 55 SOBEs are referred to as SOEs. 
 
191. Moreover, SOEs account for a significant share of lending by state-owned banks. The two 
largest banks in the country continue to lend a significant share of their funds to SOEs, including several 
that are loss-making or non-revenue-generating enterprises. In 2013, Bank of Ceylon (the largest bank by 
asset base and lending portfolio, holding 20 percent of market share) lent 38 percent of its total portfolio to 
SOEs (primarily to Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, Sri Lanka Ports Authority and Road Development 
Authority); and People's Bank (the second largest bank with 15.6 percent market share) lent 28 percent of 
its total portfolio to SOEs (with high exposure to Ceylon Electricity Board, Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, 
and Ceylon Fertilizer Company Ltd). Since these banks account for a large share of the banking industry, 
this high SOE exposure could reduce funding available to the private sector and expose the banking sector 
to systemic risks given the precarious financial positions of the concerned SOEs. 
192. SOEs have a significant market share in many sectors, including areas where there is not a 
strong apparent rationale for public intervention. While public ownership of utilities and major 
infrastructure can be warranted to oversee natural monopolies or address free/easy rider problems, a 
significant number of major SOEs remain in sectors that do not obviously have these features (Table 4.2).  
This is most striking in the finance sector, where major SOEs make up close to half of the market.  While 
the overall market shares are less significant, SOEs also are important in several agricultural subsectors. 
One rationale commonly provided for commercial SOEs is that state intervention is warranted to ensure 
service or provide employment to remote populations where the private sector is not active, but there is 
little evidence to demonstrate this necessity.  
 
193. The large SOE sector is largely a legacy issue.  Most major SOEs were established in the 1960s 
and 1970s, with some -- notably the largest state bank, the Bank of Ceylon -- founded prior to independence.  
In the past 15 years, the state has set up six new enterprises: three small banks, one insurance company, a 
trading company, and a new airline (which recently was merged with the other state-owned airline, Sri 
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Lankan Airlines).  Thus, while the SOE sector is large, it has not been growing substantively, with the 
partial exception of entrants in the finance sector.  Many of the SOEs reflect earlier, more statist policies, 
such as the state plantations that were nationalized in the early 1970s. 
  
Table 4.2 Sector Wise Performance of Asset Base of SOBEs 
Sector  No. of 
SOBEs 
Asset Size (Rs. 
Billion) 
 percent of 
GDP 
Year on Year 
Growth ( 
percent) 
Market 
Share76 
(percent) 
Energy 2 1,007.25 7.99 6.6 94 
Water 1 242.60 0.21 9.5 44 
Port 1 299.80 0.42 20 60 
Commuter Transportation 1 14.52 0.31 9.2 23 
Aviation 3 45.74 1.62 3.12 61 
Construction 3 30.96 0.30 (17.24) 2.9 
Banking & Finance 9 3,102.50 4.04 14.2 41 
Insurance 4 154.60 0.39 8.6 27 
Lotteries 2 7.77 0.28 1.97 100 
Livestock 2 7.63 0.09 10.74 13 
Plantations 7 12.63 0.11 (15.97) 3.72 
Non-renewable energy 3 3.31 0.02 11.07 0.9 
Health 4 18.62 0.28 (1.59) 27 
Media 3 8.86 0.07 2.67 32 
Marketing & Distribution 10 77.47 0.49 5.43 4.3 
TOTAL 55 5,132.26 16.62 11.60 - 
Source: Annual Report 2013, Ministry of Finance & Planning 
 
194. Efforts to restructure SOEs were undertaken during the 1990s and early 2000s and reversed 
after 2005. In the mid-1990s, the government launched an effort to reform underperforming SOEs, setting 
up the Public Enterprise Reform Commission (PERC) to carry out this work. Under the aegis of PERC, 
privatization took place in varying degrees, affecting 86 SOEs in the electricity industry, telecoms industry, 
ports, agriculture, and the national airline.77  The post-2005 government had an explicit anti-privatization 
policy that in some cases led to reversals of past privatizations.78  The government of the past nine years 
sought to make SOEs perform better, including through the establishment of the Strategic Enterprise 
Management Agency (SEMA), which focused on 20 of the most important SOEs. 
 
195. Following the end of the conflict in 2009, the military initiated business enterprises, though 
the scale of this activity is difficult to measure and its future is unclear.   Most notable among these are 
tourism and associated businesses that are widely advertised. The Sri Lanka Army79 now runs at least six 
                                                          
76 Market share = Revenue from PE/Total Sector Revenue 
77 The Public Enterprise Reform Commission, established by Act No. 1 of 1996, was mandated to improve efficiency in the 
economy, increase government revenue and motivate the private sector, but not explicitly to divest from and privatize SOEs. 
Nevertheless, divestiture did generate over $500 million between 1995 and 1998, attracted a further $400 million in foreign 
inflows, and private investments in the gas, steel, telecoms, plantations and civil aviation sectors. 
78 Sri Lankan Airlines Sri Lanka Insurance, Waters Edge and Shell Gas were some of the key privatizations that were reversed, 
with the government re-acquiring full ownership.  
79 Lagoon’s Edge (Nanthikandal), Thalsevana (Jaffna), Laya Safari (Yala), Laya Waves (Kalkudah), Laya Beach (Wadduwa), 
Laya Leisure (Kalutara)  
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tourist hotels across the country, while the Sri Lanka Air Force80 runs a golf course, two tourist hotels, and 
two banquet and convention halls. It also operates a civilian passenger airline service, a veterinary service, 
and a hair salon in Colombo. Meanwhile, the Sri Lanka Navy81 operates a whale-watching boat service, a 
restaurant in Colombo, three wedding and convention halls, and seven tourist hotels across the country. In 
addition to tourist activities, the armed forces have been engaged in agricultural farming (specifically in 
lands belonging to families in the North), vegetable distribution, running small shops and cafes (mainly 
along transport routes to the North), civil construction works (mainly for Colombo urban upgrading 
projects), and conducting “leadership training” at military camps for university entrants. These initiatives 
were tied to the 2005-14 government, calling into question the extent to which they will be continued under 
a new government.  
 
196. Sri Lanka has had a diffuse arrangement for overseeing SOEs, complicating strategic 
management.  At the highest level, the Parliamentary Committee on Public Enterprises oversees financial 
and operational performance of SOEs through an annual review mechanism.  More operational oversight 
responsibility for major SOEs has been shared between line ministries and MoF, through its Department of 
Public Enterprises. The line ministries have in turn appointed members of boards of directors of SOEs in 
accordance with the relevant legislation for governance of a given SOE (i.e. the Companies Act or act 
establishing the SOE).  SEMA and a similar Strategic Resource Management Committee were separately 
set up to provide managerial support, although reforms are mooted to bring SEMA into the MoF.  None of 
these entities appear to have had oversight over enterprises launched by the military.82 This decentralized 
model complicates holistic oversight of SOEs’ performance and management of financial risk.  In 
particular, critical information on economic and financial performance, such as return to equity and overall 
contingent liabilities of SOEs, are not systematically tracked.  SOEs have de facto considerable discretion 
to set their own policies and strategies, including in sensitive personnel areas.  The system also does not 
easily provide for making strategic decisions to maximize value to the state of SOEs or management 
changes such as restructuring.  The new government has indicated a change of course through consolidation 
of oversight by establishing a specialized ministry for SOEs, but its impact remains to be seen. 
 
197. There is strong political involvement with SOE management.  SOEs have requirements for the 
profile of its board directors spelled out either in their founding cct or more general guidelines, with a MoF 
representative always present.  But given the direct subordination to particular ministries, practice is that a 
change of government automatically triggers the resignation of boards and the appointment of a new board. 
The political connections of SOEs can lead to management decisions based on non-commercial criteria. 
Most important, the closeness of political connections increases the likelihood of SOEs receiving preferable 
treatment.  
 
198. The size, profile, and management framework for SOEs can negatively impact Sri Lanka’s 
competitiveness.  The concentration of assets under management that is prone to politicization can lead to 
unproductive utilization of the country’s assets. It also likely dampens competition in key sectors; even if 
                                                          
80 Marble beach (China Bay, Trincomalee), Eagles’ Golf Links (Trincomalee), Eagles’ Heritage Golf Club (Anuradhapura), 
Eagles Lakeside Banquet and Convention Hall (Colombo), Eagles’ Lagoon View Banquet Hall (Katunayake) 
81 Lagoon Cabanas (Panama/Arugam Bay), Sober Island Resort (Trincomalee), Weligambay Villas (Mirissa), Club House 
(Uswetikeyyawa), Dambakolapatuna Rest (Dambakolapatuna), Fort Hammenheil (Jaffna), Golf Link Hotel (Trincomalee), 
Reception Hall (Ranminithenna), Reception Hall (Poonewa), Lake Front Rest (Kantale) 
82 For instance the most recent 2013 COPE report does not cover military enterprises.  
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there has been basis for the state’s involvement owing to the absence of market actors, SOEs will discourage 
future entrants.  There is no formal mechanism to verify that there is a public purpose rationale for 
individual SOEs.  In the context of the no-privatization policy in recent years this has meant that the sector 
continues to play an outsized role.   
Box 4.4.  State Intervention in Agriculture 
Sri Lanka’s government plays a particularly large role in agriculture, consistent with inward-oriented 
policies, inefficient land markets, and a large SOE sector, which, together, create distortions.   
 
Agricultural trade and price policies.  Sri Lanka’s agricultural policies have encouraged import 
substitution of basic agricultural commodities.  Border taxes on imports and exports of agricultural 
products and tradable agricultural inputs have to generate fiscal revenue, support farmers engaged in 
import-competing activities and tax producers of export-oriented products. Import duties,and other taxes 
at the border yield nominal protection rates for importables for most agricultural products in the order of 
30–50 percent.  For rice, the total protection rate was 34 percent in 2011, making it a highly protected 
crop, mainly as result of fertilizer subsidies.  Maize, potatoes and milk are highly protected as well.  
Exports of tea and rubber are taxed at low rates. 
 
The high protection of importables has created strong disincentives for crop and export diversification, 
providing support to expand production of import-competing crops (rice, maize) and discouraging the 
production of exportables. While agricultural export promotion is highlighted in various policy 
statements, Sri Lanka’s trade policy is overly complex and slows rather than accelerates export growth. 
Protection also results in inefficient use of public resources, and does not benefit smallholders as intended.  
Additional distortions are created by land-use restriction and policies that target subsidized fertilizers for 
particular sectors, such as paddy. 
 
The distortions affect producers and consumers.  Rice producers gain at the expense of consumers.  
Income from paddy farming is estimated to be 36 percent higher than what it would be without 
government intervention. Similarly, incomes from potato and milk production are significantly higher 
while the policy impact on incomes from tea and rubber production is insignificant. Coconut farmers, on 
other hand, experience significant income reductions due to export taxes. The aggregate effect on 
agricultural income in absolute terms depends on the levels of production of all crops and the crop mix 
fostered by the incentive structure. Current policies represent an implicit tax on consumers of about 300 
percent on maize and chili, 96 percent on milk, 54 percent on potatoes and 12 percent on rice.   
 
Land tenure and rural land markets.  Sri Lanka’s current land tenure policy, which restricts use rights 
and transferability, depresses returns to land and the absence of a functioning rural land market constrains 
long-run sector performance.  Smallholder farmers are, in essence, prevented from mobilizing one of 
their most important assets for promoting much-need investment into an under-funded under-invested 
sector.   
 
While government policy has aimed at equitable distribution of land, it has also fostered and perpetuated 
smallholder agriculture.  Land legislation and settlement administration have successively limited farm 
size and constrained the rights of both owners and operators.  Population pressure and inheritance 
practices have caused substantial fragmentation, leaving average farm-size well below the public-sector-
irrigation-scheme norm of one hectare. Overall, 72 percent of farms are below one hectare. In the absence 
of a rural land market, irrigation-scheme settlers wishing to exit agriculture face a choice of abandoning 
a valuable farm or entering the uncertain informal market while market-based land consolidation 
necessary for productivity growth remains depressed. 
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Functioning land markets would allow farmers to adjust size to respond to changing commodity prices 
and increased risks.  The key to making this work is secure tenancy agreements and a stronger leasehold 
market.  For public- sector land, long-term leases with provision for easy transfer would be a major 
improvement.  For private-sector land, mechanisms to resolve title disputes through administrative and 
legal means as well as incentive systems are an immediate necessity. Legislation and programs to 
establish public- and private-sector institutions and professions to facilitate development of land markets 
are also required. 
 
The government should seek to unlock productivity potential in rural areas, particularly given the 
importance of the sector for poverty reduction. Sri Lanka’s low productivity levels – and the lack of 
incentives for farmers to improve productivity – call for renewed attention to basic investments in 
technology, extension services, irrigation, and market infrastructure. They also call for adjustments in the 
broader enabling policy framework to foster diversification and productivity and improve export 
competitiveness.  This will not only include investments in restoring and further upgrading the country’s 
productive infrastructure, facilitating market linkages, and introducing modern agricultural technologies 
but also creating a policy environment that favors the expansion of the private sector, especially SMEs, 
and allowing for more flexibility in the rural land, labor and capital markets. 
The Public Sector as Employer 
199. Strong demand for public-sector jobs has met the increased supply of such jobs.  As was 
discussed in Chapter II, there has been a 57 percent increase in public-sector employment (public service 
and semi-public entities) over the past 10 years.  This has met with steady demand from the population for 
public-sector jobs, despite the private-sector growth and the consequent demand for labor.  Data  
on the total applicant pool for various public- 
sector jobs is not available, but the example of 
the Sri Lankan Administrative Service – 
admittedly a highly prestigious service – 
indicates the attractiveness of public-sector 
employment. For the period 2008-13, there was 
an average recruitment of 163 people per year 
from an average pool of over 20,000 applicants, 
of which slightly more than half actually sat for 
exams.  Only the engineering and scientific 
services experience difficulties in recruiting 
staff.  Moreover, the vast majority of public 
servants stay in the service until retirement.   
 
200. While overall wage employment has 
declined in favor of self-employment, the 
composition of wage employment has shifted 
towards the public sector. Overall wage 
employment declined from 58 to 56.4 percent of 
the workforce between 2002 and 2012 in favor 
of self-employment. This decline in wage employment was accompanied by a decline in the share of 
private-sector wage employment throughout the decade; it fell from 77 to 74 percent of total wage 
employment between 2002 and 2012 (Figure 4.27). In contrast, public employment increased from 23 to 
26 percent of wage employment when looking at comparable districts. Given the growth of the workforce, 
Figure 4.27 The Composition of Wage Employment 
has shifted towards the public sector 
(share of total wage workers) 
 
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using LFS.  
*Excludes Northern / Eastern provinces for comparability. 
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this seemingly small percentage increase meant an increase of over 95,000 non-farm public workers 
between 2006 and 2012, peaking at 27 percent of total wage employment in 2009 when large numbers of 
men joined the armed forces (Figure 4.27). Since then, public employment relative to all formal-wage 
employment has declined somewhat, but it continues to represent the largest share of formal workers. 
 
201. Public-sector workers not only enjoy the benefits of formal employment, but they also tend 
to earn more than their private-sector counterparts. Public-sector workers have access to a non-
contributory public pension system (see Chapter III), paid vacations, and importantly, reduced work hours 
relative to private-sector counterparts. 83 Moreover, public sector hourly wages were on average 40 percent 
higher than private sector wages in 2012. Part of the wage gap can be explained by differences in individual 
characteristics, since public-sector workers tend to be more educated. However, decompositions show that 
there continues to be a wage premium for public workers that cannot be explained by observable individual 
characteristics. In fact, 14 percent of the difference in wages between public and private workers cannot be 
explained by observable differences (Figure 4.28A). The evidence suggests that there is a premium to 
public-sector work, and that this premium has grown between 2006 and 2012.  
 
Figure 4.28. Public and formal sector workers earn more than their private sector counterparts 
A. Public-Private Wage Gap 
Decompositions 
B. Formal-Informal Wage Gap 
Decompositions 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force Surveys. Calculations exclude Northern and Eastern 
provinces. 
 
202. To the extent that public-sector employment is a growing share of total formal employment, 
this has repercussions for the wage premium for private-sector formal workers. Indeed, private formal 
wages were on average 35 percent higher than informal wages. Decompositions again show that there is a 
6 percent premium to formal-sector employment, after accounting for differences in characteristics and the 
types of jobs typical of formal and informal workers (Figure 4.28B).  Together this lends some credence to 
the argument that markets are segmented, particularly for wage workers who would likely prefer formal 
                                                          
83 See Chapter III for a more detailed description of monetary and non-monetary benefits of public sector workers. 
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public sector jobs but are rationed out or excluded. To the extent that public- sector employment offers 
better working conditions for certain types of workers, the private sector will find it difficult to compete for 
the best workers.   
 
203. In fact, the evidence shows that workers, particularly educated women, are queuing for 
public-sector employment. The share of new job seekers looking for public-sector work increased between 
2006 and 2012, mostly on account of women. The share of women looking for work for the first time who 
specifically sought public-sector employment increased from 25 to 31 percent between 2006 and 2012 
(Figure 4.29A). Most of this increase is due to women with post-secondary training looking for public 
employment. That size of that group increased from 42 to 52 percent of all women looking for employment 
between 2006 and 2012, when looking at comparable samples (Figure 4.29B). If the Northern and Eastern 
provinces are included, this share increases to about 54 percent. Indeed, many workers, particularly women, 
are in fields of study that put them on a path to public-sector employment. Since science and mathematics 
pass rates are poor in secondary schools and there is relatively little access to schools offering A-level 
science streams, many are compelled to study humanities if they want to go on to do A-levels.  As a result, 
the most popular career streams are often not the ones where there is the highest demand for labor. For 
instance, there are too many studying humanities instead of subjects that would position them for jobs in 
the booming areas of tourism, finance, etc.). 
Figure 4.29. Workers are queuing for public sector jobs 
A. First time job seekers by type of job sought 
(share of all first-time job seekers) 
B. Unemployed women expecting a Public sector 
job (share of unemployed women) 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force Surveys. Calculations exclude Northern and Eastern provinces 
Interconnectedness of Public and Private Sectors 
204. There is a high degree of interconnectedness between the state and at least segments of the 
private sector that contributes to the degree of intervention by the government.   The variation in tax 
and customs incentives reflects government policy but those varying incentives also contain specific 
benefits for specific sectors, which have a limited number of major actors.  In addition, there are several 
high-profile cases of senior officials moving between public and private sectors.  For instance, the state 
frequently uses its various shareholdings in commercial banks to appoint members to boards of directors, 
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and in the process, several current government officials and former central bankers have been appointed. 
Meanwhile, pension funds managed by the Central Bank – the banking regulator – began investing in 
several financial sector firms in recent years.  At the same time, major business figures have in a few 
instances taken up senior positions in government in recent years.  There is no developed framework for 
handling conflict of interest to police the boundary between public sector employment and private sector 
interests.  The politically appointed boards of SOEs also serve to reinforce networks of influential public 
and private sector players.       
 
205. This interconnectedness points to political economy factors that support a continued large 
role for government in the market.  Given that there are frequent instances of state regulatory help to a 
given sector, it follows that private sector entities would seek to maintain or expand privileges, reinforcing 
the level of regulatory intervention into the economy.  At the same time, it also suggests that many private-
sector entities would have to adjust considerably to succeed in a more open, competitive market.  Combined 
with broader expectation of public-sector employment, a reduction of the state’s role or an attempt to “level 
the playing field” will encounter resistance from vested interests. 
D. Priorities for Fostering More and Better Jobs for the Bottom 40 Percent 
Promote Export-Led Growth 
206. Review and revise the country’s trade-related policies to promote economic diversification 
and shared growth. This could include reforming the para-tariff regime to encourage more foreign trade.  
It also likely would entail revisions to the tax system, in line with addressing fiscal constraints, to reduce 
the degree of protectionism, particularly for targeted small sectors.  This would include simplification of 
the VAT and corporate-income-tax regimes and the reduction or elimination of cesses on agricultural 
commodities.  Reductions would need to be considered in the context of whether the incentives are 
achieving the desired objective.. Finally, a continued focus on improving the trade facilitation and logistics 
environment, including streamlining licenses and permits required to export, would help to promote export-
led growth. 
 
207. Provide for more resources and quality-enhancing management in the education sector to 
ensure that the population (and especially the youth) has the skills demanded by efficiency-enhancing 
enterprises. This could include steps to: ensure high-quality general education and development of soft 
skills; enable greater private-sector participation in higher education, improvements in technical and 
vocational training and better coordination with potential employer needs; and ensure that young people 
are inclined to pursue degrees in the industries where demand is highest. 
 
208. Promote innovation by establishing linkages between R&D institutions and networks of 
entrepreneurs that can benefit.  Development adaptation and better dissemination of technologies that fit 
Sri Lanka’s economy is important for productivity growth.  R&D institutions need to be oriented towards 
filling this role.  This may, in part, be helped by encouraging more private-sector involvement directly in 
R&D as well as in setting priorities for public-sector institutions. This is a particularly important issue for 
agriculture. 
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Rebalance the Role of Public and Private Sectors to Promote Private-Sector Led Growth 
209. Improve the regulatory environment to allow firms to grow, reducing informality and 
allowing for economy-wide increases in productivity and allow firms to reach as firms can reach 
economies of scale. Some aspects of the regulatory environment that appear to be significant obstacles are: 
upgrading the systems for land tenure and land use planning in both agricultural and rural areas; 
modernizing labor legislation to encourage easier movement of labor and female labor participation; 
ensuring that the burden of business licensing and permitting is minimal, particularly in regions where this 
is a problem, such as the North; and providing for speedier resolution of commercial disputes and 
enforcement of contracts  in court or using alternative dispute mechanisms.  Bringing larger and more 
profitable firms into the formal system and improving enforcement could help formalization efforts. 
However, the definition of priorities for investment-climate reforms to unleash firms’ potential should stem 
from regular dialogue between the public and private sectors.  
 
210. Review the role and participation of the public sector in the economy.  Stronger management 
and strategic oversight of the SOE sector is important to ensure that state involvement is serving a public 
purpose, does not create unwarranted fiscal risk and public assets are effectively utilized.   The state should 
also take steps to ensure that the public service is “fit for purpose” to carry out public-sector functions and 
not as a mechanism for job creation.  The state can play a role that facilitates greater private-sector 
involvement through the establishment of a robust institutional framework for public-private partnerships 
to ensure public interests and investor concerns are balanced while crowding in private-sector investment 
and skills.  Finally, measures to address conflict of interest could reduce negative impacts of the 
interconnectedness of government with specific businesses.  
 
211. These measures together will help provide an environment conducive to efficiency- and 
productivity-enhancing FDI, allowing for less emphasis on targeted incentives.  A predictable, private-
sector-friendly regulatory environment and a skilled labor force can contribute to attracting and retaining 
FDI. Sri Lanka’s incentives regime may need to be revamped as its competitiveness improves and as 
streamlined investment policies and regulations are adopted and implemented.  
  
KEY KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
 Analysis of the tradeoffs in reducing tariff protection given the low revenue base. This 
analysis should also include potential impacts on employment in the absence of concurrent 
changes in labor legislation and other measures to reduce the cost of doing business. 
 Analysis of firm productivity, entry and exit, and survival of firms, taking advantage of the 
results of the first economic census of economic establishments. Such analysis could allow 
for a better understanding of the main barriers to the establishment and growth of firms. 
 Analysis of the school-to-work transitions of young workers, with an emphasis on cognitive 
and non-cognitive skills, aimed at identifying policy options to bolster employment and 
labor force participation. 
 Analysis of bottlenecks reducing the ability of creditworthy firms and economically viable 
projects from getting financing, especially among SMEs. 
 Analysis of migration and mobility – both internal and external -- and some understanding 
through that about potential constraints to labor mobility. Analysis of remittances, their 
sustainability, and their use. 
 Analysis of regional trade opportunities and steps to take advantage of such opportunities to 
capitalize on Sri Lanka’s comparative advantages. 
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V. Social Inclusion for Shared Prosperity and Poverty Reduction 
 
KEY PRIORITIES ON INCLUSION 
*  Urbanization can drive inclusion if there is a governance framework that empowers local decision-
making responsive to the needs of the poor and bottom 40 percent for public services and infrastructure. 
*  Multi-sector interventions to improve public service provision and promote employment opportunities 
in areas where poverty is localized -- including the Northern and Eastern provinces, Moneragala and 
the Estates; emphasis should also be devoted to reducing nutritional deprivation. 
*  Promoting reconciliation and efforts to improve equality of opportunity across ethnic groups. This 
includes promoting employment opportunities, addressing land claims in the former conflict areas, 
providing assistance to new and former internally displaced persons (IDPs), and integrated efforts to 
assist widows and ex-combatants. 
*  Increasing female labor force participation by: increasing education and better aligning the education 
women pursue and the demands of the market; making changes to legislation that prevents or deters 
women from being hired; and promoting greater participation of women in leadership positions. 
212. As is true with many countries, there are four dimensions of social inclusion that are 
important in Sri Lanka: inclusion across space, ethnicity, gender and youth. Constraints in each of 
these areas preclude the ability of large population groups from fully participating in shared prosperity. 
More generally, intersecting identities can produce a multiplication of disadvantage. For instance, the 
intersection of ethnicity, gender and location (or youth and location) can lead to increased negative effects. 
This section seeks to define areas where lack of inclusiveness is evident.  It must be noted that these 
problems can be addressed through specific interventions and especially by actions to provide for equal 
opportunity of participation for all segments in society, the economy and politics.  Opportunities for 
participation should be promoted alongside efforts to provide for effective public-sector management and 
growth through competitiveness described in the previous two chapters.  
213. The importance of addressing exclusionary constraints is heightened by Sri Lanka’s recent 
history of internal conflict.  Conflict negatively affected the entire country and specific segments of the 
poor and bottom 40 percent in particular.  As noted earlier, it is estimated that the cost of internal conflict 
in the period 1978-2002 was roughly 5 percent of GDP per annum.  Not surprisingly, the highest levels of 
poverty and weakest equality of opportunity are in the areas most affected by conflict, the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces.  Not all ways in which exclusion has occurred in Sri Lanka directly fed past internal 
conflicts, nor was exclusion the only driver of conflict.  However, many observers, including the LLRC, 
have noted that manifestations of exclusion played an important role in sustaining internal conflict in the 
country.  Addressing the need for an inclusive society, economy, and polity is crucial for sustaining peace 
and security. 
A. Inclusion across Space  
Spatial Concentration of Poverty 
214. The highest numbers of people living in poverty and the bottom 40 percent are located within 
the Kandy-Colombo-Galle multi-city agglomeration, followed by the other single city 
agglomerations. In fact, the spatial distribution of the poor and vulnerable -- in absolute numbers – across 
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Sri Lanka has come to more closely mirror the spatial distribution of the overall population, leading to an 
increase in the relative concentration of poverty around the country’s main urban areas. The highest 
numbers of people living in poverty and vulnerable to poverty are located within the Kandy-Colombo-Galle 
multi-city agglomeration, followed by other single city agglomerations (Figure 5.1).   
Figure 5.1. Spatial Location of Overall Population, Poverty and the Bottom 40 percent 
  
 
Source: World Bank staff and GIS analysis using 2012 Census and HIES 2012/13. 
 
215.  The concentration of poor in more dynamic 
areas of agglomeration point to the importance of 
cities in further poverty reduction. Almost 50 
percent of both poor and vulnerable populations are 
within 30 km of an agglomeration (Figure 5.2).84 
Therefore, efforts to improve economic performance in 
order to reduce poverty, such as those discussed in 
Chapter IV will directly benefit these populations. A 
key challenge is how to manage the growth of the 
Kandy-Colombo-Galle agglomeration, in particular, 
the Metropolitan Colombo Region, and how to increase 
other single-city agglomerations, given their potential 
and implications for economic growth, competitiveness 
and poverty reduction. Streamlining urban 
management structures and improving their capacity to 
ensure they have the administrative powers to deliver 
functional urban services and conduct integrated, strategic planning (including land-use planning and 
                                                          
84 Poverty measurement is based on per capita consumption and the national poverty line. Note that the poverty line 
will need to be updated soon given that the basket of goods being used corresponds to the 2002 basket. Similarly a 
more ambitious poverty line may be desired in line with Sri Lanka’s middle income status. 
Figure 5.2: Share of National Poor and 
Vulnerable within 30km of all 
Agglomerations 
 
Source: World Bank staff based on HIES 2012/13. 
38%
42%
52%
11%
9%
6%
0% 20% 40% 60%
Share of national poor
(official poverty line)
Share of national
vulnerable (bottom 40%)
Share of total national
population
Share of national poor
(official poverty line)
Share of national
vulnerable (bottom 40%)
Share of total national
population
K
an
d
y
, 
C
o
lo
m
b
o
,
G
al
le
 C
o
rr
id
o
r
Ja
ff
n
a,
T
ri
n
co
m
al
ee
 a
n
d
B
at
ti
ca
lo
a
96 
 
transport planning) will provide local authorities with the opportunity to respond to both present and future 
needs.  
216.  However, these interventions will 
need to be complemented with others targeted 
to assist the poor in more isolated regions of 
the country.  As noted in Chapter II, portions of 
the Northern and Eastern Provinces stand out as 
regions with high concentrations of poverty 
(Figure 5.3). This is true both for monetary and 
non-monetary measures of poverty such as 
education, nutrition, and access to services.  
Areas with higher poverty rates also tend to have 
a high share of the bottom 40 percent. In 
addition, two districts (Nuwara Eliya and 
Badulla), which make up a large portion of the 
estates, are home to 10.7 percent of the poor 
population..The analysis and recommendations 
in the preceding chapters are especially 
important for highly populated regions that can 
benefit the most from opening of markets and 
higher competitiveness given their proximity to 
markets. This chapter focuses on the North and 
East, the estate sector, and Moneragala district.  
These are areas with a long-term inclusion 
challenge that is different from the one 
confronting poor areas located near centers of 
economic activity.   
Conflict Affected Areas 
217. Poverty rates are highest in portions of the Northern and Eastern provinces, which were at 
the center of the conflict.  As pointed out above, the highest poverty headcount ratios at the district level 
are found in Mannar, Mullaitivu, and 
Kilinochchi at both the national poverty 
line and international poverty lines of 
$1.25 a day and $2.50 a day (Table 5.1). 
 
218. In these districts, poverty 
rates are highest for the youth and 
those with no education. About 47 
percent of people living in poverty in 
the Eastern and Northern provinces are 
younger than 25 – 50 percent if the more 
affluent districts of Jaffna and Vavuniya 
are excluded – as compared to only 40 
percent in the other provinces. In 
particular, in Mannar, Mullaitivu, and 
Kilinochchi, poverty rates among the 
Figure 5.3 Poverty Headcount Rate in Sri Lanka 
 
Source: World Bank & DCS Poverty Map. Poverty line is 
Sri Lankan national poverty line. 
Table 5.1. Poverty in post-conflict areas is high 
 National 
poverty 
line 
$1.25-a-
day 
$2.50-a-
day 
Districts outside of Northern 
and Eastern provinces 
6.1 2.8 29.9 
Eastern province 11.0 5.5 47.3 
Northern province 10.9 6.1 45.5 
    Jaffna 8.3 4.7 42.6 
    Vavuniya 3.4 1.6 23.1 
    Mannar 20.1 12.4 60.9 
    Mullaitivu 28.8 17.3 74.4 
    Kilinochchi 12.7 5.9 57.2 
Sri Lanka  6.7 3.2 32.1 
Source: World Bank (2015) using HIES 2012/13.  
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youth are especially high, reaching 28 percent for 6 to 14 year olds and 22 percent for 15 to 24 year olds.85  
These high monetary poverty rates are correlated with multidimensional measures of welfare to the extent 
that poverty rates are disproportionately high among those with no education. Interestingly, poverty rates 
are twice as high for those with secondary than primary education, suggesting that even reasonably well-
educated workers suffer from a lack of job opportunities in these districts. 
  
219. High poverty headcount rates in these regions are associated with weak links to the labor 
market. This is reflected in low labor force participation rates. Across provinces, labor force participation 
rates are the lowest for the Northern and Eastern provinces (Figure 5.4A), but in the absence of panel data 
that follows individuals over time it is difficult to see whether this is improving. When looking at the 
country by sub population groups, the Northern province stands out for its low labor force participation 
among males, adults, urban residents, rural residents, and those with below O-level education. Similarly, 
the Eastern province stands out as having the lowest labor force participation among youth and females.  
Figure 5.4 The North and East have weak links to the labor market 
A. Primary activity by region 
(percent of working age population, age 15+) 
B. Likelihood of unemployment relative to 
Colombo* 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using 2012 Labor Force Survey; includes all districts. 
* Results from a Probit regression estimating the likelihood of being unemployed. The model controls for age, 
education, marital status, ethnicity, the number of children and the elderly. For women it controls for whether she 
has children and whether there are other adult women in the household 
 
220. In addition to low participation, the North and East also have high unemployment rates, 
particularly among the youth and among educated women. Youth unemployment rates86 in the North 
and East were as high as 27 percent in Ampara and 25 percent in Kilinochchi compared to 12.5 percent in 
Colombo in 2012. Moreover, the percentage of those looking for a job for more than a year was highest (65 
percent) in the Eastern province. Over 90 percent of the unemployed in the Northern and Eastern provinces 
were first-time job seekers, compared to 57 percent in the Western Province.  Much of the reason for high 
unemployment in these two provinces is explained by high female unemployment, particularly among those 
with A-level education or more.  However, the probability of being unemployed is significantly higher for 
women in the North and East relative to Colombo, even after controlling for educational and other 
individual characteristics (Figure 5.4B). For men, no significant difference in the likelihood of 
                                                          
85 World Bank, 2015 (Poverty Assessment, forthcoming) 
86 Defined as the share of unemployed individuals ages 15-24. 
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unemployment is detected. The most common search method in the North and East is to register for a 
government job (48 and 45 percent, respectively), compared to Colombo where advertisements and 
informal family networks are more common. This difference is especially large among well-educated 
workers. Together, this evidence points to very high aspirations in the North and East to be employed in 
the public sector. However, in the absence of panel data that follows individuals over time it is difficult to 
see whether aspirations are changing. To the extent that these unmet aspirations are persistent, they could 
lead to further discontent. It is also important to note that female-headed households and ex-combatants are 
particularly vulnerable in a post-conflict setting (Boxes 5.1 and 5.2). 
 
 
Box 5.1 Female-Headed Households in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
 
Female heads of household are particularly vulnerable in 
the post-conflict setting of the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces. Most of these household are headed by widows 
(see figure). However female-headed households are quite 
heterogeneous. First, childcare requirements may prohibit 
younger widows with small children from generating 
income, while older female heads of households are less 
able to do certain types of manual work. Second, widows 
whose husbands served in the national army receive their 
husbands’ pension or 50 percent of his salary, while 
widows of men fighting in the LTTE receive a one-time 
payment only if they can produce a death certificate. 
Third, the application of family law according to different 
communities’ legal codes can create varying outcomes. 
Sinhalese female heads may enjoy the benefits of a more 
women-friendly Sinhalese legal code, while Muslim female heads may face restrictions on their activities 
and become particularly vulnerable when these prevent them from seizing income-earning opportunities. 
Finally, the loss of assets during the civil war can make it difficult to marry daughters as land and house 
assets are commonly used as dowry. This is particularly important in Tamil communities. 
 
Source: Schmidt and Canpolat (2015) based on Vasudevan (2013), Jayatilaka and Amirthalingam (2015), 
and Ruwanpura and Humphries (2004). 
  
Female-heads of household in the Northern 
and Eastern Province by marital status 
 
Source: Own calculations using HIES 2012/13. 
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Box 5.2 Inclusion of Ex-Combatants 
 
Persons with physical disabilities and psychological problems due to conflict, in particular ex-combatants, 
are particularly vulnerable to exclusion. An estimated 10 to 15 percent of the population in the Northern 
Province – a large portion of them ex-combatants -- suffers from a physical disability related to the conflict, 
In addition, epidemiological studies conducted among conflict-affected populations in Northern Sri Lanka 
show that the conflict has led to increased psychosocial problems among these populations. Although 
mental health issues are prevalent among ex-combatants, there is a lack of psychological assistance 
programs specifically designed for ex-combatants. Notwithstanding government programs to integrate 
former combatants, they still struggle to enter into the labor market and have relatively high levels of 
unemployment and underemployment. Social stigma -- fears of being associated with ex-combatants or 
perceptions that they are still violent -- contributes to their marginalization. In a qualitative study conducted 
with young female ex-LTTE fighters in the Eastern district of Batticaloa, Krishnan (2011) notes that job 
opportunities are more restrictive for female ex-combatants than their male counterparts, with the biggest 
barrier being that they are not able to use the clerical, engineering, or other non-combat skills they had 
learned. Ex-combatants face surveillance, which prompts fears that they have not been fully rehabilitated.  
Source: Schmidt and Canpolat (2015) based on Perera (2011, 2014),   Siriwardhana and Wickramage (2014),   
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2015), and Krishnan (2011). 
The Estate Sector87  
221. In addition to the populations in the North and East, estate workers have long had high 
poverty rates. Because the majority of them descended from indentured labor brought from India in the 
early 1900s and began to receive citizenship only in the 1980s, they lived for decades without state provision 
of social services. Large inequalities continue to exist in their access to, and utilization of, health services. 
Estate workers are largely dependent on the estate’s management for their basic needs, particularly 
housing.88 Since nationalization in 1975, the state has retained responsibility for providing education in the 
estate sector. In 1994, the Ministry of Health was requested to take over estate hospitals and had 
successfully taken over hospitals and maternity wards and dispensaries by 2000.89 Housing and land on the 
estates are under the control of plantation management. 
   
222. Poverty in the estate sector fell markedly in the past decade. Although the estate sector has 
traditionally been the poorest in Sri Lanka, poverty rates typically have been only moderately higher in the 
estate sector than the rural sector. In 2002, headcount poverty was estimated to be 30 percent in the estate 
sector, as compared to 25 percent in rural areas (Figure 5.5). A gap between the rural and estate sectors 
emerged in 2006/07, after poverty fell rapidly in rural areas but changed little in the estate sector. By 
2009/10, however, the estate sector had largely caught up to the rural sector, and by 2012/13 the estimated 
headcount poverty rate in the estate sector was 10.9 percent, compared with 6.8 and 1.8 percent in rural and 
urban areas, respectively (Figure 5.5). In fact, most of the decrease in estate poverty during the period of 
                                                          
87 The estate sector consists of state-owned plantations which comprise over 170,000 ha, most of which is devoted to 
tea and rubber cultivation. The plantations were originally set up by British colonists who brought in Indian origin 
Tamils as laborers. Housing and land on the estates remains under the control of plantation management while the 
state took over provision of social services and public infrastructure in the mid-2000s. The particular social and 
economic features of the estates have led to it being treated as a separate category from the rural and urban sectors. 
88 Jayawardena, 2013. 
89 Gunetilleke et al. 2008 
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2002-2012/13 occurred between 2006 and 2009 (from 28 to 11 percent). The large reduction in estate 
poverty is corroborated by other welfare indicators, such as the multidimensional welfare index reported 
by United Nations Development Programme (2012), which show a decline in multidimensional poverty 
from 21.1 percent to 11.4 percent between 2006 and 2009.  
 
223. One potential explanation for this sharp decline in estate sector poverty is the substantial 
increase in the price of tea, which is the major output of the estate sector as well as Sri Lanka’s largest 
exported commodity by export value. The Colombo auction price for tea surged while the quantity of total 
tea exports remained stable. This resulted in much higher profit margins and revenue for the tea industry, 
as reflected by higher ratio of auction price and production cost (Figure 5.6), along with higher wages for 
estate workers.  
Figure 5.5: Most of the reduction in estate poverty 
happened during 2006-2009 
Figure 5.6:  Higher tea price led to larger profit 
to the tea industry 
  
Source: World Bank (2015). Source: World Bank (2015). 
 
224. In fact, wage increases were larger in the estate sector when compared to the agricultural 
sector as a whole (Figure 5.7A). This may be partly because estate workers had negotiated minimum wage 
increases between 2009 and 2010. When controlling for individual characteristics, the premium for being 
an estate-sector worker relative to an urban worker has significantly increased over time (Figure 5.7B). 
Although real wages in the rural sector have been statistically the same as what an observationally 
equivalent worker would earn in the urban sector, they were significantly higher than real earnings in the 
estate sectors in 2009 and 2010. This highlights a large increase in profitability during that time period for 
own-account farmers compared to estate worker earnings, despite the increase in minimum wages. 
However, rural-sector worker premiums have since fallen, in line with commodity prices.  
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Figure 5.7 Real wage increases have been largest in the estate sector 
A. Growth in monthly average real wages B. Wage premiums relative to urban sector 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using LFS data. 
Note: Calculations exclude Northern and Eastern 
provinces. CCPI (2002=100) and CCPI (2006/7=100) 
are used to convert nominal wage to real wages. 
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using LFS surveys. 
Results from the coefficient on the estate sector dummy in 
a Mincer wage equation controlling for age, education, 
marital status, and ethnicity where the left out category are 
urban workers. Significance at 5 percent level. 
 
225. Despite recent improvements, poverty rates continue to be higher in the estates when 
compared to both urban and rural sectors, pointing to continued vulnerability. As shown in Chapter 
II, the poverty headcount is 10.9 percent in the estates, compared to 7.6 percent in the rural sector and 2.1 
percent in the urban sector poverty (Figure 5.8). At the $2.50 poverty line, the poverty headcount is 50.6 
percent in the estates compared to 34.3 percent in rural and 17.7 percent in urban areas. In fact, about 40 
percent of the population in the estate sector still lives between the national poverty line and $2.50 a day 
(2005 PPP). This indicates that a large share of the estate sector population is nearly poor and is vulnerable 
to adverse shocks. Moreover, the poverty gap index, measuring how far people are from the poverty line, 
is also considerably higher in the estates, at 13.4 percent compared to 8.9 percent in rural areas at the $2.50 
poverty line (Figure 5.8). Moreover, 62.7 percent of the population in the estate sector is in the bottom 40 
percent of the distribution, compared to 42.5 percent for rural and 23.3 percent for urban populations.  
Figure 5.8  Poverty headcount and poverty gap by location, 2012 /2013 
A. National poverty line  B. $2.50 poverty line 
  
Source: World Bank (2015) using all districts in HIES 2012/13. 
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226.  When looking at non-monetary 
indicators of poverty, health and nutrition 
are worrisome, especially in the estates.  
Island-wide 21 percent of children under 5 are 
underweight, 16 percent of babies born have low 
birth weight and 16 percent of women of 
reproductive age (15-49) are malnourished. 
Estates have the highest maternal mortality rates 
in the country, and both estate women and 
children suffer from severe malnutrition. About 
30 percent of children below 5 are underweight, 
nearly one in three babies born have low birth 
weight, and one-third of women of reproductive 
age are malnourished (Figure 5.9). A significant 
reason for child and maternal malnutrition in the 
estate sector was intake of the “wrong” kind of 
foods, specifically those lacking in protein.90 
The fact that estate women traditionally eat whatever remains after men and children have been fed is 
considered a contributing factor to women’s malnourishment.91 Being undernourished and overworked, 
mothers in the estates give birth to weak children and have inadequate breast milk, both of which contribute 
to high levels of infant mortality. 
 
227. Housing provided for the estate workers is often described as inadequate. Estate-sector 
households are less likely to have drinking water, sanitary facilities or electricity within their households. 
The differences are particularly large for availability of drinking water; only 68.1 percent of households in 
the estates have drinking water available inside their premises, compared to 77.3 percent of households in 
rural areas (Figure 5.10). Similarly, less than one-third of estate households have a toilet available in their 
unit, compared to 43.2 percent of households in rural areas. Philips (2005) argues that the lack of toilets 
and running water implies that mothers and daughters need to wake up early in the morning and go to 
bushes for bathing and other needs, exposing them to all kinds of threats. Often, entire families live in so-
called line rooms – barrack- type single rooms that are roughly 12 by 10 feet and described as crowded, 
damp, smoky and dark with leaking roofs and inadequate light and ventilation.92 Housing, education, health 
care and childcare are often provided as non-monetary “welfare packages” to estate workers. It is argued 
these create a total dependency of workers on the management for all aspects of their lives.93  
                                                          
90 Jayawardena, 2014. 
91 Aheeyar 2011, Philips 2005 
92 Little 1999; Aheeyar 2011:10 
93 Gunetilleke et al. 2008:53 
Figure 5.9. Sri Lanka. Nutrition Indicators 
 
Source: DHS, 2007. 
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Figure 5.10. Housing conditions in estate sector 
(share of households with access) 
Figure 5.11 Access to health and education 
services 
(Average time to travel, in minutes) 
  
Source: World Bank (2015), all districts in HIES 2012/13. 
 
228. Moreover, access to services and the quality of services in the estates is comparatively low. 
Travel times generally mean that estate workers are isolated in terms of access to health and education. 
Estate workers need to travel longer to reach a bus stop, secondary education and the nearest hospital 
(Figure 5.11). Most schools in the estates are primary schools and upon completion of primary education, 
students have to travel to nearby villages to continue with secondary education. Poor roads and lack of 
transport facilities may contribute to the low enrollment rates at the secondary schools among the estate 
population.94 Health facilities in the estates do not meet national standards; hospitals in the estate sector are 
less well equipped and there are fewer trained health staff and medicine.95  Poor quality of health services 
pushes estate workers to obtain private health services at higher prices.96 Estate hospitals were taken over 
by the government in 2007, but it has been difficult to send doctors to staff those hospitals due to their 
remote locations. Estate schools are also run by the public sector, and, again, allocation of teachers 
(especially Tamil-speaking teachers) has been difficult. Successive governments have changed teacher 
recruitment policies (including school-based recruitments rather than national level recruitments) to 
improve the situation. 
   
229. Poor outcomes in education impede the ability of the estate population to participate in Sri 
Lankan society. Across sectors, the greatest improvement in education attainment is seen in the estate 
sector, but it still remains low compared to other sectors.97 For instance, the proportion of those who have 
completed primary level education improved from 82 percent to 86 percent in Sri Lanka as a whole, with 
the corresponding improvement in the estate sector from 53 percent to 63 percent. The proportion of those 
who have completed O-levels improved from 7 percent to 9 percent in the estate sector. However, the 
proportion of the estate-sector working-age population with at least A-levels remains low at 3 percent, 
although improved from 1 percent in 2003. The estates not only have low levels of education for adults 
relative to the rest of the country (Figure 5.12A), but more importantly, they have lower enrollment rates, 
                                                          
94 UNFPA 2014: 24; Aheeyar 2011:11 
95 Ahmed 2014; Gunetilleke et al. 2008 
96 Gunetilleke et al. 2008 
97 In this paragraph, 2003 does not include the Northern Province, while 2012 includes the Northern Province. 
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particularly among 15 to 20 year olds, of which only 49 percent are enrolled compared to 66 percent in 
rural areas (Figure 5.12B).  
Figure 5.12 Educational levels and enrollment 
A. Level of education for individuals age 20 and 
above 
B. Share of individuals in respective age 
group enrolled in education  
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force Survey 
Note: *** All districts, ** excludes Northern Province. 
 
 
230. The youth are increasing leaving the estate sector. Between 2003 and 2012, the share of 
population in the estate sector increased from about 660,000 to about 682,000, an average growth of 0.4 
percent a year, compared to an average growth of 1.3 percent per year for the country as a whole. However, 
the number of youth ages 15 to 24 actually declined (Figure 5.12B), particularly among those aged 15-20. 
In contrast, the share of adults aged 60 and above increased by 8 percent a year on average. This shift in 
the population structure also coincided with a movement away from agriculture wage work among those 
who live in the estates, while the share of workers engaged in non-agricultural activities – primarily 
manufacturing, transport, commerce and community services – increased from 24 to 30 percent between 
2006 and 2010, but then declined somewhat in 2012 (Figure 5.13). 
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Figure 5.13 The youth are leaving the estate sector and the share of agricultural workers is in decline 
A. Change in Population Structure 
(average annual change, 2003-2012) 
A. Workers in the estate Sector 
(number of workers, share of total) 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force Survey data. Data exclude Northern province for comparability 
  
231.  The educated estate youth face 
difficulties in accessing salaried employment 
outside the estate sector. While opportunities 
for estate youth to work in service-sector 
industries, such as retail stores and 
communication centers, are expanding in nearby 
villages, the opportunities to work in 
professional, salaried occupations are not easily 
available to the estate youth. Despite their 
preference to work in such occupations, estate 
youth has to compete with better educated and 
socialized peers from the rural and urban sectors 
who are preferred by employers.98 Due to this 
situation many estate youth take on lower-level 
job openings, such as domestic workers, shop 
assistants or construction workers, and relatively 
few are able to secure jobs as semi-skilled 
workers, such as drivers or mechanics. 
According to a qualitative study conducted by Gunetilleke et al. (2008), most of the estate youth reported 
facing stigmatization and discrimination due to their Indian Tamil ethnicity and estate worker identity, both 
of which constitute a barrier in accessing non-estate job opportunities. While youth unemployment is low 
and declining relative to the rest of the country (Figure 5.14), the share of estate youth who are out of the 
labor force has increased by over 40 percent, compared to an 18 percent growth in rural areas.  Although 
this may be correlated with a higher share of youth being enrolled in school, it also suggests “voluntary” 
inactivity due to the mismatch of job opportunities and aspirations. 
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232.  Women in the estates face additional layers of exclusion. Women tend to be employed for the 
lowest-paying unskilled tasks that require intense labor such as tea plucking or rubber tapping.99 According 
to Kotikula and Solotaroff (2006), approximately 86 percent of female estate workers are fieldworkers and 
estate women face obstacles in moving up to higher-level positions. Gender segregation varies by the type 
of estate management as well as the type of crop; it is found to be less severe in rubber estates, where 25 
percent of supervisors are women, compared to 5 percent in tea estates. Despite being income earners, there 
is substantial anecdotal evidence that estate women’s wages are often collected by their husbands or fathers 
who, in turn, often spend it on alcohol.100 Their status in the estates makes women vulnerable to gender-
based violence (GBV), and not only at home; there are also frequent reports of harassment, rape and abuse 
of estate workers by male supervisors in the fields. According to a qualitative study commissioned by 
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in 2003 with 350 women in estates in Hatton, 83 percent of 
women were found to be victims of GBV (Box 5.3).101  
 
233. More generally, alcoholism is found to be an issue in the estates.102 Poor housing and 
infrastructure are seen as one of the reasons behind high levels of alcoholism in the estates. In the qualitative 
study conducted by the Center for Poverty Analysis in 2005 with the estate population, alcoholism was 
identified as a major community problem, especially by female and young respondents, and it was perceived 
as a primary cause of poverty. According to a baseline survey conducted in 2005 in the estates, the number 
of working men who regularly consume alcohol was found to range between 50 to 75 percent.103 The same 
survey also revealed that 25 to 50 percent of daily earnings were spent on alcohol. Alcoholism in estates 
has number of effects, including draining  household income and diverting funds from basic needs. 
Alcoholism is also associated with abuse of, and violence against, women in the estates.104 
 
234. Over the longer term, RPCs face major challenges which, given their extensive role in 
providing services, may impact the estate population.  RPCs historically provided social support “from 
womb to tomb” and continue to provide some services as well as guaranteed lifetime employment.  While 
the youth seek to leave the estates in general, there is still a large population, including a significant number 
of elderly dependents.  The RPCs’ business model is under pressure from a combination of factors: 
declining profitability due to relatively higher wages after several increases over the past decade while 
facing stiff competition from more productive growers in Kenya and India; declining prices for estate 
commodities (tea, coconut products, and rubber); and reduced demand from key historical consumers in 
Russia and the Middle East.  There are estimates that up to half of tea plantations’ acreage requires 
replanting. The difficult prospects for the sector may translate into profound socio-economic challenges, 
including loss of jobs and social support mechanisms, for the estate population. 
  
                                                          
99 Kotikula and Solotaroff 2006; Philips 2005; Jayawardena 1984 
100 Aheeyar 2011; Ahmed 2014; Daniel 1993; Jayawardena 1984 
101 Perera et al. 2011 
102 Gunetilleke et al. 2008; World Bank 2007; Aheeyar 2011 
103 Aheeyar 2011 
104 Gunetilleke et al. 2008; Jayawardena 1984 
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Box 5.3. Gender-based violence: One of the most extreme forms of exclusion 
 
GBV is one of the most extreme interferences with women’s dignity, and it impacts their 
opportunities to participate in society. The forms of violence faced by the women in Sri Lanka range 
from rape and domestic violence to sexual harassment in public transportation. All these prevent women’s 
access to health, education and employment opportunities. Legal consequences for rapists are rare and, in 
a UN-led survey, only 34 percent of those who admitted rape felt worried or guilty about their actions, 
suggesting that social norms are permissive of this extreme form of violence against women.  
 
Several studies argue that violence against women has increased due to conflict and disaster. The 
presence of military forces, the setting of displacement camps, the loss of male household members to war 
and alcohol abuse caused by war-related trauma increase insecurity for women. The tsunami additionally 
contributed to this environment of insecurity for women, who became victims of sexual and domestic 
violence both in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and during the post-tsunami rehabilitation and 
reconstruction process. Finally, due to instability caused by the conflict and natural disaster, girls were 
rushed into child marriages to tsunami widowers who sought government subsidies for marrying and 
starting a family, creating vulnerability.  
 
Gender-based violence is linked to cultural norms and attitudes about masculinity. In a survey 
conducted in Colombo, Hambantota, Nuwara Eliya and Batticaloa districts, de Mel et al (2013) argue that 
male perpetration of gender-based violence is linked to cultural attitudes about how to be a man. The study 
found that majority of men as well as women linked manhood to dominance, toughness and violence.  Men 
who reported committing sexual violence often were motivated by sexual entitlement – as men they 
perceive themselves as having right to have sexual relations with women.  Fifty five percent of men in the 
sample agreed that in case of rape one would have to question whether the victim is promiscuous or has a 
bad reputation. Regarding intimate partner violence (IPV), 41 percent of male respondents agreed with the 
statement that a woman should tolerate violence in order to keep the family together. Around 78 percent of 
men affirmed the view that women should obey their husbands, while 58 percent of men stated that women 
could not refuse their husbands. Women also contribute to the persistence of inequitable gender norms: 58 
percent of women (a higher percentage than men) believed that a woman should tolerate IPV in order to 
keep the family together.. Moreover, 75 percent of women agreed that, “some women ask to be raped by 
the way they dress and behave.”. According to the study, male attitudes on reproductive issues, equal wages, 
children’s education, women associations and entry into politics were more equitable. Seventy percent of 
men agreed that women should be in public decision-making roles and 62 percent supported the greater 
participation of women at the elections. Lastly, the study emphasized particular vulnerabilities that men 
face throughout their lives, which increases their risk of perpetration of violence against women. Economic 
pressures resulting from inadequate income, lack of economic assets, and financial responsibilities as 
breadwinners are found to be among the primary causes of male stress and lack of well-being. Male 
respondents are also found to have moderate level of depression and suicidal thoughts.  
Source: Schmidt and Canpolat (2015) based on Hettige et al. (2012), Save the Children (2006),  Fisher (2010); 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2012); Perera et al. (2011), Solotaroff and Pande (2014),   Rush (201), 
UNHCR (2004); Freedom House (2011); Biermann (2006); and de Mel et al (2013). 
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Moneragala 
235. Persistent high poverty rates in Moneragala are related to its strong reliance on agriculture 
and relatively little diversification within households to other industries. Moneragala is the second 
largest of the 25 districts in Sri Lanka, with relatively low population density (82 per square kilometer 
compared to an average of 331 for the country as a whole in 2014105). Moneragala is home to tea, rubber 
and coconut plantations and a large number of small holders, with 34 percent of households cultivating 
paddy land compared to 18 percent for the country as a whole. As such, it is mostly an agricultural district; 
57 percent of the workforce engaged in agricultural activities, compared to 31 percent for the country as a 
whole, while only 32 percent of workers are in services compared to 43 percent for the country as a whole 
(LFS, 2012). Moreover, it has a relatively high share of self-employed agricultural workers and unpaid 
family workers, and relatively fewer non-farm or wage employees. The relatively low density of the 
population coupled with the high reliance on agriculture suggests that households in Moneragala are less 
diversified, and as such, are especially vulnerable to agricultural price fluctuations and have few alternative 
sources of income (Figure 5.15A).  
 
236. Persistent high poverty rates in Moneragala are also related to relatively low access to 
services. Average levels of education are below the national average, with about eight years of education 
compared to the national average of nine. Access to services is in line with the national average, with the 
exception of electricity and sanitation, which are well below the country average. Travel times to secondary 
schools, hospitals and agricultural centers are also higher than for the rest of the country (Figure 5.15B). 
Approximately one-third of total area in the district is covered by natural forests under natural parks and/or 
sanctuaries that are not available for human development. However, there is increasing encroachment of 
forests, a growing human-wildlife conflict, and soil degradation from gem mining in its granite deposits.106 
Further analysis on the determinants of poverty in Moneragala would be useful to design multi-sector 
interventions that could help to reduce the relatively high levels of poverty prevalent in the district. 
                                                          
105 DCS, Mid-year population estimates, 2012-2014.  
106 Attanpola et al. 
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Figure 5.15 Moneragala Labor Force Characteristics and Travel Times to Facilities  
A. Type of work 
(share of total employed, ages 15+, 2012) 
B. Travel time to facilities 
(average time in minutes, 2012/2013) 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using LFS 2012. Source: World Bank (2015), all districts HIES 2012/13. 
 
C. Inclusion of Ethnic Communities 
237. There are differences in poverty rates among Sri Lanka’s ethnic communities.   Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Sri Lankan Moors constitute the two largest ethnic minority groups and have higher levels of 
poverty. Using the national poverty line, Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils have poverty rates that are 
3.3 and 5.3 percentage points higher than the Sinhala population, respectively. Using the $2.50 poverty line, 
the poverty headcount for Indian Tamils is 46.3 and for Sri Lankan Tamils is 44.4 percent, compared to an 
overall poverty headcount of 32.1 percent. Using both poverty lines, the poverty gap for the Sri Lankan and 
Indian Tamils is above the average (Figure 5.16).  
Figure 5.16. Sri Lankan Tamils and Moors have higher levels of poverty 
A. National poverty line 
(percent of population) 
B. US $2.50-a-day poverty line 
(percent of population) 
  
Source: World Bank (2015), all districts in HIES 2012/13. 
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238. Empirical analysis finds that most of the differences in monetary poverty is related to 
inequality of opportunities. The likelihood of being poor is not statistically different for ethnic minorites 
relative to the Sinhala majority if one controls for education, ownership of assets,and access to services.107 
Estimates from a multivariate profile of risk-of-poverty show that the likelihood of being poor increases 
with the number of family members, particularly children. With respect to the location of the households, 
rural households have a higher probability of being poor as opposed to urban households, while there is a 
high premium for living in the Western province. Any level of education attained after compulsory 
education (junior secondary, O-levels) decreases the chances of being poor. Meanwhile, living in a 
household where the head has no education or just primary education is linked to higher chances of being 
poor compared to households where the head has completed compulsory education. Ownership of assets 
such as mobile phones, a sewing machine, or a television lowers the probability of being poor, as does 
access to services, particularly having running water within premises. Age, gender, and sector of activity 
of the household head, once controlling for all other covariates, are not statistically significant in assessing 
the risk of poverty of an individual. Moreover, the probability of being poor is statistically the same for Sri 
Lankan and Indian Tamils, once individual, household, and locational characteristics are controlled for. 
This points to the fact that most of the differences in monetary poverty have to do with inequality of 
opportunities, particularly with respect to education and access to services. 
 
239. Access to services is particularly low for Tamils. For a range of indicators, the most recent 
household survey shows that Sri Lankan Tamil households have lower access to basic services, --including 
drinking water within their premises, the availability of a pipe borne line nearby their house  a toilet within 
their unit, or access to electricity (Figure 5.17A). Despite increased spending on infrastructure across the 
country, this evidence points to remaining infrastructure needs, particularly related to improving housing 
services. At the same time, Sri Lankan Moors, have higher access to basic services than the majority Sinhala 
population.  
 
240. Educational attainment is lower for the ethnic minority workforce. While educational 
attainment has improved for all population groups, the average level of education for Tamils is lower than 
that of other ethnic groups, even when excluding the most war-affected regions. For instance, comparable 
data over the last decade (excluding the North and Eastern Provinces) finds that 22 percent of Sri Lankan 
Tamils had less than primary education (compared to 12 percent for the Sinhalese workforce) and only 10 
percent had completed A Levels, compared to 13 percent for the Sinhalese workforce. This has meant that, 
on average, the Sinhalese workforce has had consistently higher levels of education when compared to the 
Tamil or Moor workforce (Figure 5.17B). 
                                                          
107 World Bank Poverty Assessment, 2015. 
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Figure 5.17. Access to services and educational attainment by ethnicity 
A. Access to basic services 
(share of households) 
B. Educational attainment 
(average years of education, ages 15+) 
  
Source: World Bank (2015), all districts in HIES 
2012/13. 
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) based on 2012 LFS. 
Excludes North and Eastern provinces for comparability. 
 
241. Rates of ownership of land are also uneven among the country’s ethnic communities.   
According to the 2012/13 HIES, 88.6 percent of Sinhalese households owned land, compared to 83.3 
percent of Sri Lankan Moor households, 73.2 percent of Sri Lankan Tamil households, and 36.5 percent of 
Indian Tamil households (Figure 5.18).  The lower rates of ownership among Sri Lankan Tamils, may be 
due, in part, to difficulties in restoring ownership rights following the destruction of property registries and 
loss of documentation owing to the conflict.  The lower rates of ownership among Indian Tamils reflect the 
continued provision of housing by many estates, although recent years have seen cases where ownership of 
houses and associated plots has been transferred. 
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. 
242. Empirical analysis using labor force 
surveys finds no statistical differences in 
unemployment rates across ethnic groups, 
while Sinhalese are more likely to be employed 
in the public sector. Labor force participation is 
low and unemployment is high for Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Moors, relative to the Indian Tamil and 
Sinhalese populations. However, much of this has 
to do with individual characteristics and the 
locational concentration of these populations. 
When focusing outside of those regions, both Sri 
Lankan and Indian Tamils have higher labor force 
participation and employment rates relative to 
their Sinhalese counterparts. This suggests that 
different rates of participation are mostly determined by differences in employment opportunities. 
Moreover, quantitative analysis shows that there are no statistical differences in the likelihood of being 
unemployed across ethnic groups, once you control for age, education and other individual and household 
characteristics. The only exception is that Indian Tamil males are more likely to be unemployed relative to 
their Sinhalese counterparts, in line with higher male unemployment in the estate sector.108 In terms of the 
activity across population groups, 
empirical analysis using the labor force 
surveys finds that Sinhalese workers are 
more likely to work in the public sector 
than other ethnic groups (Figure 5.19).  
This empirical result cannot be 
corroborated against administrative 
employment data because the ethnic 
make-up of the public service is not 
tracked.  
  
243. The evidence suggests that 
non-Sinhalese men are more likely to 
be associated with private informal-
sector jobs relative to their Sinhalese 
counterparts. Even after controlling 
for individual characteristics, such as 
age, education, and marital status, as 
well as household characteristics, such 
as the number of children and the 
district in which they are located 
(Figure 5.19), ethnic minorities seem to 
be more likely to work in informal jobs. 
Tamil men are generally more likely to 
work in private activities relative to 
                                                          
108 Arunatilake et al, 2015. 
Figure 5.19 Likelihood of activity relative to public sector 
employment and Sinhalese counterpart 
(individuals age 15 and over) 
 
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) based on the 2012 LFS excluding 
the North and East. Results report coefficients on ethnicity in a 
Multinomial logit model that controls for age, education, headship, 
marital status, number of children, number of elderly (80 years+), 
district and region fixed effects where the left out category is the 
Sinhalese workforce. Significance at least at the 10 percent level. 
Figure 5.18. Share of households owning some land, 
by ethnicity 
 
Source: World Bank (2015), all districts HIES 2012/13. 
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their Sinhalese counterparts, and within the private sector, Sri Lankan Tamils are more likely to work in 
informal private wage work. In contrast, Indian Tamil men are more likely to work in private wage work 
or to be unemployed than to work in the public sector compared to their Sinhalese counterparts. Finally, Sri 
Lankan Moor men are more likely to be informal private-sector wage workers, informal self-employed 
workers, or to be unemployed than to work in the public sector relative to their Sinhalese counterparts. 
Non-Sinhalese women, in contrast, are less likely to work as private self-employed workers compared to 
their Sinhalese counterparts, while Sri Lankan Moor women are more likely to work in the public sector 
compared to their Sinhalese counterparts. For women, there seems to be a stronger likelihood of 
participating in the public sector, particularly for Sri Lankan Moors. However, this may be associated with 
their relatively low participation in general (see below). 
 
244. Beyond these quantitative measures, perceptions of fairness, particularly when it comes to 
job opportunities, can be an important aspect in assessing the success of efforts towards social 
inclusion. A perception survey carried out by the Asia Foundation (2011) suggests that, compared to 
Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims are less optimistic about improvements in minority rights and equal 
treatment in the government job market. Religious minorities were also less likely to think that the country 
is moving in the right direction. 
 
Internally Displaced Persons and Returnees: An Additional Axis of Exclusion   
245. An additional dimension of exclusion across ethnic lines concerns internally displaced 
persons. The post-war period has seen the return of over 700,000 displaced persons to their place of origin 
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.  Although basic material needs have largely been met,109 returnees 
nonetheless face multiple challenges in accessing shelter, food and infrastructure and developing 
livelihoods.  There are particular difficulties in securing land rights owing to the lack of an effective claims 
dispute mechanism and the loss of documentation owing to conflict and displacement.  At the same time, 
there is migration into the North and East of other ethnic groups -- particularly Sinhala, some of whom were 
displaced decades earlier – which creates tension over access to land.  Finally, there are also a number of 
long-time IDPs, comprised mainly of Sri Lankan Tamils and Moors, who are excluded from the official 
statistics on IDPs and have received lower levels of assistance.  Their protracted displacement is sometimes 
hidden due to factors including deregistration of IDPs based on whether one’s family place of origin is open 
for return, but they still live in displacement.  
 
246. Families returning to their place of origin in the North are faced with problems of 
indebtedness. According to a mixed-methods study, which compares the amount of debt between groups 
who differ only in whether they engage in housing construction, households that engage in housing 
construction have significantly higher debt despite the housing assistance they received.110 About 73 percent 
of housing beneficiaries in the sample reported borrowing money on top of the housing assistance provided 
to them. Reasons for doing so included the desire to build larger and better houses. As most of the returnee 
families engage in casual labor and lack sufficient and stable income to repay their loans, they become 
indebted. In addition, Romeshun et al. (2014) argue that most of the households lack financial literacy, such 
as knowledge about interest rates, and they have poor management of grant money, which worsens their 
debt situation. Female-headed households and households with disabled members are found to be 
particularly vulnerable. Anecdotal evidence suggests that there are cases of suicides and attempted suicides 
                                                          
109 UNOPS and Government of Sri Lanka. Joint Needs Assessment, 2015 
110 Romeshun et al. 2014 
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linked to indebtedness.111 The high share of households indebted to money lenders and the average amount 
owed by households to money lenders in the Northern and Eastern Provinces (Figure 5.20) indicates both 
the comparatively high levels of indebtedness as well the resort to this less institutionalized form of money 
lending in these provinces. While high rates of indebtedness in the North and East do not only affect IDPs, 
their particular circumstances appear to be the main driver of the problem. 
Figure 5.20 Household debt to money lenders 
A. Share of households indebted to money 
lenders 
B. Average amount of debt 
  
Source: World Bank (2015), all districts in HIES 2012/13. 
 
247. Local empowerment in areas with concentrations of minorities remains an issue.  Some 
empowerment has occurred, notably through the holding of elections to provincial councils and, more 
recently, the return of some lands occupied by the military and the appointment of a civilian governor to 
the Northern Province.  While there are reports of easing, the high number of security forces in the conflict-
affected areas has been cited as one of the main obstacles for IDP returnees and others in rebuilding their 
livelihoods and achieving durable solutions.112  Reported continued surveillance and engagement by the 
military in local economic activities also have negatively affected IDP returnees and communities affected 
by the conflict.113  Settlement and implementation of a division of authority between national, provincial, 
and local governments, especially in the North and East, remains an outstanding challenge.  In addition, 
ensuring that further reconstruction and development projects proceed in a participatory manner will be 
important for inclusion. 
D. Gender Inclusion  
Low Female Labor Force Participation  
248. Sri Lanka faces a low and declining rate of female labor force participation.  Sri Lanka’s 
female labor participation had been stable at slightly below 40 percent for the past few decades up until the 
2000s, when it started to decline.  Although participation of women in the labor force is higher in Sri Lanka 
than its South Asian comparators, it is lower than comparable middle-income countries, despite decades of 
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low levels of fertility and good educational outcomes (Figure 5.21A). In 2013, female labor force 
participation stood at 35.6 percent, compared to a male participation rate of 74.9 percent. Moreover, 
participation has been slightly declining over the last decade. Across age groups, the drop in labor force 
participation rates was highest for the youth (Figure 5.21B). To a large extent, this is due to more young 
women continuing their education. In fact this is the main reason for non-participation among young women 
in 63 percent of cases in the 2012 labor force survey, up from 57.6 percent in 2002. In contrast, labor force 
participation for 60 to 69 year olds has increased over time. 
Figure 5.21. Female Labor Force Participation 
A. Developing countries 
(Percentage of female population ages 15-64) 
B. Sri Lanka. Female Labor Force 
Participation Rate, by age groups, 2002-2012 
  
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank Source: Arunatilake et al, 2015. Survey data, excluding 
North and Eastern provinces for comparability. 
 
249. Female labor force participation rates are higher for those with either low or high levels of 
education. Women with A-levels had participation rates that were 17 percentage points higher than those 
with O-levels (the next highest level of education) in 2012, and those with a degree or more had a 
participation rate 36 points higher than those with A-levels (Figure 5.22A). However, the difference in 
participation rates between highly educated women and those with less education is narrowing, albeit 
slowly.  This is seen by the flattening of the curve in Figure 5.22A over time and holds true even when 
controlling for other regional and individual characteristics. Between 2003 and 2012, the difference in the 
likelihood of participating declined by 8 and 7 percent for women with incomplete primary and completed 
primary education, respectively, relative to those with university degrees or higher.114 
                                                          
114 Results from a Probit regression estimating the likelihood of women participating in the labor force. The model 
controls for age, marital status, being household head, ethnicity, region and district fixed effects, whether she has 
children, and the number of adults age 80+. Estimates based on Labor Force Surveys excluding the Northern 
province for comparability over time. See Arunatilake et al. (2015). 
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Figure 5.22. Female Labor Force Participation 
(Percentage of female population ages 15-64) 
A. By education groups B. By marital status 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al, 2015.  Labor Force Survey data, excluding North and Eastern provinces for comparability 
 
250. As in most countries, labor force participation is lower for married women and for those with 
children. Indeed, the labor force survey confirms that separated or divorced women have the highest rates 
of labor force participation, while participation for married and never married females is similar (Figure 
5.22B). Married women were less likely to participate than similar single women, who in turn were less 
likely to participate than separated or divorced women once we control for age, education, regional and 
other individual and household characteristics, in line with previous analysis.115 Similarly, women with 
children under 5 were less likely to participate. On the other hand, the presence of other adults in the 
household who presumably can take care of children is commonly found to increase labor force 
participation by women.  This suggests that better access to affordable quality childcare facilities could 
stimulate female labor force participation.116 Furthermore, marriage changes the definitions of what 
qualifies as appropriate employment conditions and opportunities.117 
 
251. Social norms related to women’s role in the household and especially as related to childcare 
responsibilities restrict women’s opportunity to participate in the labor market. About 66 percent of 
women who did not participate cited “household activities” as the main reason for non-participation in 
2012, in line with earlier years. This is similar across urban and rural regions, but less common for young 
women (who are most often studying) and those in the estate sector (who more often cite old 
age/retirement). Interestingly, 71 percent of women with higher levels of education (A levels or more) cite 
“household activities” compared to 64 of cases for women with lower level of education118. Indeed, 
“marriage defines culturally appropriate behavior beyond economic need, individual ability, and individual 
preference”.119 Most notably, once married, women traditionally carry care responsibilities for children and 
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elderly in the household. In a survey conducted on attitudes towards gender norms in four districts of Sri 
Lanka, more than half of the male and female respondents agreed that childcare is primarily the mother’s 
responsibility and that women’s most important role is to take care of her home and cook for the family.120 
More generally, perceptions of culturally appropriate employment as opposed to the actual opportunities 
available may leave women unemployed.121 According to the National Youth Survey 2013, 64 percent of 
young women mention respectability as an important factor in their job selection.122 Finally, the type of 
degrees completed could play a role, especially when looking at arts degrees.123 
Gender Wage Gap and Occupational Segregation  
252. Beyond social norms, gender wage gaps and occupational segregation dissuade and constrain 
women from participating in the labor force. Female educational achievement is higher and has been 
growing faster than that of men. For instance, the O-level completion rates were about four percentage 
points higher for females than for males in 2012, reflecting a widening over the 2002-to-2012 period. 
Despite higher levels of education for women, wages for women continue to be lower than wages for men, 
with women earning 84 percent of male wages in 2012 (Figure 5.23A). Even when taking differences in 
the types of jobs where men and women tend to be employed into account, the wage gap in 2012 cannot be 
explained by observable characteristics or by differences in the types of work that men and women typically 
engage in. Moreover, this unexplained share has increased since 2003 (Figure 5.23B), which is likely to 
reduce the willingness of women to work. As Sinha (2012) highlights, public-sector jobs have less of a 
problem in this regard, with the relatively better gender parity in earnings in the public sector, making it 
more attractive for women to seek employment there. In addition, the public sector typically offers shorter 
workdays – which allow working mothers and wives to attend to their household duties while maintaining 
the perception of respectability – as well as other monetary and non-monetary benefits (maternity leave, 
vacations, sick leave, pension benefits, etc.).  
 
253. Discrimination in hiring practices is hard to prove. However, the Marge Survey conducted in 
the 1980s, for instance, pointed to biases against married women due to the perceived need for extra 
facilities and higher costs in the form of absenteeism and maternity leave.124 Finally, due to a high degree 
of occupational segregation based on social attitudes about appropriate jobs for women, relatively few 
occupations, such as teaching, semi-skilled and unskilled production work (often in textiles) and domestic 
service, are available to Sri Lankan women.125 Some of these jobs, such as working in garment factories in 
free trade zones, are associated with exploitation and stigmatization, which may deter women from entering 
into the labor market.126 In addition, the legal framework governing work in the private sector prevents 
women from taking up night work or part-time work in the growing service sector.127 Moreover, the laws 
                                                          
120 de Mel et al. 2013 
121 Amarasuriya 2010 
122 UNDP 2014:42 
123 Ibarguen 2004 
124 Malhotra and DeGraff 2000: 152 
125 Malhotra and DeGraff 1997: 382, Gunatilaka 2013:3 
126 Amarasuriya 2010 
127 The Shop and Office Employees Act No. 19 of 1954 states under paragraph 10(2) that “a person who has attained 
the age of fourteen years and who [...] is a female, shall not be employed in or about the business of a shop or office 
before 6 am or after 6pm on any day“. Exception included in the act include: (i) women from the age of eighteen 
years may be employed in or about the business of a hotel or restaurant for the period between 6pm and 10pm; (ii) 
women from the age of eighteen may be employed in a residential hotel before 6am or after 6pm; and (iii) women 
from the age of eighteen may be employed in or about the business of a shop or office for the period between 6pm 
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governing maternity benefits128 make employers bear the entire cost, potentially deterring employers from 
hiring women.129  
Figure 5.23. Understanding the Gender Wage Gap 
A. Real wages by gender B. Decomposing the gender wage gap * 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force Survey data. Data excludes Northern province for 
comparability. 
* Decomposition of the gender wage gap using matching, following Ñopo (2008). 
 
254. Finally, there are notable differences in female labor force participation among provinces 
and ethnic groups (Figure 5.24). Participation in the Northern and Eastern Provinces is particularly low at 
26.2 percent and 23.6 percent, respectively. The special circumstances for women due to war and effects 
of the 2004 tsunami in these regions – including high levels of gender-based violence and early marriage 
to war widowers – may contribute to the problem. Indian Tamil women are much more likely to participate 
in the labor force – their participation rate lies at 55 percent – and the participation by Sri Lankan Moor 
women is lowest, at 16.2 percent. While the high participation rate by Indian Tamil women can be explained 
by their location in the estate sector and the special labor conditions there, cultural and social norms in the 
household are likely to play a key role in determining the labor force participation of Sri Lankan Moor 
women.130  
                                                          
and 8pm. See Shop and Office Employees Act accessed at: 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/travail/docs/1350/Shop20and%20Office%20Employees%20Act.pdf (April 1, 2015).  
128 Maternity benefits in Sri Lanka’s private sector are governed by the Maternity Benefits Ordinance No. 32 of 
1939 (for women employed in any trade) and the Shop and Office Employees Act No. 19 of 1954 (for women 
employed in shops and offices) (Abeykoon et al. 2014). In 1993, Sri Lanka ratified the ILO Maternity Protection 
Convention (Revised) 1952 (No. 103). However, there remain shortcomings between the national legislation and the 
ILO convention (see Abeykoon et al. (2014: 13). One of the shortcomings is that maternity benefit payments are 
financed through employer liability. It is commonly argued that employer liability for maternity benefits lead to 
discrimination of women who are pregnant or might become pregnant (Abeykoon et al. 2014:4). Furthermore, 
maternity benefits financed through employer liability are difficult to enforce (Abeykoon et al. 2014:4). 
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Figure 5.24 Female labor force participation by location and ethnicity, 2012 
A. By location B. By ethnicity 
  
Source: Arunatilake et al (2015) using Labor Force Survey data. 
 
Female Labor Migrants and Their Families: The Inclusion Challenges of Migration 
255. One way that women participate in labor has been through migration, which poses particular 
inclusion challenges. A significant body of literature focuses on the well being of female migrants outside 
Sri Lanka and the situation of the families they leave behind.131 While the share of women in departures for 
foreign employment has declined overall since the mid-1990s, women still constituted 49 percent of 
departures in 2012.132 Out of the women migrating for foreign employment in 2012, 86 percent were to be 
employed as housemaids. Most female migrants are married, have children and come from lower income 
groups.133 Poverty, lack of employment in Sri Lanka with adequate wages, the desire to improve the 
economic status of their families (including building a permanent home and acquiring land), better 
education for their children, and overcoming economic difficulties like indebtedness are often cited as 
reasons for women’s departures.134 
 
256. Women’s migration has impacts on the family that is left behind, most notably on the children 
in the household, with implications for society more broadly. In the absence of the mother, the extended 
family and husbands take up care responsibilities for children in female migrant households.135 With the 
primary care giver being absent, children are sometimes found to be more exposed to abuse, including 
sexual abuse and incest.136 Poor financial management at home can put the benefits of migration at risk. 
Some studies find the educational performance and attendance of children of migrant mothers to be 
lower.137 Upon the return of the migrating mother, family relationships are often disrupted due to the long 
absence of the mother, her exposure to a different context, her newly gained economic power deriving from 
                                                          
131 Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign Employment et al. 2013; IOM 2009; Perera and Rathnayaka 2013; Save the 
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her income and changing the power dynamics at home, and the non-acceptance of all this by other family 
members, especially by spouses.138 This can ultimately lead to the separation of spouses, additionally 
impacting children’s opportunities. In response to the realization of these potential social costs of migrating 
mothers, the government has put in place regulations, including minimum age requirements for mother and 
child, insurance schemes and scholarships for children of migrant workers.139  
Women in Leadership Roles 
257. Women are under-represented in political life. Sri Lanka boasts having produced the world’s 
first woman prime minister in 1960, and women have been enjoying the right to vote since 1931. However, 
despite the fact that women make up nearly 53 percent of the population, they are under-represented in 
political and public decision-making bodies. Women make up only 5.8 percent of parliamentarians in the 
current National Parliament, 4.1 percent in Provincial Councils and a negligible 1.8 percent in local 
government, among the lowest in the world, and certainly in South Asia.140 The percentage of women in 
parliament between the 1930s and the present has never exceeded 7 percent (Figure 5.25). A shift in 1989 
to an electoral system based on proportional representation, which elsewhere has generally proven more 
favorable to women, has not led to a significant change in the numbers of women elected over the years. 
 
258. Women are also under-represented on 
private-sector boards. Ratwatte (2012) noted that 
of the country’s 25 top corporate entities, which 
have a total 198 directors, only 10 are women.141 
Although women on Sri Lankan corporate boards 
are valued for what they can contribute and in 
every sense are considered no less equal to the job 
than their male counterparts, they take only 5 
percent of leadership roles in the private sector. 
Similarly, a study using 2009 data found that only 
13 percent of top management positions in nine 
commercial banks in Sri Lanka are held by 
women.142  
 
E. Identifying Priorities on Inclusion 
259. The significant locational concentration of monetary poverty in urban areas points to 
harnessing the urbanization process to benefit the poor and the bottom 40 percent.  The highest 
numbers of people living in poverty and the bottom 40 percent are located within multi-city agglomeration 
areas and can benefit from efforts to increase competitiveness discussed in Chapter IV.  Providing for 
effective governance of cities to allow for responsiveness to changing social and economic conditions and 
addressing inclusion challenges will be important.  Local officials will need to have sufficient 
administrative authority, financial resources and capacity to delivery services and conduct integrated, 
strategic planning.  An empowered local government could be more responsive to addressing gaps in 
                                                          
138 Hettige et al. 2012: 23, Gamburd 2008 
139 Central Bank 2014 
140 Kodikara, 2011. Available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/chulani-kodikara/sri-lanka-where-are-
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Figure 5.25 Female representation in Parliament 
(Female Parliamentarians as a share of total) 
 
Source: Parliament of Sri Lanka. Available at: 
http://www.parliament.lk/en/lady-members 
0.0%
1.0%
2.0%
3.0%
4.0%
5.0%
6.0%
7.0%
1
9
3
1
-1
9
3
5
1
9
3
6
-1
9
4
7
1
9
4
7
-1
9
5
2
1
9
5
2
-1
9
5
6
1
9
5
6
-1
9
5
9
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
0
-1
9
6
4
1
9
6
5
-1
9
7
0
1
9
7
0
-1
9
7
2
1
9
7
2
-1
9
7
7
1
9
7
7
-1
9
7
8
1
9
7
8
-1
9
8
9
1
9
8
9
-1
9
9
4
1
9
9
4
-2
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
-2
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
-2
0
0
4
2
0
0
4
-2
0
1
0
2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
5
121 
 
service delivery and infrastructure, particularly in addressing connectivity and other constraints to 
agglomeration that will affect the bottom 40 percent’s ability to secure good jobs. 
 
260. Key priorities to address the inclusion challenges across space, ethnicity and gender include 
concerted efforts to reduce poverty, improve public-service provision and promote employment 
opportunities in the North, East, Moneragala, and the estates. Multi-sector interventions that address 
lack of job opportunities in the North and East would help to reduce poverty and ensure shared prosperity. 
This could include small works programs aimed at improving market accessibility, incentives to promote 
entrepreneurship among educated youth and direct programs to help ex-combatants and female-headed 
households would go a long way to ensuring inclusion of the most vulnerable. In the estates, multi-sector 
interventions to improve nutrition outcomes, enhance job opportunities for the youth and prepare for a 
growing number of aging estate workers would help in ensuring their inclusion in shared growth. 
 
261. Concerted efforts need to be continued to improve equality of opportunity across ethnic 
groups, regardless of where these populations reside. This mainly requires an improvement in job 
opportunities for ethnic minorities. However, it also points to the need to address land claims in the former 
conflict areas, providing assistance to new and “old” IDPs, equalizing assistance to widows whose families 
are victims of the conflict regardless of which side they were on and integrated efforts to assist ex-
combatants. These efforts, in addition to improved social protection systems (Chapter III) and better job 
opportunities (Chapter IV), will help to provide equality of opportunity and foster inclusion. 
 
262. Critical emphasis is needed on increasing labor force participation of women and ensuring 
that they enjoy equal opportunity accessing jobs as well as political and private sector leadership 
positions. Priorities in this area include improving women’s education and incentives for participation 
through a better alignment of the education women pursue and the demands of the market; reforming 
legislation that prevents or deters women from being hired; and fostering greater participation of women in 
leadership positions.   
KEY KNOWLEDGE GAPS 
 Updating the poverty line to better reflect the basket of essential commodities. 
 Analysis of spatial spread of economic activity and potential constraints to further spreading, 
including to underserved areas. This could include analysis of how the Colombo- Kandy-
Galle corridor evolved and what should learned (or not) from that process. 
 Analysis of poverty trends at the district level. 
 Adding a panel component to future labor force surveys, tracking a representative sample of 
households and individuals over time. This will substantially enhance ability to better 
understand changes in employment, mobility, and structural transformation. 
 Updating nutritional outcome data to better monitor progress in the estate sector.  
 Analysis of drivers of persistent poverty in Moneragala. 
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VI. Sustainability 
KEY PRIORITIES FOR SUSTAINABILITY 
*  Sustaining peace and security through long-term reconciliation efforts among Sri Lanka’s 
heterogeneous society is the sine qua non for progress towards the twin goals.  
 
*  Developing a more accountable and effective state to follow through on recently initiated governance 
reforms. 
 
*  A heavier emphasis on direct investment and long-term private-sector flows will be needed to sustain 
Sri Lanka’s external fiscal position. 
 
*  Sri Lanka will need to balance imperatives to preserve its natural assets, provide for health and livability 
to its citizens (especially in urban areas), and foster growth. 
 
*  Managing the impact of climate change through adaption, mitigation, as well as strategies that reduce 
the carbon footprint. 
 
*  Addressing long-term fiscal sustainability concerns related to population aging. 
 
263. The prospects for progress towards eradicating poverty and promoting shared prosperity 
depend on the sustainability of Sri Lanka’s impressive development trajectory.  As with any country, 
there are risks that external or internal conditions that have facilitated progress to date do not continue to 
hold true.  There are also risks of the emergence of new factors that can meaningfully impact progress.  
 
264. Some key risks in Sri Lanka’s recent pattern of growth and progress towards the twin goals 
have already materialized and are important constraints reviewed in previous sections.  These risks 
include the challenges of sustaining growth based on internal consumption growth and increased public 
investment; the fiscal challenge of declining revenues and increasing needs for investment in human and 
physical capital; the lack of diversification and the need to develop a more competitive, open economy that 
encourages formality and innovation; and providing for equality of opportunity and inclusion of all 
segments of the population.  Risks to social sustainability – in particular higher levels of disaffection 
coupled with higher unemployment and levels of distrust in government among the youth – are evident in 
the inclusion section.  For the most part, these areas reflect the manner in which government policies have 
shaped the contours of the country’s economy and opportunities for its citizens. 
 
265. There are four other issues important to sustainability and fundamental to continued 
progress.  The first area is the necessity to achieve a lasting settlement that ensures peace and security for 
Sri Lankans. This is the sine qua non condition for progress.  The second area involves the challenges 
inherent in the major institutional overhaul now taking place.  The third area is economic stability in the 
context of the external environment.  Finally, Sri Lanka will continue to face environmental challenges, 
particularly the risk of climate change. 
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A. Social Risks to Sustainability 
Peace and Security 
266. Global experience indicates that countries that have recently been in internal conflict are 
much more prone to outbreaks of new conflict, suggesting that Sri Lanka is an “at risk” country.  The 
2011 World Development Report found nine out of 10 outbreaks of new conflicts in the 2000s occurred in 
countries that had recently previously experienced conflict and all civil wars that occurred since 2003 
occurred in countries that previously had been in civil war.  Of course, every country has its unique 
circumstances that may or may not make it vulnerable to conflict.  In Sri Lanka’s particular case, the 
combatants who challenged the state in previous decades – the LTTE and, earlier, leftist groups in the south 
– are no longer direct threats following their comprehensive defeat or integration into the political 
mainstream.  However, the lack of an evident armed threat at present does not ensure no new outbreak of 
conflict in the future. Having won the war, Sri Lanka needs to secure the peace.  
  
267. The quantum of impact from conflict makes it a serious risk even if the likelihood of a new 
outbreak appears low.  Conflict inflicts direct and indirect costs at national, local and personal levels and 
lack of security undermines the well-being of all Sri Lankans.  As noted earlier in Chapter II, one estimate 
of the cost of Sri Lanka’s internal conflicts was nearly 5 percent of GDP from 1978 to 2002.  Conflict would 
impair the country’s ability to address the constraints outlined above, from dealing with the fiscal challenge 
to diversification of the economy.  
 
268. Sri Lanka’s LLRC identified in 2011 a broad array of steps to achieve reconciliation among 
the country’s communities.  These steps focus on: ensuring rule of law; addressing citizens’ grievances; 
devolving power; upholding language policy allowing for official use of multiple languages; providing for 
equality of opportunity; and strengthening inter-communal and inter-personal ties.  Most important, 
political consensus to work towards reconciliation by political leaders representing all communities, in and 
outside of government, is needed to underpin these efforts.  These recommendations are consonant with 
successful experience in breaking the cycle of violence in other countries, namely the need for rebuilding 
confidence in the state by providing an institutional framework that provides citizens with security, justice, 
and jobs.143   
 
269. Much has been done to implement LLRC recommendations but much remains to be done.  
The government carried out a far-reaching program of resettlement of those displaced by conflict: 
demilitarization, rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants; de-mining of nearly all land; and rapid 
reconstruction of social and connective infrastructure destroyed by conflict.  Progress in these areas has 
been substantial in the short six years since the end of the war, though infrastructure and other public goods 
that provide for equality of opportunity are still at lower levels than the rest of the country.  Other issues 
have been partially addressed. These include implementing a trilingual public service policy and holding 
Eastern and Northern Provincial Council elections, as well as organizing North-South exchange programs 
for students and civil society and making efforts to recruit Tamil-speaking local police officers.   
 
270. There have been recent renewed efforts to promote inter-communal harmony.   Since the 
change of government in January 2015, several steps have been taken to address Tamil grievances, such as 
quickly moving to appoint a civilian governor, expediting domestic mechanisms to address accountability 
in connection with allegations of crimes during the conflict, and, more slowly, releasing land used by the 
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military in the North and East.  The new government was elected with the tacit support of the leading Tamil 
party and contains leaders from the main Muslim parties.  Symbolic steps have been taken, including having 
Tamil party leaders participate in national celebrations for the first time in decades. An international inquiry 
into accountability issues delayed its reporting in recognition of the policy intent and steps undertaken by 
the government to address reconciliation.  There have been no notable episodes of inter-communal violence 
since the new government was elected. 
 
271. Yet challenges remain to achieving lasting reconciliation.  A political settlement on the 
institutional framework that addresses issues of voice of local communities is still to be worked out.  In 
particular, incoherence in the assignment of powers between the central government and provincial 
government is a source of continuing tension in the North.  There is still a large, albeit lessening, military 
presence that interferes with localities through its surveillance, economic activities, and occupation of land.  
There has been little progress towards closure on social justice, particularly accountability in connection 
with allegations of crimes committed during the conflict, as well as resolution of cases of disappearances.  
The sensitivity of this issue is heightened by the considerable international attention it attracts.  Equality of 
opportunity that will provide the conditions for citizens of all communities to find rewarding jobs is critical 
to inclusion.  While there has been progress in recent years, there is still a gap in opportunities, particularly 
in more rural, isolated areas. Sustained efforts will be needed to address these sensitive issues.   
Other Social Risks 
272. High levels of unemployment for youth – particularly educated youth – pose risks to social 
sustainability. Declining employment prospects for youth can lead to frustration and ultimately, 
tensions.144 Youth seeking government jobs frequently report the influence of social networks in obtaining 
them. In the National Youth Survey 2013, 54.4 percent pointed to “political connections” and 30 percent 
to “family connections” in obtaining public-sector employment, signaling an uneven playing field and 
causing exclusion. In the past, frustrations with social hierarchy, patronage systems and the unavailability 
of appropriate employment opportunities are argued to have played a role in tumult involving large numbers 
of youth in Sri Lanka since the early 1970s.145 The same youth survey points to pessimistic views about the 
political situation of the country and low trust towards public institutions among other issues; in 2013, 89 
percent said they have little trust in political parties, up sharply from 47 percent in 1999-2000.146 Continuing 
disparities in income, consumption and access to services, which affect ethnic minorities and create mutual 
suspicion, can constitute another risk to cohesion. Finally, displacement resulting from conflict and natural 
disasters has created tensions around land.147 With the return of IDPs, land ownership is contested between 
returnees and late occupants. In several conflict-affected areas, land rights are being used as a tool to 
promote political patronage. This can exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions, particularly in areas where minority 
communities long displaced are returning.148 Land disputes can also threaten to undermine the relations 
between government officials and communities.149  
                                                          
144 Amarasuriya 2010 
145 Amarasuriya 2010; UNDP 2014 
146 UNDP 2014 
147 Raheem 2013; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012 
148 Fonseka 2010; Raheem 2013 
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Institutional Change 
273. The 19th Constitutional Amendment reflects consensus to reducing the powers of the 
presidency, but is a major overhaul in the country’s institutional framework and will require a period 
of adjustment.  The passage of the 19th Amendment in April 2015 creates stronger accountability 
mechanisms through the introduction of a presidential-parliamentary form of government and strengthening 
the autonomy and role of independent commissions.  Additional reforms are expected to institute a right to 
information regime and strengthened audit and procurement oversight mechanisms.  There is a large degree 
of political consensus around the need to reduce the perceived excessive concentration of power in the 
presidency and lack of accountability and transparency.  Enacting these institutional changes was a core 
campaign promise, which helped secure President Sirisena’s election in January 2015. Despite contentious 
debate, the 19th Amendment eventually was nearly unanimously adopted by Parliament.   Notwithstanding 
this consensus and the goal of ensuring greater accountability, it remains to be seen how the new framework 
will operate. There will be a “working in” period as the newly formed Cabinet and independent 
commissions undertake their roles in a changed institutional framework.  
 
274. Any such major change is complex and affects the interests of many who may respond in 
unexpected ways.  The prior government was in power for nine years and was widely thought likely to 
continue for several more years.  Public servants and entrepreneurs alike had adapted to the policies, 
institutional framework and governance style of the previous government, and will need to adjust to new 
circumstances.   
B. Economic Risks to Sustainability 
External Risks 
275. Achieving a more sustainable external position will require a heavier emphasis on direct 
investment and long-term private sector flows. In line with the analysis presented in Chapter IV, recent 
external debt sustainability analysis150 has highlighted potential vulnerabilities to external sustainability 
including: (i) a chronic current account deficit and relatively low reserve adequacy metrics; (ii) a gradual 
but steady decline in goods exports as a share of GDP; (iii) a similar decline in Sri Lanka’s share of world 
exports; (iv) an already high external debt burden and a rising cost for external financing as Sri Lanka shifts 
to middle-income status and bilateral concessional debt is replaced with borrowing on commercial terms; 
and (v) modest increases in foreign direct investment, which would otherwise alleviate the need for debt 
financing. While the current account deficit has decreased in recent years, it remains financed largely by 
debt-creating inflows and central bank foreign exchange reserves are at the lower end of what is considered 
adequate by standard metrics. 
 
276. With the country’s shift to middle-income status, concessional borrowing sources are drying 
up and are being replaced by borrowing on commercial terms. The authorities have been successful in 
tapping international markets consistently with sovereign bond issues and lengthening the average maturity 
of the debt portfolio.151 Between 2007 and 2014, the government sold USD 7 billion of sovereign bonds. 
As a result of increased commercial borrowings, the non-concessional and commercial component of the 
                                                          
150 IMF, 2014. 
151 Average Time to Maturity of domestic debt increased from 2.3 to 6.0 years during 2009 to 2013, for foreign debt 
it increased from 9.3 to 10.4 years during the same period. 
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government foreign debt rose from 1 percent in 2000 to 50 percent in 2013. Recently, the banking sector 
was also borrowing overseas at relatively high yields.152  
Long-Term Risks to Fiscal Sustainability 
238. Beyond the fiscal and external risks pointed out throughout this report, an aging population 
will strain public and external finances in the long term. Sri Lanka is in the midst of its demographic 
transition, and is projected to age fast in the next few decades. The elderly dependency ratio reached its 
minimum in the 1970s and 1980s and, thanks to increases in life expectancy, has been rising steadily since 
then. Under likely population projection scenarios, the elderly dependency ratio is set to rise further to about 
25 percent by 2020, and could then 
stabilize around 33 percent under the no-
change scenario or rise to 99 percent 
under the low-fertility scenario (Figure 
6.1). Private-sector savings are expected 
to fall, as the elderly draw down their 
savings, while increased current fiscal 
expenditure on aging (health, pensions, 
and long-term care) will negatively 
affecting public-sector savings. As a 
result, the already low national savings 
rate would further undermine the negative 
savings-investment balance. 
 
239. Population aging will likely 
impact the fiscal accounts through 
three channels: tax revenue, fiscal 
expenditure, and GDP growth. In the absence of a tax reform, a decline in the labor force will lead to 
falling revenue from income tax. An increase in the share of elderly will lead to higher expenditure on 
pensions, health and long-term care, much of which would be expected to be covered by the national budget. 
There may be savings in education expenditure to the extent that only the young receive education, though 
from the perspective of improving educational outcomes to increase Sri Lanka’s competitiveness, more 
public expenditure on education may be needed instead. The combination of falling income taxes and 
increased expenditures will lead to persistent deficits and consequent accumulation of public debt.  
Increased debt, in turn, will lead to further increases in expenditure through interest payments. Finally, a 
slowdown in labor growth and potentially lower investment (as discussed above) will lead to a slowdown 
in GDP growth, which will worsen the capacity of the economy to sustain high debt. There may also be 
feedback effects, where government fiscal policy may affect the decision of the elderly whether to retire or 
stay in the labor force.  
  
240. Moreover, Sri Lanka is relatively older and poorer compared to other countries facing an 
aging population. Sri Lanka is already a relatively old country, especially compared to other South Asian 
countries, although its population is still younger than countries in Europe and Central Asia and a number 
of middle-income East Asian countries (Figure 6.2A). The projected share of 60+ in total population as of 
                                                          
152 For example, National Savings Bank borrowed USD 750 million at 8.875 percent in the year 2013. 
Figure 6.1 Elderly dependency ratios, for different 
demographic scenarios  
(Percent relative to working-age population) 
 
Source: UN population projections, Bank staff calculations 
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2015 is 13.4 percent, but the share of elderly is projected to increase to 25.7 percent of total population by 
2050, an increase of 12.3 percentage points. Sri Lanka is also relatively poor given its age. Compared to 
other Asian countries with a similar elderly dependency ratio, Sri Lanka’s GDP per capita is low; hence 
there is urgency to “get rich before getting old.” Moreover, Sri Lanka’s social expenditure (most of which 
is age-related) is relatively small compared to other similar-age countries. As shown earlier, expenditure 
on health is relatively low and has been declining over time (Figure 6.2B). Expenditure on pensions is 1.4 
percent of GDP -- reflecting its limited scope, which comprises only retired public-sector workers.  
Figure 6.2 Aging and Social Expenditures in international perspective 
A. Age and aging B. Social expenditure 
  
Source: UN population projections, medium fertility scenario, staff calculations 
  
241.  Between now and 2060, the 
elderly dependency ratio is projected 
to rise sharply, while the young 
dependency ratio is projected to fall. 
The population is projected to peak in 
the mid-2040s before starting to fall 
(Figure 6.3). Life expectancy at birth 
has increased from 60 years for the 
cohort born in 1960 to 74 years for the 
2012 cohort. The share of the population 
above 60 will increase from 13 percent 
to 27 percent by 2060 under the 
medium-fertility scenario. 
 
242. Illustrative simulations of the 
long-term impact of aging on the 
fiscal accounts can help shed light on 
the constraints and policy space 
Sri Lanka
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 10 20 30 40
In
cr
ea
se
 i
n
 e
ld
er
ly
 
( 
p
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
p
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
, 
2
0
1
5
-5
0
)
Elderly (60+,  percent of pop, 2015)
AFR
EAP
ECA
LAC
MNA
SAR
Bangladesh
Cambodia
India
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1 2 3 4 5
E
d
u
ca
ti
o
n
 e
x
p
en
d
it
u
re
, 
p
u
b
li
c 
( 
p
er
ce
n
t 
o
f 
G
D
P
)
Health expenditure, public (% of GDP)
Figure 6.3. Population projections in Sri Lanka 
 
Source: UN population projections, medium fertility scenario, staff 
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available to the government.153 A baseline scenario of no tax reform and a policy of bringing public health 
and education expenditure to levels closer to other middle-income countries would lead to a steady rise in 
primary (non-interest) expenditure from 14 percent of GDP in 2013 to 20 percent of GDP by 2060. This 
widening primary deficit combined with a slowing GDP growth would lead to a rapidly growing level of 
public debt-to-GDP from 78 percent of GDP at end-2013 surpassing 150 percent of GDP within two 
decades. Interest payments would form the majority of public spending, which would be clearly 
unsustainable.  
 
243. Public policy action may help avert this scenario through tax reforms and increasing the 
retirement age in line with rising life expectancy. With only about 4 percent of the working-age 
population paying income tax, there is scope to counteract the slowdown and eventual decline in the labor 
force by having more people pay income tax. For other taxes, there is also scope to gradually but persistently 
widen the tax base, reduce exemptions and improve tax collection (Chapter III). A major tax reform that 
would gradually lift revenue to 22 percent of GDP over time could offset the projected increase in 
expenditure on education, health and public-sector pensions sufficiently to achieve a primary surplus and 
contain the fiscal deficit, and put public debt back on a declining path.  
 
244. Extending the retirement age could temporarily boost GDP growth, but its impact would not 
be enough to reverse the debt dynamics, due to inertia in the labor market and demographics. 
Gradually extending the retirement age for public-sector workers could help stabilize public pension 
expenditure, but it would have only a small effect on labor market dynamics and GDP growth. Due to 
inertia, it would not fix the fiscal deficit as fast as tax reform would. If people work longer across the board, 
it would temporarily reverse the declining labor force and income-tax revenue as more people would enter 
than exit during the transition. This temporary boost to GDP and revenue would make the debt dynamics 
look more favorable, but it would not make it sustainable by itself. 
 
245. Any reform of this nature will be politically sensitive and needs to be gradual, but delaying 
reform will force more painful actions to be taken later. Tax reform will not increase tax revenue at 
once, and such reforms will face political economy challenges. However, the sooner tax revenue increases, 
the more space there will be for expenditure later. Similarly, increases in the retirement age can be 
implemented only slowly, so preparation has to start soon.  
C. Environmental Risks to Sustainability   
277. Sri Lanka has a significant advantage in its rich natural asset base that can be a long-term 
contributor to growth and quality of life.  The country has a rich tradition of conservation dating back 
over 2,000 years when ancient edicts called for the preservation of wildlife in defined areas.  Its 
extraordinary variety of landscapes and biodiversity is today relatively unaffected with low levels of air, 
water, and land pollution. For instance, its air quality is the best in South Asia, in large part thanks to its 
                                                          
153 Simulations based on publicly available information by Bank staff available upon request. These simulations do 
not constitute official World Bank projections. While the current numbers are based on actual data as of end-2013, 
the projected numbers are based on simple projections of the tax base (revenue) and projected trends in 
demographics and cost inflation (expenditure). It should be noted that these simulations do not take into account the 
fact that many (informal sector) workers are not covered by neither the public nor the private sector pension scheme, 
and in the future there may be pressure to extend coverage to those workers as well. Neither do they it include 
possible future public expenditure on long-term care.  
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effective vehicle emissions control system, though the anticipated doubling of private vehicle traffic 
between 2010 and 2020 and an increase in use of coal for power generation will pose an increasing 
challenge.  Sri Lanka’s natural assets provide for high levels of livability and contribute to Sri Lanka’s 
attractiveness for tourism.   
278. However, there are environmental challenges to be managed. There has been an increase in 
arable land due to the expansion of agriculture at a rate of 2.7 percent per year between 2006 and 2011, the 
years for which information is available154.  Correspondingly there has been a reduction in forest cover from 
33.2 percent in 2000 to 29.7 percent in 2010 (which does not take into account likely losses in the conflict 
affected north).  Sri Lanka had the fifth highest rate of deforestation (15 percent) in the world during the 
period 2000-2005, with consequences for watersheds and soil loss, and leading to a panoply of economic 
and environmental damages. A recent 2010 World Bank study found that economic losses from land and 
environmental degradation far exceed (by orders of magnitude) the revenue from agriculture, suggesting 
that limits to land conversion have likely been reached.  This has contributed to high and rising levels of 
species extinction; according to a recent survey, 33 percent of inland vertebrate fauna and 61 percent of its 
flora are nationally threatened.  Fresh water resources are at risk due to encroachment that occurs in the 
absence of adequate watershed planning and enforcement.  
 
279. Soil conservation is critical for agricultural productivity and particularly for poorer 
households who are most dependent on agriculture for their livelihoods.  The clearing of forests for 
new lands that cause increased runoff and siltation rates in steeply sloped lands as well as intensive farming 
practices are linked to declining productivity.  The Global Assessment of Soil Degradation suggests that 
nearly 33 percent of Sri Lanka’s land area is severely or very severely degraded in terms of reduced 
agricultural productivity.  A Bank study found that the potential cost savings of better nutrient management 
is between US$50 million to 100 million over a 20-year period, suggesting high economic returns to soil 
conservation. 
280. Protection of watersheds is vital for agricultural irrigation, domestic water use, flood 
attenuation, forestry, fishing, recreation and other services to the population and environment.  The 
total annual value of watershed services in the Southern Province is estimated to range from US$2,128 per 
hectare (ha) in the Muthurajawela Marsh to US$12,494 for mangrove forests and to US$622,845 for coral 
reefs.  In contrast, the estimate by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) of the average annual 
global value of watershed benefits stands at US$3,274/ha.  Moreover, the average revenue from paddy 
cultivation in Sri Lanka is estimated at only US$750/ha.  Thus the payoffs from watershed benefits far 
exceed the marginal financial returns from paddy cultivation – the default option in agriculture.  Protection 
of water resources is also vitally important for human health.  There are strong indications that chronic 
kidney disease, a disease afflicting over 10,000 persons, stems from high chemical concentrations in 
domestic and irrigation water supply155.  
 
281. Sri Lanka’s solid waste management challenge is linked to the rapid pace of urbanization.  
Waste generation is characterized by distinct geographic patterns in Sri Lanka, with higher volumes being 
generated in more prosperous urban areas and provinces. Collection rates average 31 percent whereas other 
                                                          
154 FAO 2013 
155 Paranagama et al, 2013 
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middle-income countries have average collection rates of 68 percent.156  The bulk of waste is organic, 
suggesting there is scope for reducing the pollution load of wastes requiring ultimate disposal, and for 
employment generation through complementary composting activities.  Poor management of solid wastes 
in Sri Lanka is a direct consequence of under-investment and corresponding policies.  A 2011 World Bank 
study identified a funding gap that is estimated to rise to LKR 1.6 billion ($16 million) by 2015 and a further 
LKR. 4.2 billion ($42 million) by 2020. 
282. Sri Lanka will be well served in seeking to obtain environmentally, socially and economically 
equitable growth – or green growth -- now and long into the future, especially in urban areas.  The 
large Colombo metropolitan region in particular will need to balance these priorities in order to have 
sustainable urban growth while enhancing its livability and quality of life for its inhabitants.  This will 
require holistic, long-term planning across sectors, coordination among agencies and a broad range of 
stakeholders – including the government, non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and the 
general public – and may be served by access to green financing. This will involve seeking to allocate 
public funding and crowd in private-sector funding in pursuit of green growth as well as institutional 
capacity.  An important part of capacity would involve the ability to assess the value of sustainable benefits 
as well as a monitoring, reporting, and verification methodology.  
 
283. The human-elephant conflict exemplifies environmental sustainability challenges.  Protected 
areas are of insufficient size and quality to sustain the country’s elephant population as evidenced by data 
showing that over two-thirds of the wild elephant population can be found outside the protected area system.  
Wild elephants are compelled to graze on agricultural lands to survive, resulting in a vicious spiral of 
conflict with agriculturalists.  This has reached alarming proportions in many parts of the dry zone in Sri 
Lanka, with around 70 humans and over 200 elephants killed annually due to the conflict.  With increased 
development and the inevitable erosion of habitats, the problem is set to worsen unless immediate remedial 
action is taken. 
284. In addition to imperatives to have growth be green, the country will need to manage disaster 
risks.  Sri Lanka’s has a disaster risk profile characterized by high frequency/low severity events and a 
number of single large-loss events. Disaster risks are associated with several factors, including climate 
change discussed below (though impacts cannot be assessed with specificity), as well as land usage patterns 
that lead to greater vulnerability. Annual average disaster loss is estimated to be USD 380 million, with 
floods accounting for an annual expected loss of USD 240 million. Legislation calls for the establishment 
of a Disaster Fund as an insurance mechanism, but de facto disaster-related expenditure is provided in an 
ad hoc manner through supplementary budget allocations. Although the state-owned Sri Lanka Insurance 
Corporation is the designated insurer for public assets like infrastructure, there is very little insurance of 
private property (less than 1 percent of residential property is insured), and crop insurance is not widespread 
either.157 The government is working to improve relevant data collection and develop a national disaster 
risk financing strategy.  It is also looking to link with social protection benefit distribution programs to 
provide benefits quickly to deal with disaster impacts, though this hinges on overall improvement of the 
social protection system. 
 
                                                          
156 World Bank, 2011. 
157 World Bank, 2014 
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Climate Change  
285. The country will be exposed to long-term effects of climate change. Model simulations under 
different scenarios indicate a significant past warming trend of about 0.75°C per century in annual mean 
temperatures over the South Asia region.158 Future temperature projections indicate a steady increase in 
temperatures across the three periods, with anomalies reaching 4°C–5°C for high-emission scenarios by the 
2080s. Warming will be widespread throughout the region by end of the 21st century. Spatial patterns of 
rainfall change indicate future increases over eastern and northeastern areas.  
Table 6.1. Impact of Climate Change on Rice Yield in Sri Lanka 
 
Source: Adopted from Ahmed and Suphachalasai, 2014 
286. Low-end estimates show Sri Lanka suffering a 1.2 percent loss of annual GDP by 2050 due to 
climate change, even if measures are taken to address it.159  Changes of temperature and rainfall variation 
will directly impact many sectors of the economy, including power, transport, agriculture and aquaculture, 
with further impacts on health, human settlements, and tourism.   Climate change will lead to more 
occurrences of natural disasters, such as droughts, floods and landslides, due to extreme weather events.160  
Much of the impact will be on agricultural yields, with a decline in rice yield of as much as 23 percent by 
2080 (Table 6.1). Farming districts with heavy reliance on primary agriculture, few infrastructural and 
socioeconomic assets (or low adaptive capacity), and high level of exposure to historical hazards are the 
most vulnerable.161 The vulnerability of rice crops to droughts is expected to increase, especially in the dry 
and intermediate zones. Tea plantations at low and medium elevations are more vulnerable to impacts of 
climate change than those at high elevations. Reduction of monthly rainfall by 100 mm could reduce 
productivity by 30–80 kg of tea per hectare.162 Extended dry spells and excessive cloudiness during the wet 
season can reduce coconut yield, with annual losses of US$32 million to US$73 million. However, during 
a high rainfall year, the economy could gain by US$42 million to US$87 million due to high coconut yields. 
Future projections on coconut yield suggest that production after 2040 may not be sufficient to cater to local 
consumption.163 
  
                                                          
158 Ahmed, M. and Suphachalasai 2014 
159 Ahmed and Suphachalasai, 2014 
160 Statement of Sri Lanka to 18 session of Conference of Parties to the United National Framework Conference on Climate 
Change-COP UNFCCC, 2012 
161 Eriyagama et al 2010 
162 Wijeratne et al 2007 
163 Eriyagama et al 2010 
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287. Marine and coastal 
areas are projected to be 
similarly affected.  Sri Lanka’s 
coastal region covers about 23 
percent of the island’s land 
area.164 It also accommodates 
about 25 percent of the 
population, and includes a heavy 
concentration of urban areas, 
tourism infrastructure and 
industries that are vulnerable to 
the impact of sea level rise and 
increased frequency of storms 
and the intensification of coastal 
erosion due to climate change 
(Figure 6.4). The impacts on 
marine and coastal areas have 
been observed in the alteration 
of ocean circulation, coral reef 
ecosystems, ocean and estuarine 
salinity, fisheries and recreation 
and tourism activities. The 
effects also include dryland and 
wetland losses, which impose 
both physical and economic 
risks on coastal communities.  
288. Climate change will impact other areas, such as availability of water, energy, public health.  
The availability of irrigation water is highly vulnerable, especially in the dry zone, due to the increase in 
droughts and the high dependence of agriculture. Vulnerability of drinking water to drought is also 
widespread. The South/South Central, North Western, and North Central regions of the country are 
particularly vulnerable. Drinking water vulnerability to floods is prevalent in many areas of the country. 
Such areas have limited access to piped water and rely heavily on groundwater, resulting in high incidence 
of water-borne diseases.165  Second, hydropower generation will be impacted over time. Annual average 
rainfall has decreased over the last 57 years at about 7 mm per year, resulting in water scarcities in the dry 
zone.166 Third, climate and anomalous weather events are expected to cause a general increase in the number 
of cases of both vector- and water-borne diseases. The region’s mortality rate – influenced  by dengue, 
malaria and diarrhea – would increase over time as a consequence of climate change. Morbidity and deaths 
from such diseases could increase in the future under all scenarios.167 
                                                          
164 Coast Conservation Department 2006 
165 De Zoysa and Inoue 2014 
166 Rathnayake et al 2009 
167 Ahmed and Suphachalasai, 2014 
Figure 6.4. Impacts of a 1-meter sea level rise  
A. Impacted area 
 
B. Impacted population  
 
Source: Ahmed and Suphachalasai, 2014. 
133 
 
D. Priorities on Sustainability 
289. Sustaining peace and security through sustained reconciliation among Sri Lanka’s 
heterogenous communities is a sine qua non for progress towards the twin goals.    Closure regarding 
difficult chapters in Sri Lanka’s past is needed to forestall the possibility of new tensions emerging.  
Governments at all levels will need to maintain focus on overcoming issues among the country’s ethnic 
communities that have fueled past violence.  This will likely include sustained implementation of 
mechanisms to address these issues, including domestic mechanisms for assessing accountability as well 
as following through on the many LLRC recommendations.  It also calls for consistent consideration of 
promoting inclusion and reconciliation across all public programs.   
 
290. Sustaining momentum to carry through with institutional and political reforms will be 
needed to ensure government effectiveness and stability.  At the time of writing this SCD, the new 
institutional framework embodied in the 19th Amendment has not yet been implemented.  Electoral reforms 
have not yet been finalized and legislation regarding right to information and the audit function are awaiting 
consideration in Parliament. August 2015 general elections have led to the formation of a new government, 
which is now setting policies for the coming years.   There will need to be sustained commitment by Sri 
Lanka’s political leaders to carrying through with the new model, overcoming any transitional issues that 
may emerge, and providing for smooth operation of government.  
 
291. A heavier emphasis on direct investment and long-term private-sector flows will be needed 
to sustain Sri Lanka’s external fiscal position.  Past reliance on remittances and external borrowing to 
maintain the country’s balance of payments will become harder to sustain.  Remittances are likely to remain 
at comparable levels while there is limited scope for continued borrowing, since it will be at commercial 
rates and the country’s low revenue-to-debt ratios.  FDI is important for competitiveness but also to help 
with balance of payments.  
 
292. Long-term sustainability concerns related to an aging population need to be addressed sooner 
rather than later.   Having passed its demographic peak, Sri Lanka faces an urgency to get rich before it 
gets old.  In addition to addressing the present acute fiscal challenge, tax reform to structurally increase 
fiscal revenue over the long term is needed to create room for increased public expenditure on education, 
health and pensions. Increasing the retirement age in line with increasing life expectancy would also help 
temporarily reverse the decline in the labor force. 
293. Sri Lanka will be well served in seeking to ensure environmentally sustainable growth and 
better manage disaster risk.  This could include soil conservation efforts, protection of watersheds, and 
improved solid waste management. This will require holistic, long-term planning across sectors, 
coordination among stakeholders, and seeking to allocate public funding and crowd in private-sector 
funding in pursuit of green growth. In addition, a national disaster risk financing strategy will be needed, 
along with better integration of disaster relief with social protection benefit distribution programs. 
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VII. Conclusions 
 
294. Sri Lanka’s development trajectory has shown impressive gains but there are strong 
indications that drivers of past progress are not sustainable.  The country has experienced strong growth 
and a rapid reduction in poverty over the past decade. It has ended a 30-year debilitating internal conflict 
and rapidly addressed many of the needs of the conflict-affected population. It has just gone through a 
remarkable democratic transition and has embarked on far-reaching institutional reforms to provide for 
greater effectiveness and probity of government. Its human development outcomes remain impressive, even 
if continued improvement is becoming more challenging.  However, the country’s inward-looking growth 
model based on non-tradable sectors and domestic demand amplified by public investment cannot be 
expected to lead to sustained inclusive growth going forward.   
 
295. The systematic diagnostic set out in this report points to fiscal, competitiveness, and inclusion 
challenges as well as governance and sustainability cross-cutting challenges as priority areas of focus 
for sustaining progress in ending poverty and promoting shared prosperity.  These overarching 
challenges were identified through the SCD’s systematic “leave-no-stone-unturned” review of the many 
possible factors that constrain or drive progress on the twin goals (Box 7.1).  The identified challenges 
represent an aggregate of discrete constraints identified by the analysis, filtered by five criteria: the potential 
impact on twin goals, the time horizon for this impact, strength of the evidence base, complementarities, 
and whether addressing the constraint is a precondition for dealing with other constraints. The extent to 
which criteria have been met is derived from observation of where Sri Lanka’s current performance falls 
below that of appropriate comparator countries (mainly in South and Southeast Asia) and/or the country’s 
own past, and where Sri Lankan stakeholders have identified major issues over the course of drafting the 
SCD.  The resulting list of areas may not be an exhaustive tracking of all of the country’s development 
challenges, but it sets out what is most significant in relation to the twin goals.  
Priority areas of focus to end poverty and promote shared prosperity in a sustainable way 
296. The fiscal challenge is marked above all by constraints brought about by poor revenue 
collection.   Chronically disappointing revenue performance and the persistently narrow tax base despite 
growth is a first order issue.  Continued strong commitment to fiscal sustainability urgently requires long-
term domestic revenue mobilization efforts.  This diagnostic identifies a range of tax administration and 
policy issues that may be driving low revenue performance, but substantial additional analysis into many 
areas, most notably tax exemptions and enforcement, is required.  Greater effectiveness and efficiency on 
the expenditure side through improvements in public-sector management can also help increase fiscal 
space.  Ultimately, more fiscal space is a precondition for addressing other constraints. Low revenue has 
led to a lean and rigid budget where low levels of public spending on health, education and social protection 
undercut Sri Lanka’s past strong gains in human development and leave it less well equipped to face 
changing human development needs as a MIC.  This is especially important in light of the need to reduce 
inequality of opportunity and invest in skills to enhance competitiveness. Beyond increasing fiscal space 
for these priority projects, there is room to improve efficiency of spending on social protection and public-
sector personnel management that undermines the effectiveness of the state. Reducing fragmentation and 
improving targeting of the existing social protection system can ensure that  
135 
 
 
Box 7.1 Approach to Prioritization 
This Systematic Country Diagnostic was compiled in three phases: (i) a comprehensive gathering and 
review of existing evidence of constraints and factors towards progress on ending extreme poverty and 
promoting shared prosperity (the twin goals); (ii) identification of main themes and further research based 
on knowledge gaps identified in the initial review; and (iii) organizing and prioritizing areas of focus for 
achieving progress towards the twin goals.   
A systematic review of potential opportunities and constraints that could affect the twin goals led to 
the identification of main themes. This SCD is based on a systematic and detailed review of key potential 
factors impacting progress on the twin goals by using a hybrid framework that combines the Hausman, 
Rodrik and Velasco (2005) growth diagnostics methodology with the Bussolo and Lopez-Calva (2014) 
assets-based framework. The systematic review of Sri Lanka’s performance on the 22 factors identified by 
this framework led to four major themes, which formed the basis for organizing this report: (i) fiscal 
sustainability and the need to ensure fiscal space for development; (ii) fostering growth and jobs for the 
bottom 40 percent; (iii) ensuring spatial and social inclusion; and (iv) the importance of more effective and 
efficient governance.  
 
Prioritization was then conducted in two steps. First, throughout the report, prioritization was based on 
technical factors, including comparisons of Sri Lanka to other countries that are similar or aspirational as a 
means of prioritizing areas. Areas where Sri Lanka demonstrated relatively strong performance for an LMIC, 
such as overall access to infrastructure and basic health outcomes were assessed as having less importance 
as a constraint, but rather reflected opportunities for Sri Lanka to capitalize on in making progress on the 
twin goals.  These opportunities are summarized briefly at the beginning of Chapter IV.  The first six chapters 
of this volume represent the result of analysis that was made against the general criteria of: 
 The potential impact on ending poverty and on promoting shared prosperity: This assessed its potential 
impact on ending poverty and ensuring a sustainable increase in the welfare of the less well off. The 
overall impact on achieving the twin goals will obviously have the highest weighting. 
 Complementarities: This refers to the degree to which addressing these constraints would have influence 
across different domains (growth, inequality, sustainability) and/or would magnify the positive impact 
of addressing other constraints. 
 Strength of the evidence base behind the impact.  This refers to the extent to which there is a  compelling 
argument for particular reforms, with the stronger cases scoring higher priority. 
 Time horizon of impacts: This refers to the timeframe under which the impact can be expected to be 
realized, and would seek to balance short- and longer-term impacts. 
 Preconditions: These are constraints that need to be addressed to unlock wider potential. 
 
The second step in the prioritization process involved consultations with a broad set of stakeholders 
after the completion of a first working draft.  These consultations validated the analysis and served to 
assess the relative importance of the diagnosed constraints and drivers. Over 120 persons from various 
spheres participated in consultations.  Discussions at the consultations were complemented by surveys to 
ensure a broad range of inputs.  On the basis of the consultations and completed analysis, prioritization of 
areas against the criteria was finalized. A summary of this prioritization is below; for a fuller treatment, 
please see Annex 1.4. 
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Priorities Key Criteria Met 
FISCAL  
Fiscal sustainability a key precondition for progress in all 
areas, including macroeconomic stability. Greater fiscal 
space allows for addressing equality of opportunity 
through increased social spending, especially important 
for inclusion. Efficiency of social protection has direct 
impact on ending poverty. Evidence base is strong. 
Reform the tax regime and improve tax administration 
to improve revenue performance 
Improve the adequacy and effectiveness of spending 
Improve the amount of financing and efficiency of 
social protection 
COMPETITIVENESS  
Review and revise the country’s trade-related policies  Trade and adoption of new technologies promote 
diversification, external sustainability, and growth, which 
translates to good jobs. Overcoming skills mismatches 
contributes to growth and participation of the bottom 40 
percent, including minorities and women. Evidence base 
is strong for skills and trade policy issues. 
Provide more resources and quality-enhancing 
management in the education sector to expand skilled 
workforce and overcome skills mismatch 
Promote innovation by establishing linkages between 
R&D institutions and networks of entrepreneurs 
INCLUSION  
Proper urban management and effective governance 
of cities to address locational concentrations of 
poverty 
Urbanizing areas are associated with growth and absolute 
majority of poor are proximate to these areas. Ensuring 
continued benefits of agglomeration will help progress for 
the majority of the poor. For those living in more remote 
areas, more targeted interventions will be needed to ensure 
equality of opportunity through improved service delivery 
and greater participation in the labor force. Evidence base 
is very strong. 
Multi-sector interventions to reduce poverty and 
promote employment opportunities in areas with the 
highest poverty rates (North, East, Moneragala, and 
Estates) 
Improve equality of opportunity across ethnic groups, 
regardless of where they reside 
Increase labor force participation of women and 
ensure equal opportunity in access to jobs, political 
and private sector leadership 
GOVERNANCE  
Governance has cross-cutting impact on all other 
challenges. In particular, labor, land, and other regulation 
create major distortions in the economy. The size of the 
public sector leads to inefficient use of public resources 
and distorts labor markets. The ability of government to 
carry out core functions depends on effectiveness of the 
public sector. Evidence base is strong. 
Improve the regulatory environment to allow firms to 
grow and enhance overall productivity in the economy 
Review the regulatory role and participation of the 
public sector in the economy 
Improve the efficiency of the public sector 
SUSTAINABILITY  
Sustain peace and security through long-term 
reconciliation efforts 
Peace is sine qua non for continued investment, growth, 
and personal well-being of large segment of the 
population. Sustaining the state's institutional capability 
over the long term is integral competent facilitation of 
private-sector-led growth. Macro-economic and 
environmental sustainability are preconditions for 
continued progress as well as capitalizing on the country's 
asset base. Evidence of associated risks is strong. 
Develop a more accountable and effective state 
Place heavier emphasis on direct investment and 
equity portfolio flows than debt  
Preserve natural assets and address the impact of 
climate change 
Address the long-term fiscal sustainability concerns 
related to population aging 
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every dollar spent on social protection has a maximum impact in reducing poverty. Similarly, improving 
controls on public-sector remuneration and reducing political influence in civil service management could 
substantially improve the efficiency of public-service delivery. 
 
297. The competitiveness challenge involves many areas where Sri Lanka can improve 
performance, with improving the skill sets of the labor force emerging as a major constraint for 
growth and good jobs for the bottom 40 percent.  Sri Lanka’s educational system, particularly at tertiary 
levels, is not providing a sufficient volume of workers of the quality and skills demanded by the market.  
This, in part, reflects low public spending on the area, but also points to bottlenecks in expanding the 
availability of university slots, and the adequacy and quality of the curricula.  Efforts in this regard could 
include steps to ensure: high-quality general education and development of soft skills; greater private-sector 
participation in higher education, improvements in technical and vocational training; better coordination 
with potential employer needs; and that youth are inclined to pursue degrees in the industries where demand 
is the highest.  
 
298. Trade policy and a host of land, labor and other regulatory barriers further hamper the 
country’s development.  It will be important to review and revise the country’s trade-related policies, 
including the para-tariff regime to encourage more foreign trade, simplify the VAT and corporate income 
tax regimes, and reduce or eliminate export taxes (cesses) on agricultural commodities.  Continued focus 
on improving trade facilitation and the logistics environment, including streamlining licenses and permits 
required to export would help to promote export-led growth. Similarly, greater linkages between R&D 
institutions and networks of entrepreneurs can help competitiveness and a more outward-oriented economy, 
particularly for agriculture. Moreover, there is need to improve the regulatory environment to allow firms 
to grow, reducing informality and allowing for economy-wide increases in productivity and allowing firms 
to reach economies of scale. Some aspects of the regulatory environment that appear to be significant 
obstacles are: upgrading the systems for land tenure and land-use planning in both agricultural and rural 
areas; modernizing labor legislation to encourage easier movement of labor and female labor participation; 
ensuring that the burden to business licensing and permits is minimal, particularly in regions where this is 
a problem, such as the North; and providing for speedier resolution of commercial disputes and enforcement 
of contracts  in court or using alternative-dispute mechanisms.  Bringing larger and more profitable firms 
into the formal system and improving enforcement could help formalization efforts. However, the definition 
of priorities for investment climate reforms to unleash firms’ potential should stem from regular dialogue 
between the public and private sectors.  
 
299. The role and participation of the public sector in the economy poses further competitiveness 
constraints.  Stronger management and strategic oversight of the SOE sector is important to ensure that 
state involvement is serving a public purpose, does not create too much fiscal risk, and is not crowding out 
the private sector.   The state should take steps to ensure that the public service is “fit for purpose” to carry 
out public-sector functions and not as a mechanism for job creation.  The state can play a role that facilitates 
greater private-sector involvement through the establishment of a robust institutional framework for public-
private partnerships that would ensure public interests and investor concerns are balanced while crowding 
in private-sector investment and skills.  Finally, measures to address conflict of interest could reduce 
negative impacts of the interconnectedness of government with specific businesses. These measures 
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together will help provide an environment conducive to efficiency- and productivity-enhancing FDI, 
allowing for less emphasis on targeted incentives.   
 
300. The inclusion challenge is two-fold, recognizing that absolute numbers of the poor and bottom 
40 percent are in urbanizing population centers while relative concentrations of poverty are in 
specific, relatively remote districts.  Forty-three percent of the poor are in the districts directly along the 
Kandy-Colombo-Galle corridor, which has seen significant agglomeration and associated growth over the 
past two decades. The challenge will be to ensure that the poor and bottom 40 percent are able to participate 
in this growth going forward as a means to lift themselves out of poverty.  Priority efforts in this respect 
include proper urban management in addition to adequate access to services to ensure the poor living in 
these areas of agglomeration can benefit from economic activity in these areas. At the same time, there are 
“pockets” of high rates of poverty in the North, East, estate sector and Moneragala where equality of 
opportunity in terms of access to services and linkages to the labor market are lower. Efforts to ensure 
inclusion of these communities could include small works programs aimed at improving market 
accessibility, incentives to promote entrepreneurship among educated youth and direct programs to help 
ex-combatants and female-headed households. In the estates, multi-sector interventions to improve 
nutrition outcomes, enhance job opportunities for the youth, and prepare for a growing number of aging 
workers would help in ensuring their inclusion in shared growth. In addition, there is need to address land 
claims in the former conflict areas, providing assistance to new and “old” IDPs. The lack of increase in 
female participation in the labor force despite decades of high educational attainment, caused in part by 
labor practices, is a major cross-cutting issue. Efforts to address this could entail both reforms to the legal 
and regulatory environment, as well reforms of the public sector to ensure that the private sector can 
compete, more targeted interventions that could ensure women are able and willing to pursue careers that 
are in line with the demands in the labor market, and fostering greater participation of women in leadership 
positions. 
Cross-Cutting Challenges 
301. The governance challenge manifests itself in many ways, which taken together constitute the 
fundamental constraint on progress on the twin goals.  Governance issues are cross cutting and underlie 
in many important ways the three challenges outlined above.  Governance is obviously central to the quality 
and probity of public expenditure as well as to the government’s capacity to provide for equality of 
opportunity for the poor and bottom 40 percent to improve their welfare.  Moreover, the quality of 
governance is integral to addressing corruption concerns and sustaining public trust. It is also integral to 
revenue performance, particularly the effectiveness of tax and customs administration.  The most prominent 
manner in which governance acts as a constraint is in how the state carries out regulatory functions for the 
economy. Policies that orient the economy inward, such as the convoluted tax system, restrictive land and 
labor market regulation, and inefficient subsidies -- and the related quality of administration thereof -- 
reflect areas where governance is a critical constraint.  This burden of government regulation has led to a 
large informal sector, which negatively impacts improvements in productivity. Governance weaknesses 
have further led to significant expansion of the public sector’s role in the labor market and certain economic 
sectors.  This expanded role in the economy contributes little to effective use of the country’s resources or 
productivity gains, whether it is interventions in agriculture, multiplying tax incentives, or absorbing a 
significant portion of the labor force.  Finally, ensuring the provision of key public goods, such as 
infrastructure and public services, is a core function of government; the extent to which there is inequality 
in access to such goods reflects areas where strengthened governance is warranted. The transparency and 
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accountability reform agenda of the present leadership is an important opportunity to strengthen 
governance, though this will be a long-term process.   
302. Sustainability risks should be borne in mind while addressing constraints to progress on the 
twin goals. The longer-term risks of security and institutional reform, as well as economic and 
environmental sustainability, will require adequate planning and mitigating policies sooner rather than later.  
Above all, the sine qua non for progress on all fronts is a sustained focus on overcoming grievances that 
have fed past conflict and, more generally, carrying through on good governance reforms is integral to 
providing stability. This will likely include sustained implementation of mechanisms to address these 
issues, including domestic mechanisms for assessing accountability as well as following through on the 
many LLRC recommendations. It also calls for consistent consideration of promoting inclusion and 
reconciliation across all public programs.  External sustainability is integral to macroeconomic stability, 
and will require structural reforms that allow for increases in FDI and long-term private-sector flows instead 
of external borrowing. Long-term fiscal sustainability given the aging population will require planning in 
order to meet declining revenues and increasing expenditures due to this demographic change. Long-term 
improvement in revenue and increasing the retirement age in line with increasing life expectancy would 
help to avoid major adjustment in the future. Finally, Sri Lanka will be well served in seeking to ensure 
environmentally sustainable growth and better manage disaster risk. This could include soil conservation 
efforts, protection of watersheds, improved solid waste management, and holistic, long-term planning to 
promote green growth. In addition, a national disaster risk financing strategy will be needed, along with 
better integration of disaster relief with improved social protection distribution programs. 
 
303. These challenges are in many cases areas of opportunity for the next five years. The constraints 
identified in this diagnostic are issues that can realistically begin to be addressed in the coming years 
through policy changes and improvements in capacity. Raising revenues is much easier than cutting 
expenditures, and there is significant global experience to draw upon.  Trade liberalization is possible, as 
Sri Lanka itself demonstrated in the late 1970s and 1990s, though this will need to be accompanied by 
regulatory reforms in land and labor markets to ensure that the private sector can truly be competitive. Sri 
Lanka has advantages that should make it attractive for FDI; the administrative steps to become more 
attractive have been demonstrated by many of its MIC competitors in Southeast Asia. More granular 
understanding of the specific needs of the poor and how they can participate in labor markets should allow 
for more efficient use of resources in providing of infrastructure and services that lead to equality of 
opportunity. There is much that Sri Lanka can realistically accomplish that will allow for it to capitalize 
more fully on its location, natural endowments, and human capital.       
Synergies 
304. The areas of priority identified above are highly interrelated. Because the constraints go to the 
core of how Sri Lanka’s government and economy function, progress in reducing these constraints can be 
expected to have significant indirect effects for the country as a whole and the bottom 40 percent in 
particular. At a basic level, greater fiscal space and efficiency of expenditure will allow government to be 
more effective. A growing economy can be expected to provide jobs for the bottom 40 percent and an 
environment conducive to addressing specific inclusion challenges, which, in turn, provides for 
sustainability.   
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305. There are particularly important areas of synergy that provide for progress on inclusion, 
sustainability and growth. For instance, effective governance of cities will not only be critical for 
addressing spatial inclusion challenges, but could also improve the benefits of urban agglomeration and 
raise the level of overall growth and job creation. Good governance in urbanizing areas is also important to 
balance social, environmental, and economic equity concerns to allow for Sri Lanka to benefit long term 
from its relatively unharmed natural asset base. Improving partnership between the public and private 
sectors will facilitate more private-sector-led growth and can crowd in financing of public goods to lessen 
the fiscal burden on the state. Similarly, improving equality of opportunity (including addressing land 
claims) across ethnic groups is likely to be crucial for improving social stability and the sustainability of 
peace. Moreover, closing the gender gap in labor force participation is not only important in terms of social 
inclusion, but is, in effect, critical in terms of the broader challenge of raising competitiveness and ensuring 
shared prosperity, particularly given an aging population will increase the dependency rate.   
 
306. There is a nexus of issues around providing for skills development that meets the needs of Sri 
Lanka’s economy going forward. On the one hand, there are important elements of state performance that 
need addressing to improve the population’s skills mix: its ability to create more fiscal space to provide 
quality education to the population; the efficiency of resources directed towards human capital 
development; its ability to listen to and partner with the private sector on ensuring that the right skills are 
being provided, both by public and private institutions; and the impact that the state has on the labor market 
given its outsized role as an employer.  At the same time, investment in skills, particularly with public 
financing, is integral to equipping the bottom 40 percent with capacity to get good jobs, a fundamental 
means of boosting shared prosperity. A more skilled labor force in turn helps Sri Lanka become more 
competitive, including within global value chains, as well as a more attractive as a destination for FDI.       
307. Addressing the constraints and sustainability issues diagnosed in this report will require 
effective leadership. Consultations conducted while preparing this diagnostic showed strong consensus 
around Sri Lanka’s development challenges as they are articulated herein. Indeed, with regard to some 
constraints, reforms or government intervention have been initiated to address problems such as equality of 
opportunity in underserved areas or improving Sri Lankans’ skill sets.  The government has articulated 
further plans to address other constraints outlined in this diagnostic. However, enacting reforms and 
carrying through with strong governance to implement them will be challenging, as vested interests are 
likely to resist change. While the challenges are clear, effective leadership will be needed to address them 
and put Sri Lanka on a path that will revitalize its progress in ending poverty and promoting shared 
prosperity. 
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Appendix 1. Sri Lanka’s Performance on the Millennium Development Goals  
Goals 
and 
Targets 
Indicators  
Sri Lanka 
Base 
Year 
Sri 
Lanka 
Latest 
Year 
Sri Lanka 
Country 
Progress 
(as of 2014) 
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data) 
South 
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Asia 
(latest 
data) 
Vietnam 
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 (latest 
data) 
    
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
 
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
GOAL 1: ERADICATE EXTREME POVERTY AND HUNGER 
Reduce 
extreme 
poverty 
by half 
Proportion of 
population living 
below $1.25 
(PPP) per day 
(percent) 
15 
1
9
9
1
 
4.1 
2
0
1
0
 
low poverty 29.7 
2
0
1
0
 
14.3 
2
0
1
0
 
16.9 
2
0
0
8
 
32.7 
2
0
1
0
 
Reduce 
hunger by 
half 
Proportion of 
population below 
minimum level of 
dietary energy 
consumption          
(percent) 
30.6 
1
9
9
1
 
24.6 
2
0
1
3
 
Moderately 
high hunger 
16.8 
2
0
1
1
-2
0
1
3
 
10.7 
2
0
1
1
-2
0
1
3
 
12.89 
2
0
1
3
 
15.2 
2
0
1
3
 
GOAL 2: ACHIEVE UNIVERSAL PRIMARY EDUCATION 
Universal 
primary 
schooling 
Net enrollment 
ratio in primary 
education 
(enrollees per 100 
children) 
99.8 
2
0
0
1
 
93.9 
2
0
1
2
 
High 
enrollment 
94.4 
2
0
1
2
 
93.9 
2
0
1
2
 
98.2 
2
0
1
2
 
98.9 
2
0
1
1
 
GOAL 3: PROMOTE GENDER EQUALITY AND EMPOWER WOMEN 
Equal 
girls' 
enrolment 
in 
primary 
school 
Ratio of girls to 
boys in primary 
education 
0.97 
1
9
9
0
 
1 
2
0
1
2
 
Parity 1 
2
0
1
2
 
0.99 
2
0
1
2
 
1.01 
2
0
1
2
 
1.02 
2
0
1
1
 
Women's 
share of 
paid 
employm
ent 
Share of women 
in wage 
employment in 
the non-
agricultural sector  
30.2 
1
9
9
7
 
30.4 
2
0
1
2
 
Medium 
share 
19.8 
2
0
1
2
 
38.5 
2
0
1
2
 
40.4 
2
0
0
4
 
19.3 
2
0
1
0
 
Women's 
equal 
represent
ation in 
national 
parliamen
ts 
Proportion of 
seats held by 
women in 
national 
parliament (single 
or lower house 
only - percent) 
4.9 
1
9
9
0
 
5.8 
2
0
1
4
 
Very low 
represent-
ation 
16 
2
0
1
4
 
18.4 
2
0
1
4
 
24.3 
2
0
1
4
 
11.4 
2
0
1
4
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Targets 
Indicators  
Sri 
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Sri 
Lanka 
Latest 
Year 
Sri Lanka 
Country 
Progress 
(as of 
2014) 
SAR 
(latest 
data) 
South 
Eastern 
Asia 
(latest 
data) 
 
Vietnam 
(latest 
data) 
India 
 (latest 
data) 
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GOAL 4: REDUCE CHILD MORTALITY 
Reduce 
mortality 
of under-
five-year-
old by two 
thirds 
Under-five 
morality rate 
(deaths of 
children per 1,000 
births) 
21.3 
1
9
9
0
 
9.6 
2
0
1
3
 
Low 
mortality 
55 
2
0
1
3
 
29 
2
0
1
3
 
23.8 
2
0
1
3
 
52.7 
2
0
1
3
 
GOAL 5: IMPROVE MATERNAL HEALTH 
Reduce 
maternal 
mortality 
by three 
quarters 
Maternal 
mortality ratio 
(maternal deaths 
per 100,000 live 
births) 
49 
1
9
9
0
 
29 
2
0
1
3
 
Low 
mortality 
190 
2
0
1
3
 
140 
2
0
1
3
 
49 
2
0
1
3
 
190 
2
0
1
3
 
Access to 
universal 
reproductiv
e health 
Contraceptive 
prevalence rate 
(percentage of 
women aged 15-
49, married or in 
union, using 
contraception) 
66.1 
1
9
9
3
 
68.4 
2
0
0
7
 
High 
access to 
reproduc-
tive health 
57 
2
0
1
2
 
63.1 
2
0
1
2
 
77.8 
2
0
1
1
 
54.8 
2
0
0
8
 
Unmet need for 
family planning 
(percentage of 
women aged 15-
49, married or in 
union, with unmet 
need for family 
planning) 
18.2 
2
0
0
0
 
7.3 
2
0
0
7
 
14.4 
2
0
1
2
 
12.5 
2
0
1
2
 
4.3 
2
0
1
1
 
20.5 
2
0
0
8
 
GOAL 6: COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA AND OTHER DISEASES 
Halt and 
begin to 
reverse the 
spread of 
HIV/AIDS 
HIV incidence 
rate (number of 
new HIV 
infections per 
year per 100 
people aged 15-
49) 
0.01 
2
0
0
1
 
0.01 
2
0
1
2
 
Low 
incidence 
0.02 
2
0
1
2
 
0.03 
2
0
1
2
 
0.02 
2
0
1
2
 
    
Halt and 
reverse 
spread of 
tuberculosi
s 
Number of new 
tuberculosis cases 
per 100,000 
population 
66 
1
9
9
0
 
66 
2
0
1
2
 
178 
2
0
1
2
 
202 
2
0
1
2
 
147 
2
0
1
2
 
176 
2
0
1
2
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Goals and 
Targets 
Indicators  
Sri 
Lanka 
Base 
Year 
Sri 
Lanka 
Latest 
Year 
Sri Lanka 
Country 
Progress 
(as of 
2014) 
SAR 
(latest 
data) 
South 
Eastern 
Asia 
(latest 
data) 
 
Vietnam 
(latest 
data) 
India 
 (latest 
data) 
    
V
a
lu
e 
Y
ea
r 
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r 
V
a
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e 
Y
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Number of 
tuberculosis 
deaths per 
100,000 
population 
7.5 
1
9
9
0
 
1.1 
2
0
1
2
 
 24 
2
0
1
2
 
25 
2
0
1
2
 
20 
2
0
1
2
 
22 
2
0
1
2
 
GOAL 7: ENSURE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 
Reverse 
loss of 
forests 
Proportion of land 
area covered by 
forest ( percent) 
36.4 
1
9
9
0
 
28.8 
2
0
1
0
 
Medium 
forest 
cover 
14.5 
2
0
1
0
 
49.3 
2
0
1
0
 
44.5 
2
0
1
0
 
23 
2
0
1
0
 
Halve 
proportion 
without 
improved 
drinking 
water 
Proportion of 
population using 
an improved 
drinking water 
source ( percent) 
67.6 
1
9
9
0
 
93.8 
2
0
1
2
 
High 
coverage 
  
  
91 
2
0
1
2
 
89 
2
0
1
2
 
95.2 
2
0
1
2
 
92.6 
2
0
1
2
 
Halve 
proportion 
without 
sanitation 
Proportion of 
population using 
an improved 
sanitation facility 
(percent) 
  
    
  42 
2
0
1
2
 
71 
2
0
1
2
 
75 
2
0
1
2
 
36 
2
0
1
2
 
Improve 
the lives of 
slum-
dwellers 
Proportion of 
urban population 
living in slums 
(percent) 
  
    
  35 
2
0
1
2
 
31 
2
0
1
2
 
35.2 
2
0
0
9
 
29.4 
2
0
0
9
 
GOAL 8: DEVELOP A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT 
Internet 
users 
Internet users per 
100 inhabitants  
0 
1
9
9
0
 
21.9 
2
0
1
3
 
High 
usage 
12.3 
2
0
1
2
 
24.9 
2
0
1
2
 
43.9 
2
0
1
3
 
15.1 
2
0
1
3
 
Note : The MDG Country Progress Snapshot provides an overview of the progress achieved at country level since 
1990 towards the Millennium Development Goals. The snapshot is intended mainly to provide the international 
community easy access to the information and are not meant to replace in any way the country profiles produced at 
the national level in several countries. They are also meant to reflect the contribution of country-level progress to the 
global and regional trends on progress towards the MDGs.  
The data used in the snapshot are from the MDG global database (http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx). The 
metadata and responsible agencies can be found on http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Metadata.aspx. Sources of 
discrepancies between global and national figures are due to, among others, different methodology and definitions or 
different choice of data sources. At the global level, the monitoring of the progress aims to ensure better comparability 
of data among countries.  
Sources: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2014/Snapshots/IND.pdf;                
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2014/Snapshots/VNM.pdf;                 
http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/Resources/Static/Products/Progress2014/Snapshots/LKA.pdf  
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Appendix 1.2 Poverty Indicators for Sri Lanka 
 
How is Poverty measured? 
The official poverty figures in Sri Lanka refer to the share of individuals whose per capita consumption 
falls below the official poverty line. This indicator is usually defined in the literature as headcount index 
and it is a measure of the incidence of poverty. The data used for the analysis are drawn from the Household 
Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), which has been collected every three to five years since 1995. The 
2012/13 HIES covers all 25 districts for the first time in the history of the Sri Lanka household budget 
survey.  
 
The consumption aggregate is the sum of the consumption expenditures of all food and nonfood items of 
each household. The consumption aggregate is spatially deflated to take into account differences in the cost 
of living of the different districts. To get the per capita consumption, the spatially deflated consumption 
aggregate is divided by the number of household members (excluding the persons who are member of the 
household but usually live elsewhere in the country or abroad). Once per capita household consumption is 
calculated, it is then compared to the national poverty line, which was set to Rs 1,423 in 2002, equivalent 
to the minimum necessary to consume 2,030 kilocalories per capita per day (using the Cost of Basic Needs 
approach). The poverty line has been subsequently updated using the Colombo Consumer Price Index. 
 
The World Bank uses as extreme poverty line $1.25 a day in 2005 ppp terms, which represents the mean of 
the poverty lines found in the poorest 15 countries ranked by per capita consumption among 88 surveyed 
countries over the period 1990-2005 (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula, 2009). The Sri Lanka national poverty 
line is about $1.50 a day in 2005 ppp. Other commonly used poverty lines for international comparisons 
across middle-income countries are $2.50 a day and $4 a day in 2005 ppp, which correspond to, in turn, Rs 
6,058 and Rs 9,692 a day in 2012/13 prices. In addition to the national poverty line, The SCD will use the 
US $1.25, US $2.50 poverty lines. 
 
The poverty gap and severity of poverty  
Although the headcount index is the most widespread measure of poverty, it has a serious shortcoming in 
that it does not take into account the intensity of poverty, i.e. how far from the poverty line the poor are. A 
measure of poverty that overcomes this problem is the poverty gap index. The poverty gap index is the 
average shortfall of the total population from the poverty line as a share measured as a percentage of the 
poverty line itself. The severity of poverty is a measure that puts a higher weight on households furthest 
away from the poverty line. Both of these measures will complement the analysis of headcount poverty in 
the context of the SCD. 
 
What is the consumption cut-off line for the bottom 40 percent?  
Finally, the SCD will focus on the bottom 40 percent to discuss the welfare of the less well-off more 
broadly. The consumption cut-off line for the bottom 40 percent (the threshold below which the poorest 40 
percent of population lays) in 2012/13 is Rs 6,765, or $ 2.79 a day in 2005 ppp. 
 
Key issues with consumption calculations in Sri Lanka 
There are three main concerns about the methodology followed for building the official consumption 
aggregate. First, the consumption aggregate includes some items that are usually excluded, in particular: 
expenditure on durable goods, rarely incurred expenses (e.g. weddings, funerals, ceremonies, litigations, 
purchased properties), and expenses on provident funds, insurances, payment of debts, money lending and 
income taxes are typically excluded (see Deaton and Zaidi, 2002). Second, to guarantee comparability 
153 
 
across surveys, the consumption aggregate should exclude items that were not included in previous years’ 
questionnaires, or those for which the recall period has changed over time. Third, since the survey is 
conducted over a period of 12 months, the use of a temporal price adjustment would be recommended.  
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Appendix 1.3. Sri Lanka. Characteristics of the Poor 
 
Overall 
Bottom  
40  
percent 
Top 
60 
percent 
Poor 
  National US1.25 US2.50 
              
Average age 33.0 31.0 34.3 29.1 28.4 30.7 
Average household size 3.9 4.4 3.6 4.9 5.0 4.5 
 (percent of individuals) 
Industry1/             
Agriculture 30.7 41.9 23.0 48.8 47.9 43.2 
Industry 23.8 24.9 23.1 23.8 21.4 24.5 
Services 45.3 32.8 53.9 27.2 30.7 31.9 
Education             
Average years of education for              
Head 8.2 6.6 9.1 5.5 5.4 6.4 
Individuals age 20 or more 8.9 7.5 9.7 6.5 6.3 7.3 
Health             
Average distance (Km)             
Clinic 2.4 2.9 2.1 3.5 3.5 3.0 
Dispensary 2.1 2.8 1.6 3.5 3.4 2.9 
Hospital 6.6 7.5 6.0 8.2 8.5 7.6 
Maternity clinic 5.2 6.0 4.7 6.3 6.1 6.0 
Access to services             
Share of households with: (percent of households) 
Electricity 90.2 82.2 94.5 69.2 65.5 80.4 
Landline telephone 36.7 21.7 44.8 13.0 9.5 19.8 
Mobile telephone 81.1 71.4 86.4 56.5 50.4 70.1 
Pipe borne line nearby their house 62.2 54.9 66.2 49.8 48.6 53.7 
Tap water 30.9 22.5 35.5 17.8 16.2 22.0 
Toilet available within the unit 47.0 36.2 52.9 32.2 31.4 35.9 
Sealed toilet connected to sewage 3.6 2.1 4.5 2.4 2.8 2.1 
Sealed toilet connected to pit/tank 93.1 92.6 93.4 87.1 85.2 91.9 
Source: Own estimates, HIES 2012/13 
1/ Refers to the industry where the Household Head is employed. All unclassified industry sectors are assigned to 
Services  
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Appendix 1.4 Methodology 
 
This Systematic Country Diagnostic was compiled in three phases: (i) a comprehensive gathering and 
review of existing evidence of constraints and factors towards progress on ending extreme poverty 
and promoting shared prosperity (the twin goals); (ii) identification of main themes and further 
research based on knowledge gaps identified in the initial review; and (iii) organizing and prioritizing 
areas of focus for achieving progress towards the twin goals.  A guiding principle was to have broad 
participation and feedback from the World Bank Group’s Sri Lanka country team as well as external experts 
and stakeholders to ensure completeness of data collection and analysis.  Thus, following an initial desk 
review of evidence, a series of brainstorming sessions were held with a broad team of stakeholders.  
Ultimately an additional 14 background papers and notes were also either commissioned independently or 
completed in parallel and utilized for the SCD.     
Marshalling evidence 
A hybrid framework combining the Hausman, Rodrik and Velasco (2005) growth diagnostics 
methodology with the Bussolo and Lopez-Calva (2014) assets-based framework was used to identify 
a set of possible constraints and drivers towards progress on the twin goals.  The Hausman, Rodrick 
and Velasco (2005) growth diagnostic is a top-down approach based on a simplified growth model that 
identifies for several potential distortions.168 In order to focus on the ability of the bottom 40 percent to 
latch on to the growth process, this top-down approach was combined with the principles of the Bussolo 
and Lopez-Calva assets framework.  The Bussolo/Lopez-Calva framework postulates that the incomes of 
the bottom 40 percent depend on the level of assets – human, physical, financial, social and natural capital 
– that people own and accumulate, the intensity with which they are used, and the returns associated to 
those assets. The method aims to consider the constraints as well as facilitating factors to asset accumulation 
and their use. These have a direct impact on the income generation capacity of all households in an 
economy, but particularly on the poor and those belonging to the bottom 40 percent of the income 
distribution. The framework in Figure A1 thus places shared prosperity as the desired goal, which in turn 
depends on economic growth and the ability of the bottom 40 percent to benefit from growth. The 
framework provides a breakdown of the range of possible factors contributing or constraining achievement 
of this outcome. 
 
The returns to economic activity depend on the availability of assets and the returns to those assets. 
Assets include human, social, natural and physical capital, with a focus on the bottom 40 percent. Human 
capital includes health, education and nutrition (Figure A1). While “social capital” refers to a specific 
concept and attendant literature, in fact issues of social inclusion are central to acquiring and using assets. 
Social inclusion is defined as “improving the terms of individuals and groups, disadvantaged on the basis 
of their identity, to take part in society”.169 This can be achieved by improving the ability, opportunity, and 
dignity of such people, who are disadvantaged, inter alia, on the basis of their gender, age, disability status, 
caste, ethnicity, marital status or sexual orientation. Natural capital refers to access to land, a clean 
environment, and natural resources such as forests and fisheries. Physical capital refers to access to basic 
infrastructure, including roads, ports, electricity, water, and sanitation. It is also important to note that that 
                                                          
168 Following Dixit (2007) we do not use the framework as a decision tree, but rather as a way to organize and 
discipline the analysis by identifying the range of possible constraints and drivers. 
169 World Bank 2013 
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there is a strong non-monetary dimension to “shared prosperity”. That is, the growth impact of health, 
education, social inclusion and natural capital may not be very large, but their impact on “well-being” may 
be huge.170  Health, education, social inclusion and the environment matter for their intrinsic value, not just 
for their instrumental value to boost growth. 
 
The returns to economic activity also depend on the returns to those assets, which in turn depend on 
government performance and performance of the market. Government performance is reflected in its 
ability to (i) maintain macroeconomic stability; (ii) ensure the effective provision of public goods and 
services; (iii) provide a regulatory environment that provides a level playing field that facilitates economic 
activity; and (iv) mitigate individual risks through a social protection system and addressing systemic risks. 
Market performance depends on whether there are barriers to competition in domestic markets as well as 
export competitiveness of the economy as a whole, the ability to innovate, and whether there are distortions 
in markets that constrain growth of the bottom 40 percent.  Special attention was paid to the labor and 
agricultural markets given their effects on the bottom 40 percent. Each of these potential constraints or areas 
of strength was considered, evaluating the relative strength of each as a threat to future efforts to end poverty 
and ensure shared prosperity.   
 
Access to finance depends on the availability of domestic savings and access to international finance. It 
also depends on whether there are bottlenecks in local finance with respect to high cost of finance, high risk 
                                                          
170 Becker, 1964, 2007 
Figure A1. Diagnostic Framework 
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(or poor risk management), insufficient competition, issues with banking intermediation, or lack of financial 
literacy. 
Figure A2. Digging Deeper 
 
The framework provides a means to “leave no stone unturned” while also unbundling interrelated 
issues, which in turn allows for greater specificity as well as comprehensiveness.   Many of the possible 
constraints or drivers are interrelated or cross cutting.  This is particularly the case with government 
performance. For instance, the government’s ability to finance (or attract private-sector financing) and 
organize the delivery of public goods and services has a direct impact on the quality and quantity of assets 
held by the poor, and its performance as a regulator affects markets and the cost of finance. For the purposes 
of this SCD, performance of government was reviewed in terms of core government functionality and 
capacity whereas its specific impacts in areas such as improving human capital were addressed in those 
respective sections.  Similarly, social inclusion concerns are cross cutting. They are, however, distinct in 
their core interest in individuals and groups disadvantaged on the basis of their distinguishing features and 
how their ability, opportunity and dignity to own, accumulate and use assets and generate returns from them 
can be improved.   
 
Identification of main themes and prioritization  
 
Prioritization was conducted in two steps.   First, analysis of technical issues and outputs/outcomes 
among possible constraints or, conversely, strong performance along each of the 22 dimensions identified 
in the framework pointed to the relative importance of a given issue.  Where possible, this analysis was 
complemented by comparisons of Sri Lanka to its past performance as well as to other countries that have 
similarities and/or are aspirational for the country, primarily in South and Southeast Asia.  While differences 
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in Sri Lanka’s performance compared to others did not necessarily mean the presence of a constraint, in 
cases where the country was an outlier often did indicate areas of relative weakness. This process led to the 
identification of four main themes in the context of wide consultation, both within the Bank as well as 
through brainstorming sessions with multiple stakeholders in Sri Lanka. 
 
The information and analysis gathered were then weighed against five criteria: 
 
 The potential impact on ending poverty and on promoting shared prosperity: This assessed its 
potential impact on ending poverty and ensuring a sustainable increase in the welfare of the less well 
off. The overall impact on achieving the twin goals will obviously have the highest weighting. 
 Complementarities: This refers to the degree to which addressing these constraints would have 
influence across different domains (growth, inequality, sustainability) and/or would magnify the 
positive impact of addressing other constraints. 
 Strength of the evidence base behind the impact.  This refers to the extent to which there is a 
compelling argument for particular reforms, with the stronger cases scoring higher priority. 
 Time horizon of impacts: This refers to the timeframe under which the impact can be expected to be 
realized, and would seek to balance short and longer-term impacts. 
 Preconditions: This would identify constraints that need to be addressed in order to unlock wider 
potential. 
 
The second step in the prioritization process involved consultations with a broad set of stakeholders 
after the completion of a first working draft.  The team carried out several rounds of consultations among 
focal points representing global practices, cross-cutting solutions areas, and IFC operations regarding the 
draft of the analysis and solicited input on priorities, based on the above criteria.  External consultations on 
the analysis in the text and to identify priorities were held with a broad range of stakeholders in government 
ministries and departments, think tanks, other civil society groups, representatives of the private sector, and 
development partners. Consultations were held in Colombo and in Jaffna to capture a broader range of 
views. The consultations both helped to validate the analysis in the SCD and to help assess the relative 
importance of the diagnosed constraints and drivers.   
 
On the basis of feedback from all consultations, the team substantiated priorities against the five 
criteria.  The finalization of priorities against criteria is articulated in the tables below.   
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Matrix of Identified Priorities 
1. FISCAL 
Key Priorities in Fiscal Reforming the tax regime and 
improving tax administration to 
improve revenue performance 
Improve the adequacy and 
effectiveness of spending 
Improve the amount of financing 
and efficiency of social protection 
IMPACT ON TWIN 
GOALS 
Ensures fiscal sustainability, and 
therefore macroeconomic stability, a 
precondition for poverty reduction. 
Reduces the risk of undercutting, and 
increases the ability to increase, 
investment in human development.  
More rational public spending will 
allow for greater resources to be 
directed at improving human capital 
and enhance and spending on social 
welfare needs, thereby reducing 
poverty. 
 
An increase in the amount of funding 
and better targeting of existing social 
protection can ensure maximum impact 
in reducing poverty for relatively low 
levels of financing.  
TIME HORIZON Short to Medium-term 
Short-term: Reforming tax regime, 
including rationalizing exemptions and 
streamlining tax policy, could improve 
revenue more quickly 
Medium-term: Reforms to tax 
administration and expanding the tax 
base would strengthen tax collection 
and help sustainable revenue 
generation in the medium-term. 
Medium-term Short-term 
An even modest increase in the amount 
of financing and better social 
protection targeting will reduce poverty 
among the most vulnerable. 
 
COMPLEMENTARITIES Reforming tax regime and 
administration could improve business 
climate and enhance competitiveness. 
Frees up fiscal space to enhance 
spending on human capital 
investments. 
Improved social protection will allow 
for greater participation of the poor in 
the economy   
EVIDENCED-BASED Moderate. 
Visible decline in tax collection and 
proliferation of exemptions. However, 
additional analysis into revenue impact 
of tax exemptions and compliance 
issues and collection vulnerabilities is 
merited. 
Strong. 
Evidenced by emerging gaps in health 
and education provision. More 
evidence required on effectiveness of 
spending on infrastructure in terms of 
rate of return and impact on access and 
poverty reduction. 
Strong. 
Evidenced by the undesirable 
distributional impact of poorly targeted 
social protection schemes. 
ESSENTIAL 
PRE-CONDITION 
Yes Yes Yes 
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2. COMPETITIVENESS 
Key Priorities on 
Competitiveness 
Review and revise the country’s 
trade-related policies  
Provide more resources and quality-
enhancing management in the 
education sector to expand skilled 
workforce 
Promote innovation by establishing 
linkages between R&D institutions 
and networks of entrepreneurs 
IMPACT ON TWIN 
GOALS 
Greater trade openness would enable 
export growth and diversification of the 
economy, thereby generating more and 
better jobs and promoting shared 
growth. 
Improving the skills of the labor force 
can improve opportunities for the 
bottom 40 percent, particularly among 
youth, to access good jobs in industries 
that will grow in a competitive 
economy.  
By enhancing firm-level efficiency and 
competitiveness, innovation can create 
jobs in industries that will grow in a 
competitive economy. Agricultural 
innovation can particularly benefit the 
poor. 
TIME HORIZON Medium-term Medium to long-term 
Medium-term: Expanding vocational 
training and matching skills with 
industry needs can address the skills 
shortage in the medium-term 
Long-term: Reforms to education 
management and expanding tertiary 
education will foster a more competitive 
workforce with long-term impacts. 
Medium- to –long-term 
Medium-term: Connecting entrepreneur 
networks to existing R&D facilities will 
benefit competitiveness in the medium-
term 
Long-term: A sustained increase in 
R&D spending and promoting 
innovation will have longer-term 
competitiveness impacts 
COMPLEMENT 
-ARITIES 
A more outward-oriented trade policy 
can amplify the gains from rebalancing 
towards a stronger private sector role in 
the economy, and enhance overall 
economic growth. 
A skilled labor force can enhance 
competitiveness and efficiency of firms, 
promoting overall growth. It will also be 
important complement to greater trade 
openness and promoting exports. 
Greater innovation among firms will 
amplify gains from trade openness, in 
promoting competitiveness in exports 
and economic diversification. 
EVIDENCED-BASED Very strong. 
Evidenced by the stagnant economic 
and export diversification alongside the 
recent slide towards inward-looking 
policies.  
Very strong. 
As evidenced by the substantial number 
of firms reporting lack of skilled labour 
as a constraint. 
Moderate. 
R&D and innovation lag well behind 
comparator economies, and is 
influencing the visible stagnation of 
export and economic diversification.  
ESSENTIAL 
PRE-CONDITION 
Yes Yes No 
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3. INCLUSION 
Key Priorities in 
Inclusion  
Proper urban management and 
effective governance of cities to 
address locational 
concentrations of poverty 
Multi-sector interventions to 
reduce poverty and promote 
employment opportunities in the 
North, East, Moneragala, and 
estates 
Improve equality of opportunity 
across ethnic groups, regardless 
of where they reside 
Increasing labor force 
participation of women and 
ensuring equal opportunity 
in accessing jobs as well as 
political and private sector 
leadership positions 
IMPACT ON 
TWIN GOALS 
As most of the poor and bottom 
40 percent are located within 
multi-city agglomeration areas, 
proper urban management and 
adequate access to services will 
be important for the poor living 
in these areas to benefit from 
agglomeration. 
Improving job opportunities and 
better access to markets and services 
would reduce poverty and promote 
shared prosperity in isolated regions. 
In the estates, improving nutrition 
outcomes, better job opportunities for 
the youth, and preparing for an aging 
population will ensure inclusion. 
Improving economic opportunities 
for ethnic minorities, as well 
addressing post-conflict issues 
related to land, IDPs, war widows 
and ex-combatants, would reduce 
poverty and foster inclusion, 
towards more shared growth. 
Enables women to access 
better jobs and improve 
overall inclusion of women in 
the economy. 
TIME HORIZON Medium- to long-term Medium-term Short- to medium-term 
Short-term: Addressing pressing 
issues, such as access to basic 
services in post-conflict 
communities can have short-term 
impacts on poverty reduction 
Medium-term: Impacts from 
improving job opportunities for 
ethnic minorities will be seen over 
a more medium-term horizon. 
Medium- to long-term 
Medium-term: Reforming 
labor laws that disincentivize 
female participation can have 
short-term positive impacts 
Long-term: Impacts of better 
alignment of the education 
women pursue and the 
demands of the market would 
be seen in the longer-term. 
COMPLEMENT 
-ARITIES 
Improved governance of cities 
and better urban management can 
boost competitiveness and 
promote shared growth. 
Improving human development 
outcomes in the North, East and 
estates can improve human capital 
required for enhancing 
competitiveness of these provinces. 
Improving job and income 
opportunities among ethnic 
minorities would ensure social 
sustainability. 
Given an aging population, 
greater female labor force 
participation would be 
important to increase overall 
growth. 
EVIDENCED-
BASED 
Strong.  
Substantial evidence on the 
location concentration of poverty 
around urban agglomerations, as 
well as potential for enhancing 
growth in urban corridors. 
Very strong. 
Substantial evidence on high poverty 
and exclusion in the North, East, 
Moneragala and estates, across 
multiple indicators. 
Moderate. Evidence on lagging 
human development outcomes of 
some minorities, and also 
international evidence on need to 
address post-conflict needs to 
prevent return to conflict. 
Strong. 
ESSENTIAL 
PRE-
CONDITION 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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4. GOVERNANCE  
Key Priorities on 
Governance 
Improve the regulatory environment 
to allow firms to grow and enhance 
overall productivity in the economy 
Review the regulatory role and 
participation of the public sector in 
the economy 
Improve the efficiency of the public 
sector 
IMPACT ON TWIN 
GOALS 
Providing a more conducive business 
climate with business-friendly 
regulatory systems would allow formal 
firms to grow and reduce informality, 
thereby creating more and better jobs. 
Land management could allow for 
better use of agricultural lands, and 
greater certainty over property rights 
could induce greater investment and 
job creation. 
Reducing the distortionary impact of 
the state’s role in the economy can 
ensure private sector is not crowded out 
and can grow, generating more and 
better jobs for the bottom 40 percent.  
Improving controls on public sector 
remuneration and reducing political 
influence in public service management 
could improve service delivery, with 
particular impacts on lagging regions. 
TIME HORIZON Medium-to Long-term 
Medium term: trade facilitation;  
Long term: Labor legislation  
Land management 
Medium-term Medium-term to Long-term:  
Gains from improvements to public 
sector efficiency and better service 
delivery to people will be seen in the 
medium and long term. 
COMPLEMENTARITIES Removing regulatory obstacles will 
amplify the gains from greater 
innovation and from greater trade 
openness, by enhancing 
competitiveness and growth of the 
private sector. 
Better management and reduced 
budgetary burden of SOEs can free up 
resources for increasing social 
spending. 
Increased efficiency of the public 
sector will help address the fiscal 
challenge.  Freed up resources for new 
investments in human capital as well as 
meeting infrastructure needs of a 
middle-income country. 
EVIDENCED-BASED Strong. 
Substantial evidence on the low 
performance on ease of doing business, 
regulatory barriers faced by firms, and 
high and growing informality among 
firms. 
Moderate 
Loss-making SOEs are a substantial 
drag on public finances. 
Large public-sector employment that is 
generously remunerated poses unfair 
competition to private sector businesses 
wishing to find and retain the best 
possible candidates. 
Strong 
Several detailed analyses of 
shortcomings in public financial 
management, particularly procurement 
and Sri Lanka has been an outlier in 
terms of accountability and 
transparency of public sector 
operations.  High opportunity costs of 
large, inefficient public sector. 
ESSENTIAL PRE-
CONDITION 
Yes No Yes 
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5. SUSTAINABILITY 
Key Priorities on 
Sustainability 
Sustaining peace and 
security through long term 
reconciliation efforts 
Developing a more 
accountable and 
effective state 
Placing heavier 
emphasis on direct 
investment and equity 
portfolio flows than debt  
Preserve natural assets 
and address the impact of 
climate change 
Addressing long-term 
fiscal sustainability 
concerns related to 
population aging 
IMPACT ON 
TWIN GOALS 
As a country with a history of 
violent conflict, long-term 
reconciliation among the 
country’s ethnic 
communities, and preventing 
new fissures along religious 
lines from emerging, are 
essentially for creating a 
climate of inclusivity and 
promoting shared prosperity.  
Governance reforms that 
improve accountability to 
citizen’s can improve 
efficacy of state programs 
in meeting the twin goals. 
Recent governance 
reforms must be seen as a 
beginning in a wider 
effort to improve 
effectiveness and 
accountability of the state. 
Reliance on debt to 
finance growth constrains 
the available public 
finances to meet social 
needs and tackle extreme 
poverty as more money is 
utilized on debt 
repayment. Attracting FDI 
will contribute to growth 
of the private sector and 
create jobs for the bottom 
40 percent. 
Tackling environmental 
challenges will reduce 
vulnerability of 
communities at most risk of 
droughts, sea level rise, 
crop loss and agricultural 
land degradation, water 
pollution, landslides due to 
deforestation, etc. 
Environmental management 
will also influence poverty 
in urban areas. 
Without a robust and 
well-financed pension 
scheme, Sri Lanka 
would leave older 
populations in poorer 
groups more vulnerable. 
Lack of fiscal space to 
support healthcare and 
elderly care needs would 
also hurt inclusion and 
reverse gains made on 
reducing poverty.  
TIME 
HORIZON 
Medium- to long-term Medium- to long-term Medium- to long-term Long-term Long-term 
COMPLEMENT 
-ARITIES 
Forging a sustainable 
political settlement to long-
standing fissures along ethnic 
and religious lines can 
improve inclusion, improve 
competitiveness of the 
economy, and make Sri 
Lanka an attractive 
investment destination. 
A more accountable and 
effective state can ensure 
better utilization of public 
finances and greater 
transparency and better 
governance can provide a 
more conducive 
environment for private 
sector activity. 
Enhancing FDI and equity 
flows can improve 
competitiveness with 
expanding productive 
capacity, opening to new 
markets, job creation, and 
technology transfer. 
Preserving Sri Lanka’s 
natural assets and 
environmental quality will 
have a positive spillover 
effect on improving 
competitiveness in 
economic sectors that rely 
on them, such as, tourism 
and agriculture.  
Decreasing tax revenues 
due to a smaller working 
age population would 
further constrain public 
finances. Sustainable 
financing for pensions 
would help ease the 
fiscal burden brought on 
by an ageing population.  
EVIDENCED-
BASED 
Strong. 
Substantial evidence on the 
impact of conflict on growth 
and human development 
outcomes. International 
evidence on risks of returning 
to conflict. 
Moderate Strong 
Substantial international 
evidence on the risks of 
reliance on external debt 
financing. 
Moderate Strong 
ESSENTIAL 
PRE-
CONDITION 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Notes: Short-term defined as 1-2 years; Medium-term as 3-5 years; Long-term as more than 5 years. 
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Appendix 2.1 Infrastructure  
 
Sri Lanka has taken significant strides in recent years to upgrade the amount and accessibility of 
infrastructure.  Whereas South Asian comparators continue to have infrastructure gaps that profoundly 
limit access for large segments of the population, Sri Lanka has a solid infrastructure base (Figures A3 and 
A4).  Going forward, the main issues for Sri Lanka’s infrastructure development lie primarily in terms of  
 
efficiency of operations and 
maintenance and the lack of an 
effective framework for soliciting 
private investment or more generally 
setting up public-private partnerships.  
Infrastructure has largely been 
financed by the budget, with the 
exception of some independent power 
generation plants and 
telecommunications networks.  
Access issues according to 2012/13 
HIES data are concentrated in 
conflict-affected areas in the North, 
though there has been visible 
improvement in that region.  The 
government has invested over 220 
billion rupees, or about 4.4 percent of 
its total expenditures (outside of interest payments) in infrastructure in the Northern Province alone over 
the past five years (Ministry of Finance 2014). 
Figure A3. Access to Infrastructure 
 
Source: World Development Indicators, 2012; note roads percentage for Sri Lanka is 2003 
Figure A4. Assessment of Overall Infrastructure by Firms 
 
Note:  Data based on an opinion survey of business executives.  Scale 
ranges from 1 to 7, where 7 is the best  
Source: World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Index 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Access to
electricity (% of
population)
Improved
sanitation facilities
(% of population
with access)
Improved water
source (% of
population with
access)
Roads, paved (% of
total roads)
India
South Asia
Thailand
Vietnam
Lower middle
income
Sri Lanka
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
5.5
6
2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2013-14 2014-15
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Vietnam
India
Malaysia
Pakistan
  165 
 
  
 
 
Nearly all households have regular access to electricity and power supply is expected to keep pace 
with an annual increase in demand of close to 10 percent, though this increase will need to be balanced 
to minimize environmental impacts.  Thanks in part to increased private-sector participation, there have 
been strong gains in recent years in reliability and accessibility of electricity (Figure A5). Recently added 
capacity has yielded a 94 percent electrification rate according to the Ceylon Electricity Board (CEB).  
HIES data for 2012/13 shows 96.6 percent of the population in general (94.2 percent for the bottom 40 
percent) had access to electricity, with post-conflict areas of Mullaitivu (58.3 percent) and Kilinochchi (40.3 
percent). 
Figure A5. Electricity Generation of Grid Power Plants, 1976-2012 
 
Source: Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 
 
as the major outliers (Figure 29).  Of greater issue 
is the cost of electricity, which appears to be 
driving the identification of power as a constraint 
as per the last enterprise survey in 2011, though 
recent tariff reductions of 25 percent have eased 
this burden. Costs are driven mostly by fuel 
imports for thermal generation. System losses 
have gone down from over 20 percent in 2000 to 
roughly 12 percent in 2011 (World Bank 2013).  
Notwithstanding this record, there is scope for 
improving efficiency in the power sector through 
optimizing dispatch from generation plants into 
the grid.  Thanks to tariff reforms and a write-
down of liabilities, the state-run CEB turned a net 
profit in 2013.  Future demand for energy is 
expected to be met almost entirely from coal-fired 
plants with a reduction in the use of fuel oil and 
hydropower staying level at around 4000 GWh 
per year and renewable sources modestly increasing from their current levels (Figure 30).  However, there 
is substantial potential and political willingness to develop the renewable energy sector through significant 
public and private investments with the aim to source a large share of the country’s future energy demand 
from renewable sources, focusing on wind, hydro and pumps-storage. 
Figure A6. Share of households with access to 
electricity 
 
Source: Own estimates, HIES 2012/13. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Overall Bottom 40%
Major Hydropower 
Thermal 
(Coal)  
New Renewable 
Thermal (Oil) 
  166 
 
  
 
 
Transport infrastructure has also been enhanced in recent years.  Roads now account for 95 percent of 
passenger travel and 98 percent of freight transport. Sri Lanka has a high density of roads providing for 
good accessibility to the population. Expanded efforts to devote more resources to rehabilitation have 
improved the condition of the overall network, though maintenance remains a primary concern.   Increasing 
congestion in urban areas is a growing issue owing to an expected doubling in modal share of private 
vehicles from 2010 to 2030 coupled with limitations on available road space as well as poor condition of 
public transport. Sri Lanka has built expressways connecting the Southern and Western Provinces and has 
plans to build an expressway network connecting the rest of the island.  Capital expenditure on roads has 
been financed through foreign borrowing (over half of which is from the Chinese Government) and 
government resources; private financing is expected to be sought for construction of the Northern 
Expressway.  The major issues facing the roads sector are deferring maintenance in a tight budget 
environment, contracting issues, and attracting private-sector financing. A 2013 report found in a sample 
of road rehabilitation contracts variations resulting in cost elevation from 38 percent to 53 percent and 
contract time extensions from the initial period up to completion from 7.5 percent to 180 percent (World 
Bank 2013). In addition, there are multiple cases of contracting without competitive selection, often owing 
to financing conditions from external lenders.   
 
Port capacity has been increased substantially in the past five years.  The expansion of the Colombo 
port increased capacity by 50 percent, including a recently completed new terminal under a build-operate-
transfer arrangement and the construction of a deep draft port in Hambanthota. Colombo is currently the 
27th busiest port in the world, handling about one-third as many containers as Dubai and one-sixth as many 
containers as Singapore in 2013 (Containerization International Yearbook 2013). 
 
Sri Lanka has had rapid growth in telecommunications infrastructure, making it a leader in the 
South Asia in Internet use and broadband take-up.  At the same time, Sri Lanka still lags behind many 
MIC competitors in use of ICT.  Internet penetration stands at nearly 22 percent, the highest among large 
SAR countries, but lower than MIC competitors in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand or Vietnam.  Similarly, 
Figure A7. Projected Growth of Electricity Generation, 2013-2032 
 
Source: Sri Lanka Sustainable Energy Authority 
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mobile telephony penetration rate is 95.5 percent, which is higher than the rest of larger SAR countries, but 
lower than other MICs or the Asia Pacific region as a whole, which is 120.3 percent (Figure A8).   Third-
generation (3G) services as a percentage of the entire mobile market is 4.4 percent compared to 41.2 percent 
in the Asia Pacific region. The mobile telephony market has five major companies of which two are 
dominant. Competition has led to some of the lowest data and voice rates in the world. However, the 
dynamics in Sri Lanka’s market are such that there is limited incentive for players to invest in increased 
broadband services in rural areas and new services, which in turn may delay the introduction of new, 
innovative services in the sector.   Despite concerns regarding broadband quality and cost, IT-enabled 
services and the software industry have grown rapidly in recent years, now accounting for $500 million in 
export receipts and around 70,000 employed.  Despite this success, there remains a workforce deficit in the 
ICT industry. 
While sector liberalization 
has supported the expansion 
of mobile services across the 
country, there are areas 
where ICT policy and 
regulation could be 
strengthened.  These areas 
include enforcing stronger 
compliance to high-quality 
standards for voice services and 
data speeds, encouraging faster 
broadband roll out in rural 
areas, and regulating equal and 
open access to essential 
facilities such as submarine 
landing stations and backbone 
networks.  Sri Lanka is also one 
of the few countries in the region that has not leveraged telecommunications infrastructure rollout by other 
utility providers such as the power transmission, railways and roads authorities.  An infrastructure sharing 
policy would help expand broadband services across the country, lower costs of service provision and 
provide for domestic network redundancies. 
 
Sri Lanka overall outperforms its South Asian comparators in providing for water and sanitation, 
but there is substantial differences within the country between urban, rural, and estate sectors.  As 
shown in Figure 26, Sri Lanka has slightly better indicators than South Asian peers and is comparable to 
LMICs in East Asia.  Pipe borne water supply coverage stands at 44 percent (2013, National Water Supply 
Drainage Board (NWSDB)) nationally; of which 34 percent is managed by the NWSDB and the rest are 
mainly community managed Rural Water Supply (RWS) schemes or schemes managed by the local 
authorities. The technical capacity for the operation and maintenance of an estimated 40 percent of the over 
4,000 RWS schemes in the country remains low, prompting the government to establish a new National 
Community Water Supply Department in the past year. Approximately 75 percent of the urban population 
has access to pipe borne water while around 20 percent of the rural population has such access. The quality 
Figure A8. Mobile telephony and internet penetration 
 
Source:  World Telecommunication/ICT Development Report, 2014 
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of service is also lower for communities in small towns and rural areas, where continuous 24-hour supply 
is a rarity. The water and sanitation service levels in the plantations (estate sector) remain far below the 
national average, with only sporadic investments having been made in these areas over the past few decades. 
Yet overall access to safe drinking water, which includes protected wells, is high and reported to be 85 
percent of the total population (NWSDB 2013) and 94 percent according to WHO/UNICEF Joint 
Monitoring Programme (JMP) figures of 2012 for water and sanitation released in 2014.  Similarly, the 
NWSDB estimates that 85.7 percent of the population has access to adequate sanitation; with 83.2 percent 
having onsite sanitation and 2.5 percent a piped system. The 2012/13 HIES data point to lower levels of 
access to water (62.2 percent of all households and 55.2 percent of the bottom 40 percent) and sanitation 
(47 percent of the overall population and 36.2 percent of the bottom 40 percent having a toilet on premises), 
with much lower levels of access in the Northern districts of Kilinochchi, Mulaitivuu, and Vavuniya.  The 
discrepancy is due in large part to the HIES not accounting for protected wells and RWS as access to water.  
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Appendix 2.2 Opportunities and Obstacles in Access to Finance 
 
Opportunities Obstacles 
Commercial banks have limited 
ability and to serve MSMEs. 
- Financial innovation among commercial banks (which dominate the financial 
sector in Sri Lanka) has been limited, with lending practices based on collateral 
and limited interest in development of other credit processes such as cash-flow-
based lending and financial instruments beyond loans. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that lack of competition (in spite of a large number of banks in the sector) 
has reduced incentives for innovation to target underserved economic segments. 
- Despite the high penetration of regulated financial institutions in Sri Lanka, an 
estimated 64 percent of micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) remain 
without checking or savings accounts (World Bank, 2014e), highlighting the need 
for both higher bank penetration, as well as opportunities for complementary non-
bank financial institutions to target underserved market segments. 
Credit infrastructure deficiencies 
limit the ability of lenders to 
identify creditworthy borrowers. 
- Credit bureau covers 44.5 percent of the population, and 30 percent of registered 
firms171. However important sources of information on creditworthiness, such as 
payment history with microfinance institutions and utilities, are not included in the 
information. 
- Movable collateral registries do not exist in Sri Lanka. This severely curtails the 
ability of firms and entrepreneurs to use non-real estate assets (eg. vehicles, 
machinery, inventory, accounts receivable) as security to their loans. This, together 
with the bank practices based on collateralization lead to major de-facto obstacles 
to borrowers, especially smaller ones, which account for 93 percent172 of the 
enterprise sector. 
Legal framework deficiencies 
enhance lenders’ risk aversion, 
increase cost of credit and reduce 
availability of finance. 
- Banks experience significant difficulties in case of borrowers’ default. Despite the 
existence of a separate Commercial Court, resolution of legal disputes takes on 
average 44 months, creates costs of more than 20 percent of the disputed value and 
requires more than 40 individual steps. Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests 
significant discretion in the application of laws resulting in unpredictability of 
judiciary processes. These deficiencies enhance banks’ risk aversion, which limits 
incentives to expand the borrower base, and fosters increasing collateralization 
requirements. The high cost of disputes resolution is passed on to borrowers as a 
higher cost of credit. 
- The existing Secured Transactions law in the country does not support the 
operationalization of the collateral registry in an enforceable manner.  
Limited development of financial 
instruments beyond traditional 
bank loans leaves important 
sectors and financial services needs 
underserved. 
- Factoring can enhance the ability of MSMEs to obtain financing for working 
capital by leveraging their otherwise idle accounts receivable. However, 
shortcomings in secured transactions framework hamper the viability of factoring 
as a financial product.  
- Operational leasing of equipment (an alternative to longer-term bank loans) has 
been hampered by deficiencies in secured transactions (see above) and the lack of 
a well-functioning movable collateral registry. 
- Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) can be an important source of financing for 
micro entrepreneurs, especially in rural areas. However, the lack of regulation 
and supervision of the MFI sector has led to a proliferation of lenders (estimated 
at more than 1,000) with anecdotal evidence of abuses on pricing and loan 
recovery practices. The lack of regulation of deposit-taking MFIs also creates 
significant risks for savers.  
- Insurance is significantly underdeveloped for an economy with the income and 
aspirations of Sri Lanka, leaving enterprises and individuals vulnerable to 
unforeseen events. Less than less than 15 percent of SMEs and less than 1 
percent of micro enterprises used any form of insurance. Personal insurance 
premiums account for 1.22 percent of GDP, well below the proportion in India, 
Malaysia and Thailand (4.10 percent, 4.92 percent and 4.07 percent, 
respectively).  
                                                          
171 Doing Business 2015  
172 Statistics Committee and IFC estimations. 
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Lack of consumer protection, 
financial literacy, and business 
development services expose the 
population to significant risks. 
- Lack of a well-defined consumer protection framework (including appointment 
and empowerment of an agency in charge of its enforcement) leave users of 
financial services unprotected against unfair practices by lenders.  
- Lack of financial literacy initiatives and business development services, especially 
targeting micro entrepreneurs and low-income individuals in urban and rural areas 
enhance the risk of over-indebtedness.  
Lack of financial innovation 
around remittances restricts their 
potential mobilization for 
investment. 
- Remittances represented about 10 percent of GDP and 86 percent of reserves in 
2014173.  But Sri Lanka has not leveraged fully the potential of remittances due to 
factors including: 
o High cost of formal channels with an average fee for remittances of more 
than 10 percent of the principal. This discourages the use of formal 
channels in favor of informal mechanisms, thereby limiting the flow and 
permanency within the financial sector. 
o Use of innovative cross-border money-transfer technologies through 
mobile phone platforms has not been developed in Sri Lanka, while it 
has proved a way to enhance accessibility and affordability of formal 
remittance channels in other countries in the region 
o Financial Innovation leveraging remittances flows has not taken place in 
Sri Lanka, while in other countries this has led to investment instruments 
linked to remittances including housing and larger investments (diaspora 
bonds).  
 
  
                                                          
173 Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
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